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TOWARD A STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF
ALLOCATION OF POW ERS: LEGISLATORS AND
LEGISLATIVE APPOINTEES PERFORMING
ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS

John Devlin*
The t hree-part division of sovereign authority among largely independent
legislative, executive, and judicial branches, and the competing principle of
"checks a n d balances" among those branches, have been and remain corner
stones of t h e American system of government, both state and federal. As any
graduate o f a junior high school civics class can attest, few propositions are re
garded as so basic. But, as any constitutional lawyer can also attest, few pro
positions are so difficult to define or apply consistently to actual issues of
governmental organization.
It is n o novel insight to note that the burgeoning administrative bureau
cracy, both federal and state, poses special and perhaps ultimately insoluble
problems for traditional "distribution of powers" analysis. 1

In exercising the

powers delegated to them, administrative agencies and officials typically exercise
all three types of powers, and are responsive to some degree of control by each of
the constitutional branches. 2

Thus administrative agencies and officials fit

poorly, if a t all, into the three-part conceptual framework underlying the federal
and state constitutions. 3 These conceptual problems have been exacerbated by
•
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I. With apologies for what may seem like unnecessary jargon, this article will use the descrip
tive phrase "separation of powers" solely for so much of the American theory of governance as
posits that the legislative, executive, and judicial branches ought be kept distinct and independent.
Where the theory is meant in its broader sense-incorporating "checks and balances" as well as pure
"separation" principles-the phrases "allocation of powers"
used.

or "distribution

of

powers"

will be

2. See generally Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 574-95 (1984) (discussing both legal theories and
practical politics of joint presidential and c o ngressional influence on federal agencies); Frank R.
Anderson e t al., A Symposium on Administrative Law: The Uneasy Constitutional Status of Adminis
trat ive Agencies, 36 A M. U. L. REV. 277 (1987) (addressing various aspects of issue).
3. The doctrinal difficulties posed by the growth of multi-function federal administrative agen
cies have b e e n repeatedly noted by Justices and commentators, usually with dismay. See, for exam
ple, the often cited lament of Justice Jackson:
[Federal administrative agencies] have become a veritable fourth branch of Government,
which has deranged our three-branch legal theories much as the concept of a fourth dimen·
sion unsettles our three dimensional thinking....
Administrative agencies have

been

called quasi-legislative, quasi-executive or quasi·

judicial, as the occasion required, in order to validate their functions within the separation-
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s, in both numbers and power, on
the massive growth of administrative agencie
both the state and federal levels.
The bulk of scholarly discussion on the distribution of powers in the admin

istrative context has focused on conflicts between Congress and the President
v. Valeo,4 INS v.
over control of federal agencies, where cases such as Buckley
d a large
have
engendere
7
Olson
v.
Chadha/' Bowsher v. Synar,6 and Morrison
body of commentary.s However, as the federal g overnment has shifted responsiof-powers scheme of the Constitution. The mere retreat to the qualifying phrase "quasi"' is
implicit with confession that all recognized classification s have broken down, and "quasi"'
is a smooth cover which we draw over our confusion as we might use a counterpane to
cover a disordered bed.
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487-88 (19 5 2 ) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Par
ticular government functions may be very difficult to assign to a particular Montesquieuian category.
See infra note 91. Instead, c hameleon-like, they may appear in different guises, depending on which

official is performing that function. See Freytag v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 2631, 2655 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.

714,

749 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
Some state court judges have likewise noted the impossibility of applying pure separation of

powers theory to the real world of the state administrative bureaucracy:
[S]trict application of the separation of powers doctrine is inappropriate today in a complex
state government where administrative agencies exercise many types of power including
legislative, executive and judicial powers often blended together in the same administrative
agency. The courts today have come to recognize that the political philosophers who de
veloped the theory of separation of powers did not have any concept of the com ple xities of
government as it exists today.
State ex rel. Schneider v. Bennett,
N.E.2d 476, 478 (Mass.

1974)

547

P.2d 786,

791 (1976);

see also Opinion of the Justices, 309

(noting growth of administrative agencies "has som et im e s tended to

obscure admittedly indistinct boundary lines between the three branches" and administrative activi
ties cannot always be readily classified as executive, legislative, or judi c ial in nature).
Other state courts and judges have, however, steadfastly resisted th e emergence of what they see
as an extra-constitutional "fourth branch" of governme n t , and have insisted that administrative
officials and actions be clearly located in one or another o f the traditional branches. See, e.g., Legis
lative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907,

916-17

(Ky. 1984) (declaring unconstitutional

attempt to designate legislatively dominated LRC as "independent"' agency wi t h executive powers,
on grounds that "[t]here is, simply put, no fourth branch of government" and that s uch legislative
organ can exercise only legislative powers); Herman Bros., Inc. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
564 So 2d 294, 298 (La. 1990) (Cole, J., concurring) (noting "absurdity of the Commission's plenary
:
authonty argument, the continued pursuit of which exhibits constitutional illusions of being a fourth
branch of government"').

(1976).
(1983).
714 (1986).
654 (1988).

4. 424 U.S. 1

5. 462 U.S. 919
6. 478 U.S.
7. 487 U.S.

8· The commentary is far too numerous
to catalogue. For a partial and somewhat eclectic
see generally Rebecca L. Brown, Separated
Powers & Ordered Liberty ' 139 U. PA. L. REV.
.
1513 1515 -16 (1991) (ag reemg that courts
should address separation of powers issues onl y when
'
bra ches of government pose threat to integrity
of institutio nal process); Stephen L. Carter, Consti·
tut1ona/ Improprieties· ReRec
"' ' tions on M'1stretta, Morrison, & Administrati Government, 51 u CH I
ve
L. R EV. 357 391-98 (1990) (criticizing
courts' reliance on original intent); E. Donald Elliott, Why
:
Ou � ���ration of P�we rs Jurisprudence
is So Abysmal, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506, 530-31 (1989)
.
(cnttclZlng current Junsp
rudence fior �
1mg to d1stmgu1sh between interpretation and htera l'ism)·
ia1
.
R.1chard J. Pierce, Jr., Morrison v.
01son, separation of Powers & the Structure of Government, 1988
sample,

·

·

�

·

·

·

·

·

·

·

·

·

·

·
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bilities and discretion to the states, state administrative agencies have come to
approach their federal counterparts in size and power.9 Thus, the issues posed
by these battles for influence on the machinery of government have become sali
ent on the state level as well.
The institutional arrangements by which state legislatures may attempt to
assert effective influence over the process of administering state government are
many and v aried. Legislatures may attempt to draft statutes "tightly" so as to
leave little r o o m for administrative discretion, 10 or may assert authority to re-

SUP. Cr. REV. 1, 9-20 (reviewing current theories on separation of powers); Thomas 0. Sargentich,
The Contemporary Debate About Legislative-Executive Separation of Powers, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
430, 475-79 (1987) (arguing that courts should review separation of powers issues by considering
ideals of administrative process); Robert L. Stern, The Separation of Powers Cases: Not Really a
Mess, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 461 (1989); Peter L. Strauss, Formal & Functional Approaches to Separation
of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 490-96 (1987) (advocat
ing functional a n alysis); Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law & the Idea ofInde
pendence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 305-07 (1989) (advocating rule of law analysis).
9. See generally ALAN ROSENTHAL, GOVERNORS AND LEGISLATORS: CONTENDING POWERS

I, 167-213 (1990) (describing both expansion of state regulatory activity and resulting struggles be
tween governors and legislatures over effective control of this expanding government).
10. At one time, the so-called "nondelegation" doctrine required both Congress and state legis
latures to draft statutes in precisely this fashion. That doctrine was ultimately rooted in separation
of powers concerns, in that it was intended to prevent Congress from transferring its core lawmaking
functions to executive or quasi-executive bodies. The doctrine purported to require legislative bod
ies, state or federal, to determine conclusively in advance all significant issues of policy, and allowed
administrative officials only very limited discretion to "fill up the details" or apply clear statutory
standards to particular cases. See, e.g., United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 (1911) (holding
statutes granting authority to make administrative rules not improper delegations of legislative
power); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 496-97 (1904)(requiring Congress to legislate as far as
is "reasonably practical," and to leave duty of carrying out statutory result to executive); King v.
Concordia Fire Ins. Co., 103 N.W. 616, 620 (Mich. 1905) (holding that statute allowing insurance
commission to choose policy form was paramount to allowing agency to make law and was therefore
unconstit utio nal).
However, it eventually became apparent, a t least to the federal courts, that these formulations
were too restrictive, and that a generalist Congress was simply unable to make all of the substantive
decisions required by the growing federal government. In J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928), Justice Taft reformulated the responsibility of Congress to provide only
some "intelligible principle" sufficient to guide administrators who exercise discretion and reviewing
courts who review that exercise. Id. at 406-09. Modem federal courts have interpreted this require
ment very leniently, permitting very broad delegations of power with only the most minimal of
statutory guidelines. See, e.g., Touby v. United States, Il l S. Ct. 1752, 1756 (1991) (upholding
delegati on to Attorney General of authority to add drugs temporarily to schedules of controlled
substa nces); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-74 (1989) (upholding Congress's delega
tion of sentencing guidelines to independent sentencing commission).
Many state courts have come to conclusions broadly similar to those of the federal authorities.
Though the formulation most frequently used by the state courts-that the legislature provide suffi
cient "standards" for administrative action-is perhaps more susceptible to restrictive interpreta
tions than is the federal "intelligible principle" language, state courts have, on many occasions,
permitted broad delegations of authority to state administrative agencies and officials. See, e.g.,
Warren v. Boucher, 543 P.2d 731, 734 (Alaska 1975) (permitting state officials to determine similar
ity of proposal and existing act not unconstitutional delegation of judicial power); State v. Arizona
Mines Supply Co., 484 P.2d 619, 624-26

(Ariz.

1971) (upholding statute that "reasonably inferred"

executive enforcement standards under state's police power); Department of Transp. v. City of At-
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h a "legislative veto" annulling
view particular agency actions, 11 either throug
mechanisms of legislative rethat action12 or through other, less coercive
creating state commission comprise d of
lanta, 398 S.E.2d 567, 571 (Ga. 1990) (upholding statute
v. Odom, 470 So. 2d 988, 991executive members to approve taking of municipal property); Johnson
of pesticide regulations on
nt
enforceme
s
92 (La. Ct. App.) (upholding state advisory committee'
355 (La. 1985); Sullivan
2d
So.
76
4
denied,
cert.
discretion),
grounds that they involved no agency
1972)(upholding "broad"
(N.Y.
606-07
603,
N.E.2d
283
Glasser,
v.
Ass'n
Racing
Harness
County
racing industry); Bauer v.
regulatory powers conferred on state commission to regulate harness
(holding statute allowing
1978)
(S.C.
876-77
South Carolina State Hous. Auth., 246 S.E.2d 869,
did not vest "unbri
bonds,
and
notes
issue
and
rates
interest
maximum
set
to
state housing authority
dled" discretion in agency); Lobelville Special Sch. Dist. v. McCanless, 381 S.W.2d 273, 276(Tenn.
decision);
1964) (upholding agency determinations where statutory guidelines followed in reaching
to
Approaches
Michigan
and
Federal
the
of
Comparison
A
see generally Mark N. Mathias, Note,
of
development
(tracing
(1985)
139-42
135,
REV.
L.
EY
L
COO
3
Rulemaking,
Administrative

nondelegation doctrine in Michigan). This lenient approach is not u niversal, however. Unlike fed
eral courts, which have not struck down a federal statute on nondelegation grounds for almost 60
years, state courts have proven quite willing to declare state delegations unconstitutional for failure

to provide sufficient restraints upon administrative discretion. See, e.g., D.P. v. Florida, 597 So. 2d
952, 955 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (prohibiting state agency from "criminalizing" escapes from

juvenile residential facilities); Commissioner of Agric. v. Plaquemines Parish Comm'n Council, 439
So. 2d 348, 350 (La. 1983) (holding statute lacking sufficient guidelines gave agency "unfettered"
discretion to regulate pesticides); Missouri v. Raccagno, 530 S.W.2d 699, 704(Mo. 1975) (voiding
agency's determination that failure to collect cigarette taxes was unlawful); Chapel v. Common
wealth, 89 S.E.2d 337, 343(Va. 1955) (holding legislature may not confer broad powers to regulate
dry cleaning industry without statutory guidelines); Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co., 371 P.2d
409, 418-19(Wyo. 1962)(striking down State Fair Trade Act which left legislative duty of enforce
ment to judiciary via private parties).
Regardless of the nuances of state nondelegation Jaw, however, statutory draftsmanship is un
likely to prove an effective mechanism for asserting legislative control over administrators. The
practical impediments are simply too great. While state legislatures may not be required to deal with
quite the same range of issues as Congress, their responsibilities are still far too broad to permit
detailed consideration of every issue of state governance. Similarly, it is not possible for statutory
drafters to anticipate all of the circumstances that may arise in the future. Thus, delegation of
substantial discretion cannot be completely avoided, and the best that a legislature can hope fo r i s to
retain some measure of influence on how that discretion is exercised.
11. Mechanisms for legislative review of administrative rulemaking were popular in the states.
By the middle of the 1980s, more than two-thirds of the states had some kind of provision for s u c h
legislative review. See Barbara L. Borden, Comment, Legislative Review of Agency Rules i n Arizona:
A Constitutional Analysis, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 493, 526 n.275 (1985) (listing 37 state legislative
oversight provisions of various types); see generally L. Howard Levinson, Legislative & Executive
Veto of Rules of Administrative Agencies: Models and Alternatives, 24 WM. & MARYL. REV. 79, 96-

105 ( 1982) (discussing models other than one or two house vetoes).
12. While some arguments for the viability of state legislative vetoes have been made, see, e.g.,
. .
Wilham J. Pohlman, Comment, The Continued Viability of Ohio's Procedure for Legislative
Review of
Agency Rules in the Post-Chadha Era, 49 Omo ST. L.J. 251, 268-72 (1988),
state courts have uni

�orml y struck down mechanisms that purport to give the legislature broad power to overrule admin-

_
1strauve
regulations �ithout presentment to the governor, on grounds
that such arrangements
_
violate state constitutional mandates regarding the mechanics
of law making, separation of powers,
or both. Courts have so held re�ardless of whether the veto was
to be exercised by particular legislative committees, see, e.g., Opm1on of the Justices, 431
A.2d 783 , 786-89 (NH
. . 1981) (expressing
opm1on
that 1eg1s
· ·
· 1alive veto not unconstitutional per se but
couId b e 1·f 1·t aII ows smaJI groups m
.
House or Senate to exercise control over executive
functions); State ex rel. Barker v. Manchi n, 279
S.E.2d622,630-36(W.Va 198 l)(void ing veto
power of l 2-person leg1slat1ve committee regulating
mme safety) , or by the legislature as a whole. See, e.g.,
State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769,
·

·

·

·

.

·

·

·

·
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view.13 Alternat ively, or in addition, legislatures may use their powers of appro
priation14 or various non-statutory means15 to pressure administrators to reach
775-79 (Alaska 1980) (voiding statutory provision by which vote of both Houses could annul agency
regulation of lotteries); Opinion of the Justices, 429 N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (Mass. 1981); General As
sembly of N.J. v. Byrne, 448 A.2d 438, 443-47 (N.J. 1982) (voiding legislative veto provisions in
Legislative Oversight Act on grounds it impeded executive enforcement of law); Commonwealth v.
Sessoms, 5 3 2 A.2d 775, 778-82 (Pa. 1987) (distinguishing Chadha on ground that agency at issue not
charged with execution of laws, but nevertheless concluding legislative disapprovals must be
presented to g overnor). However, more limited legislative vetoes have sometimes been upheld. See,
e.g., Enourato v. New Jersey Bldg. Auth., 448 A.2d 449, 451 (N.J. 1982) (holding legislature's au
thority to veto narrowly-defined class of building projects sufficiently within scope of legislative over
sight of executive action); Opinion of the Justices, 266 A.2d 823, 826 (N.H. 1970) (approving
proposed amendment requiring committee authorization of certain state personnel salary changes);
see generally Scott Welman, Comment, Joint Committee on Administrative Rules: The Missouri Leg
islature's Disregard for the Missouri Constitution, 58 UMKC L. REV. 113, 113-16 (1989) (criticizing
use of legislative veto in Missouri); Richard Lee Slater, Note, Oklahoma's Legislative Veto: Combat
Casualty in Separation of Powers War, 12 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 129, 147-59 (1987) (examining
historical uses of legislative veto in Oklahoma).

At least two states, Connecticut and Iowa, have enacted constitutional amendments authorizing
legislative vetoes passed by both houses of the legislature. ROSENTHAL, supra note 9, at 184.

13. Actual and proposed mechanisms usually involve some form of legislative committee gener
ally charged with the responsibility of reviewing proposed administrative rules and regulations.

They differ, however, as to the consequences of legislative disagreement. Committees may have the
power to suspend rules temporarily pending p ossible modification by ordinary statute; to require the
agency to reopen the rulemaking process in order to consider proposed changes; to publish an "ob

jection" that has the effect of reversing the ordinary p resumption of validity if the rule is challenged
in court; or simply to make recommendations for legislative action to the legislature

as

a whole,

which again must be accomplished by ordinary statute. See generally ROSENTHAL, supra note 9, at
184 - 9 3 (describing various methods of legislative control); Ran Coble, Executive-Legislative Rela
tions in North Carolina: Where We Are & Where We Are Headed, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 673,
690-93 (1990) (discussing various incarnations of North Carolina Administrative Rules Review
Committee); Philip P. Frickey, The Constitutionality of Legislative Committee Suspension of Admin
istrative R ules: The C ase of Minnesota, 70 MINN. L. REV. 1237, 1259-67 (1986) (arguing legislative
suspension of administrative rules violates separation of powers); Levinson, supra note 11, at 79-105
(comparing federal and state models for legislative veto powers); David S. Neslin, Comment, Quis
Custodiet Ipsos C ustodes?: Gubernatorial & Legislative Review of Agency Rulemaking Under the 1981
Model Act, 57 WASH. L. REV. 669, 680 -82, 686 - 96 (1982) (critiquing various mechanisms of legisla
tive review included in 1981 Model State A dministrative Procedure Act).

At least two states have agreed with P rofessor Frickey that a mechanism that allows a legisla
tive committee unilaterally to suspend an a d ministrative rule violates separation of powers princi
ples. See Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 917-19 (Ky. 1984) (striking

down statute requiring committee approval of agency regulations); State ex rel. Stephan v. Kansas
House of Representatives, 687 P.2d 622, 634. 38 (Kan. 1984) (striking down statute allowing legisla
ture to adopt, modify, or revoke administrative rules and regulations without governor's approval).

In contrast, South Dakota's State Constitutio n specifically permits a suspensive legislative veto. S.D.
CONST. art. Ill, § 30.
14. This power of appropriation is significant because all state constitutions requ ire legislative
appropriation as a p recond ition to spending money. While the process of setting the budget is, in
most cases, do minated by the governors, see generally ROSENTHAL, supra note 9, at 131-62, the need
for administrators to appeal to legislative appropriations committees for actual funding of those
budget requests, and the ever-present threat to use that power to retaliate against administrators who
displease the legislature, are powerful tools.

ROSENTHAL, supra note 9, at 175, 181. Such power is

not without limits however. The role of governors in crafting initial budget requests and the power
held by many to reduce or veto particular budgetary line items gives the governors a similar club to
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results compatible with legislative policy preferences. Finally, legislatures may
use their power to structure state government to vest administrative duties in
themselves or in officials that the legislature may appoint.
Though each of these mechanisms is importan t and worthy of comparative
study, this article will focus solely on the last method of asserting influence listed
above-legislative efforts to vest themselves or their appointees with administra
tive powers. Such efforts clearly present a number of challenges to constitu
tional theory. Obviously, attempts by legislatures to vest executive authority in
their members or appointee s may violate traditional principles of separation of
policymaking and policy-executing powers on several grounds.16 Moreover, de
pending on how these efforts are structured, they may fall afoul of state constitu
tional provisions vesting specific powers and duties in the governor, 17 restricting
the length of legislative sessions, 18 or barring legislators from holding particular
offices.19 Various courts that have been called upon to decide these issues have,
not surprisingly, reached divergent conclusions as to the constitutionality of
such efforts by legislatures. However, as will be developed below, those differhold over the heads of administrators. See generally Coble, supra note 13, at 678-87 (1990) (describ
ing legal battles that eventually vindicated governor's power to prepare budget recommendation free
of legislative influence, and legislature's responses); Antonia C. Moran, Note, Expenditure Control:
Balancing the Constitutional Powers in Connecticut, 20 C ONN . L. REV. 953, 1008-27 (1988) (tracing
growth of gubernatorial power over budget and over state administrative agencies in modem era).
15. See ROSENTHAL, supra note 9, at 173-76 (discussing oversight and intervention by standing
committees and individual legislators). As Professor Rosenthal sum marizes:
Although the governor is the chief administrator, it is not unusual for the head of a depart
ment to spend as much time relating to the legislature as to the governor and the gover
nor's staff. Nor is it unusual for those at the top of the ladder in career service to spend
more time trying to pacify the legislature than trying to figure out what the governor might
want to do. The governor's concern is episodic, the legislature's - through one house or
the other, a single committee or several, and any number of individual members - is
continuous. Some legislator is always on the bureaucracy's b a ck. Moreover, "bureaucrats
fear legislators" because legislators are "important, abrasive, insistent and vindictive."
Id. at 173-74 (quoting WILLIAM T. GORMLEY, JR., TAMING THE BUREAUCRACY 221 (1989)).
16. A number of constitutional objections may be raised. The mere exercise of a power of
appointment may itself be considered essentially "executive" in nature and thus beyond a legisla tor's

legitimate authority. Performance of administrative functions by individual legislators may violate
state "incompatibility" clauses. Finally, any attempt to exercise indirect control over the adminis
tration of laws through appointment of administrators may violate basic allocation of powers princi

ples by im�ermissibly joining lawmaking and law-applying power or by infringing on the ability o f
t h e e xecuti e branch t o carry out i t s constitutionally assigned duties. See infra notes 129-221 a n d
:
accompanymg text.

17 Two types of such provisions that can be found in many state constitutions are those grant
.
m the governor general power to appoint administrative officials,
and those vesting the governor
�
with a duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed. See infra
notes 65-66 74.77 115-19 135 - 36
and accompanying text.
·

'

'

'

18. See infra notes 83-84, 211-14 and accompanying
text.
19'
on lauses barring legislators from holding particula
?
r offices are of two types: "in�
.
compatt. bthty prov1s1ons which bar a leg1s1ator from
hoId'mg executive office or exerc1smg executtve
.
.
.
auth nty while simultan eously retainin g his legislative
seat; and "ineligibility" provisions which bar
�
. g an office
a l gislator from occupyin
which has had its pay or benefits increase during that legisla
d
tor s tenn. Only th first type of clause raises true
distribution of powers issues. See infra notes 120�
3 I and accompanying text.

� �'."

·

·

�

.

·
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ences do not seem to be the result of differences in constitutional texts or history,
but rather of the real debate over how distribution of powers principles common
to all American constitutions should be applied to state governance.
This ongoing debate regarding the emerging state constitutional law of sep
aration of powers has been obscured by the relative lack o f scholarly commen
tary discussing these issues in a specifically state constitutional and comparative
context. With few exceptions, commentary on state constitutional separation of
powers questions has tended to focus on particular states viewed in isolation;20
comparisons between the states and the federal government have generally been
limited to a restricted range of separation of powers issues.21

This paucity of

analysis directed at the consequences of the pervasive differences between federal
and state governments for purposes of allocation of powers analysis has had
unfortuna t e results. In particular, it has led some state courts to rely excessively
on federal precedents, or otherwise to fail to focus on the relevant differences
between states and the federal government with respect to these issues.
The thesis of this article is that there are systematic differences between the
federal government and the states with respect to their constitutions and their
place in the American scheme of government, and that these differences make
the development of an independent theory of state constitutional allocation of
governmental powers both possible and desirable. While a full articulation of
such a theory is surely beyond the scope of any single article, 22 the effort here
will be t o look at a particular set of issues, that is, those posed by the perform
ance of administrative functions by legislators or legislative appointees, as a first
step toward sketching what an independent state-based approach might entail.
Accordingly, Part I sets the stage by briefly laying out basic principles and cur
rent federal law, and then argues that the structural differences between states
20. One major exception to this sweeping generalization is exemplified in Professor Bruff's
analysis of selected separation of powers issues under the Texas Constitution, which paid careful
attention to relevant differences between state and federal governments. See generally Harold H.
Bruff, Separation of Powers Under the Texas Constitution, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1 337 (1990). Other
pieces taking a broader comparative view include Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Eligibility of Public Of
ficers and Employees to Serve in the State Legislature: An Ess ay on Separation of Powers, Politics. and
Constitutionai Policy, 1 988 UTAH L. REV. 295; and John V. Orth, Forever Separate and Distinct:
Separation of Powers in North Carolina, 62 N.C. L. REv. 10- 1 4 (1983) (comparing jurisdiction deci
sional law o n separation of powers).
2 1 . See, e.g., Louis Fisher & Neil Devins, How Successfully Can the State's Item Veto be Trans
ferred to the President?, 75 GEO. L.J. 159, 1 88 - 95 ( 1 986) (discussing item veto provision ofBalanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1 985); Levinson, supra note 1 1, at 85-86 (discussing
various models of legislative and executive veto power); Neil C. McCabe, Four Faces of State Consti
tutional Law: C hallenges to Speedy Trial and Speedy Disposition Provisions, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 1 77,
209- 1 4 (1989) (discussing implications of state speedy trial provisions for federal Speedy Trial Act).
22. Any complete theory of allocation of powers under state constitutions would clearly require
consideration of a host of issues. Some, including the related issues of the non-delegation doctrine,
legislative vetoes and their less coercive variants, and informal legislative oversight over administra
tion, have already been mentioned. See discussion supra notes 1 1 - 1 3. Other important issues in
clude: (I) the scope of the governor's powers to oversee the state administrative process and, in
particular, the relations between governors and other statewide elected officials; (2) line item vetoes,
and the other infinite permutations on the theme of shared control of state budgeting; and (3) the
host of problems involved in state judicial review of administrative action.
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and the federal government are so significant that they preclude reliance on fed
eral law as a guide to the resolution of state separation of powers problems. Part
II focuses on state court decisions and argues that the structural similarities
among states are sufficient for them to be considered together as part of a unified
field of inquiry. Part II then briefly surveys and critiques relevant state constitu
tional texts and decisions dealing with the power of legislators or legislative ap
pointees to exercise administrative functions. It finally attempts to sketch the
possible outlines of a state-based approach, arguing that the "pragmatic" ap
proach of the better reasoned state cases is both compatible with the original
beliefs and intentions of the founding generation, and appropriate in light of
specific policy concerns posed by state-level governmental innovation.
I. DECLARING INDEPENDENCE: ON THE PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY OF
FEDERAL PRECEDENT TO ISSUES OF SHARED CONTROL OF ST A TE
ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS
A. Basic Concepts and Federal Analysis
The principle of separation of powers is not explicitly stated in the Federal
Constitution, but is instead implicit in the clauses that "vest" the legislative,
executive, and judicial powers of the federal government in Congress, the Presi
dent, and the federal courts, respectively.23 It is clear that the founders intended
to separate the powers of the new national government into three branches, but
that they did not embrace any "pure" concept of separation of powers. Rather,
the government they created was a compromise between two somewhat inconsis
tent approaches, partially embodying both the conceptual distinctions drawn by
Montesquieu and others among different types of power, and the English tradi
tion of "mixed government," characterized by a system of checks and balances
among different governmental institutions. 24 These competing principles have
given rise in the federal cases to two distinct lines of analysis. One line, which
may be referred to as the "formalist" or "conceptual" approach, requires classi23. U.S. CONST. art. I, §

1, art. II,

§1

& art. III,

§ l. Despite the lack of an explicit statement

in the Federal Constitution, it has never been doubted that some form of separation was intended.

See Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201 (1928) (noting while some state constitutions
expressly provide for separation of powers, and others, like the Federal Constitution, do not, princi
ple is "implicit in all"). Indeed, one of the major motivations for the creation of the Constitution
was the perceived need to improve the efficiency of the federal government by removing day-to-day
administrative tasks from the purview of the original Congress established by the Articles of Confed
eration.

See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 115-16 (1926) (quoting James Madison, ANNALS
581 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)).

Of CONGRESS

24. The fullest account of the emergence and interaction of these two concepts can be found in
21-118 (1967) tracing the

M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION Of POWERS

development of such doctrines from classical times to the British Constitution in the late eighteenth
century.

See also W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING Of THE SEPARATION Of POWERS 24-27 (1965)

(describing emergence of British notion of mixed government, and distinguishing it from concept of

An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and
L. REV. 211, 214 (1989) (tracing evolution of separation of powers
doctrine during constitution-making period in U.S.); Matheson, supra note 20, at 304-05 (describing
separation of powers); Gerhard Casper,

Practices, 30 WM.

& MARY

separation of powers theories in United States during revolutionary period).
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fication of governmental functions as either "executive," "legislative," or "judi
cial" in nature, and as signs plenary control accordingly.25 Under this analysis,
mechanisms by which the executive and legislative branches may share control
of administrative organs are always suspect and usually prohibited. 26 The other
line of analysis, which can be referred to as the "functionalist" or " checks and
balances" approach, focuses on the need to preserve a dynamic balance of effec
tive power among the constitutional branches, and usually involves an es sen
tially a d hoc inquiry into the effect of a particular institutional arrangement on
the autonomy and core functions of those branches.27

Under this approach,

novel institutional arrangement s mixing conceptually distinguishable personnel

25. This conceptual approach is generally labeled "formalist." Statements of the principle can
be found in federal cases stretching back many years, including the following classic formulations:
[T]he Constitution was so framed as to vest in the Congress all legislative powers therein
granted, to vest in the President the executive power, and to vest i n one Supreme Court
and such inferior courts as Congress might establish, the judicial power. From this divi
sion in principle, the reasonable construction of the Constitution must be that the branches
should be kept separate in all cases in which they were not expressly blended, and the
Constitution should be expounded to blend them no more than it affirmatively requires.
Myers v. U nited States, 272 U.S. 52, 1 16 (1926), overruled by INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
It may be stated then, as a general rule inherent in the American constitutional sys
tem, that, unless otherwise expressly provided or incidental to the powers conferred, the
legislature cannot exercise either executive or judicial power; the executive cannot exercise
either legislative or judicial power; the judiciary cannot exercise either executive or legisla
tive power ....
Legislative power, as distinguished from executive power, is the authority to make
laws, but not to enforce them or appoint the agents charged with the duty of such enforce
ment. The latter are executive functions.
Springer v.Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 1 89, 201-02 ( 1 928). The Supreme Court has continued to
employ this type of analysis in many, but not all, recent cases. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
714, 715 ( 1 986) (officer subservient to Congress may not be assigned "executive" powers); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 1 42 ( 1 976) (only officials appointed by President in accordance with Appoint
ments Clause may perform "executive" duties).
26. See, e.g., Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 734 (striking down, on formalist grounds, statute vesting
"executive" authority to trigger automatic budget cuts in official ultimately responsible to Congress);
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983) (declaring unconstitutional all "legislative vetoes" of ad
ministrative decisions); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 140-41 (striking down statute granting executive en
forcement authority to Commission comprised mainly of congressional officers or appointees).
The classic statement of the consequences of such formalist analysis for any attempt by Con
gress to share in or oversee the administration of its laws can be found in Justice Burger's peroration
in Bowsher:
(A]s Chadha makes clear, once Congress makes its choice in enacting legis lation, its partic
ipation ends. Congress can thereafter control the execution of its enactment only indi
rectly-by passing new legislation. (citation omitted] By placing the responsibility for
execution of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act in the hands of an
officer who is subject to removal only by itself, Congress in effect has retained control over
the execution of the Act and intruded into the executive function. The Constitution does
not permit such intrusion.
478

U.S. at 733-34.
27. This approach is generally labeled "functionalist." The principle seems to have been im
plicit in Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631-32 (1935). which held that Con
gress could limit the power of the President to remove members of "independent" regulatory
agencies exercising quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. However, the principle received its
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or functions, or limiting the President's effective control of administrative offi
cials, are permissible so long as they preserve that dynamic balance bet"'.een the
branches and do not threaten the ability of any branch to carry out its core
responsibilities. 28
It is a gross understatement to say that the United States Supreme Court's
analysis of separation of powers issues has been the subject of intense scholarly
criticism. The Court's reasoning and results have been variously described as
"an incoherent muddle,"29 "abysmal,"30 and a "mess."3 1 The critique has re
sulted only in part from the inherent shortcomings of the two lines of analysis
sketched above--that government operations often cannot realistically be catefirst clear statement from Justice Jackson, who clearly rejected definitional approaches and empha
sized that the powers of the constitutional branches often mix and overlap:
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform to
judicial definitions of the power of any o f its branches based upon isolated clauses or even
single Articles tom from context. While the Constitution diffuses power the better to se
cure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a
workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, au
tonomy but reciprocity.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 ( 1 952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
Although no single canonical statement of what this analysis requires has yet been articulated,
its core elements can be gathered from a number of statements in the opinions of its adherents. As

applied to problems of government structure, the essential inquiry was formulated in terms of pre
serving the "balance" among the branches, ensuring that no branch was hindered in carrying out its
core functions, and preventing any branch from unduly aggrandizing itself at the expense of another.
See, e.g. , Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 3 6 1 , 380-83 (1 989) (defending "flexible" approach to
separation of powers concerns and defining essential issue as whether proposed arrangement will
"undermine authority and independence of one or another coordinate Branch, the extent to which [a
provision of law] prevents [a branch] from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions," or
whether it "impermissibly threatens the institutional integrity of" one of the branches); Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689-91 , 693-94 (1988) (defining inquiry variously as whether Congress has
"unduly" i n terfered with President's exercise of executive power and constitutional duty to "take
care that the laws be faithfully executed," as whether the case presents "an attempt by Congress to
increase its o w n powers at the expense of the Executive Branch," or whether case poses "a danger of
congressional usurpation of Executive Branch functions"); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 7 14, 770
( 1 986) (White, J., dissenting) (defining whether there is "a genuine threat of encroachment or ag

grandizement of one branch at the expense of the other" (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I , 122
( 1 976)); INS v . Chadha, 462 U.S. 9 1 9, 1000 ( 1 983) (White, J., dissenting) ("[l]n determining
whether the Act disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches, the proper inquiry
focuses on the extent to which it prevents [one of the branches] from performing its constitutionally
_
assigned fun ttons.
[and] whether that impact is justified by an overriding need to promote
·
.
obiect1ves wi t i n the const1tut1onal authority of Congress.") (quoting
Nixon v. Administrator of
Gen. Servs., 4 3 3 U.S . 425, 443 ( 1 977)).
See ' e g. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 3 80 - 4 1 2 ( 1 989) (finding no consti
tutional violation in Con.
gress
. .s creation of United States Sentencing Commission as body composed o f bo th JU
" · 1 and non· d 1c1a
.
.
.
judicial
appointees, charged with quasi-legislative functions,
and located within judicial branch);
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U S 654 693-97 ( 1 9 88) (hold'
mg c ongress may secure mdependence
·
of
.
special counsel charged wuh mvesttgatmg
executive branch m1scon
·
·
of
d uct b y d epnvmg
executive
· ·
hnth power t o choose such counsel and power to
remove them , except '"
1or good cause) .
2'l. See Br w n supra note 8 at 1 5 1 7 & n . JO (I"1stmg
·
·
·
1mpress1ve
roster of articles highly critical
of Court s analysis, or lack thereof).
JO. Elliott, .tupra note 8, at 506.
.1 1 . S t p n L. Carter, The Independent
Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L. REV.
105 ( 1988) .
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gorized i n the way that the formalist theory requires,3 2 and that the balancing
test which lies at the core of the "functionalist" approach often leads to ad hoc
and apparently unprincipled decisions. 33 The depth of the critique reflects the
Court's apparently unpredictable vacillations between those approaches, and its
failure to articulate a clear and convincing theory to undergird its decision to
apply a particular approach in a particular case. 34
Nonetheless, despite these problems of theory, the outline of the current
distribution of powers between Congress and the President i s becoming tolerably
clear, at least as applied to specific issues regarding control and staffing of the
federal administrative bureaucracy. Federal government agencies are created by
Congress, under organic acts which determine not only the agencies' existence,
but also their composition, mission, powers, and level of independence. 35 Con
gress may delegate substantial power and discretion to agencies or officials, pro
vided only that Congress articulate by statute some "intelligible principle" on
which officials and reviewing courts may rely to ensure that the policies estab
lished by the legislative branch are being followed. 36 Congress may and does
exercise various forms of informal supervision over agencies and officials

32. See , e. g. , Brown, supra note 8, at 1 523-27 (warning of consequences of formalist approach);
Sargen tich, supra note 8, at 437- 38 (discussing reasons for growing disenchantment with formalist
approaches); Pierce, supra note 8, at 2-6 (critiquing Justice Scalia's formalist "vision" in Morrison

v.

Olson).
T h e problems here go deep. The first requirement of any "categorical" analysis is to define the
relevant categories clearly. However, the Court's attempts to define and distinguish the concepts of
'"legislative," "executive," and "judicial" power have not to date proven particularly helpful in
resolving hard cases. Thus, for example, in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983), Chief Justice
Burger, writing for the majority, held that t h e action by one branch of Congress to reverse a deporta
tion decision was "legislative" in nature because all congressional acts fall presumptively into that
category, because that "had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, d u ties, and relations of
persons,"' a n d because Congress could have achieved the same result by statute. Id. at 952-53. In
contrast, Justice Powell, concurring, would have classified the same act as "j udicial" in nature be
cause it d i d not enact a general rule, but rather applied that rule to a particular person. Id. at 964 65. I n a n y case, both definitions are clear l y overbroad. Many undoubtedly executive and judicial
acts-such as awarding a government contract or j u d icial construction of a statute-surely affect
individuals' rights and duties, and could j u st as surely be accomplished by legislation.
many clearly executive decisions-such

as

Likewise,

deciding which applicant will be awarded a valuable li

cense-involve application of general criteria to individuals.

33. See , e.g. , Sargentich, supra note 8, at 439- 44 ( discussing two models of functionalist under
standing of s eparation of powers problems); see generally Carter, supra note 8, at 357-64 (criticizing

recent functionalist decisions in Morrison and Mistretla).
34. See, e.g. . Brown, supra note 8, at 1 5 30 - 3 I (noting Court's failure to articulate any consis
tent set of extrinsic values that would explain ultimate purposes to be served by separation of pow·
er,); Bruff, supra note 20, al 1 342-43 ("The Su preme Court's rationale for choosing one a p proach
over the other in a particular case . . . is ultimately obscure-perhaps even to the Justices."): Elliott,
s11pra note 8, at 5 30 - 32, (arguing Court's narrow literalism has obscured core concepts that should
inform separation of powers analysis). But see Stern, supra note 8, at 46 1 -M (finding Court's diver·
gent approac hes persuasive).

.1 5 . The constitutional authority for Congr ess's power to create these st ruct ures of government
is fou n d in the Necessary and Proper Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I. § !I, c l . 1 8.
36. See supra note JO and accompanying text.
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charged with carrying out such delegated duties,37 but may not overrule particu
lar administrative acts by any means short of full and formal legislation. 3 8
Although staffing of the federal administrative bureaucracy has been held to
be essentially an "executive" function, 39 Congress may impose some limits on
the President's discretion in both the hiring and firing of certain officials. For
purposes of appointment, the Federal Constitution divides officials into three
categories: high ranking "officers of the United States" who may be appointed
only by the President, subject to the Senate's "advice and consent;"40 "inferior"
37. See generally R. PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 3 . 1 ( 1 985) which
lists the various mechanisms by which this informal oversight can be exercised:
Congress has a wide variety of means, both statutory and non-statutory, by which it
can seek to control agency discretion. . . .

Appropriations can be wielded to punish or

reward agencies and restrictions can be placed on the use of appropriated funds. Congress
can also shape administrative decisions indirectly by applying political pressure through
the use o f committee reports, through budgetary, oversight, or investigatory hearings and
hearings o n the nominations of administrators, and through direct communications with
administrators. The effectiveness of this last group of controls can be i ncreased by requir
ing that agencies report to Congress before they act, by utilizing the General Accounting
Office to i nvestigate agency conduct, and by employing the Congressional Budget Office to
consider the economic effects of government programs.

Id. at 43; see also Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEX. L.

REV. 207, 227-44 (1 984)) (discussing oversight methods, interest group pressures, and internal

agency characteristics); Strauss, supra note 2, at 59 1 - 96 (discussing internal and external procedures
as well as inter-governmental relationships).

38. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 9 1 9, 954 ( 1983) (Congress may not overrule decision of execu

tive officer exercising delegated authority through anything short of formal statute). While the nar

row holding of Chadha involves only the requirements of bicameralism a n d presentment, Justice
Burger's opinion appears to presume a very restrictive view of the role of Congress in overseeing the
administration of the laws:
Congress made a deliberate choice to delegate to the Executive Branch, and specifically to
the Attorney General, the authority to allow deportable aliens to remain in this country in
certain specified circumstances. It is not disputed that this choice to delegate authority is
precisely the kind of decision that can be implemented only in accordance with the proce
dures set out in Art. I. Disagreement with the Attorney General's decision on Chadha's
deportation-that is, Congress' decision to deport Chadha-no less than Congress' original
choice to delegate to the Attorney General the authority to make that decision, involves
determinations of policy that Congress can implement in only one way; bicameral passage

followed by presentment to the President. Congress must abide by its delegation of author
ity until that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked.

Id. at 9 54 - 5 5 ; see also 8 wsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 7 14, 733 - 34 ( 1986) (limiting role
of Congress to
the enactment of leg1slat1on, not active participation in its execution). The Court's insistence on an
across-the-board condemnation of the legislative veto in all cases regardless
of context drew consid 
erable critical commentary. See generally Peter L. Strauss, W
a� There a Baby in the Bathwater? A
Com ment on the Supr�me Court 's Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE
L.J. 789, 791-92 ( 1 983)
.
(cnucizm
g court for failure to distinguish between use of vetos
in regulatory context and executive
congrcss1onal relations).

?

39. See M ye rs v. Unite States, 272 U.S. 52,
1 6 1 , 1 64 (1 926) (holding power to appoint and
.
remove govermncnt officials .IS m its nature an
executive power" and constitutional limitations of
general proposition arc to be strictly construed).
40· U . S .
art. II, § 2, c I . 2. The hard question, of
course, is definin g the class of "officers
o f t h e United States who must be approved by the Sen
ate. The court has attempted to define the
.
term. hut withou t notable success. See, e.g. , Buckle
y v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 , 1 26 ( 1 976) ("[A]ny ap-

�
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admi nistrative officials who may be appointed by the President, by the courts, or
by heads of departments, as Congress may choose;41 and mere "employees," the
appointment of whom is not governed by the Constitution. 42 Congress may pre
scribe the qualifications of appointees43 and may, within limits, restrict the Pres
ident's authority by conferring the power to appoint certain inferior officers on
heads of departments or on the courts.44 However, members of Congress may
not personally serve on administrative organs,45 nor may congressional appoin-

pointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an 'Officer of the
United States.' "); see generally Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 ( 1 988) ("The line between
'inferior' and 'principal' officers is one that is far from clear, and the Framers provided little gui
dance into where it should be drawn.").
4 1 . U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, c l . 2.
This category of "inferior officers" has proven as difficult to describe or define as its converse.
Without attempting a comprehensive definition, the Court in Morrison held that independent coun
sel appointed to investigate executive branch misconduct under the federal Ethics in Government
Act of I 9 7 8, though independent of any direct control by superior authority, nonetheless "clearly
falls on the 'inferior officer' side of that line."

Morrison,

187 U.S. at 67 1 . The Court pointed to three

factors as supporting this conclusion: that the independent counsel was removable (though only
under limited circumstances) by the Attorney General who was thus a "higher ranking" official; that
the counsel had "limited duties" and was "limited in jurisdiction" to a single investigation; and
finally that she was "limited in tenure" in that her appointment would terminate when the particular
investigation was completed.

Id.

at 67 1 -72; see also Freytag v. Commissioner, 1 1 1 S. Ct. 263 1, 264 1

( 1 99 1 ) (holding "special trial judges" appointed to assist regular judges of United States Tax Court
also "inferior" officers, appointment of whom can be vested in Chief Judge of Tax Court).
42. Freytag, I 1 1 S. Ct. at 2640; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 1 26 n. 1 62 ( 1 976) (per curiam).
43. See, e.g. , Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 , 4 1 2 ( 1 989} (upholding United States
Sentencing Commission against distribution of powers challenge).

Though the organic statute

vested ultimate power to appoint the seven Commissioners in the hands of the President, it signifi
cantly restricted his choices: "At least three of the members shall be Federal judges selected after
considering a list of six judges recommended to the President by the Judicial Conference of the
United States. No more than four members of the Commission shall be members of the same polit
ical party."

Id.

at 368 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 99 1 (a) ( 1 988)).

44. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, c l . 2; see also Morrison, 487 U.S. at 675-76 (noting Congress's
discretion with respect to such appointments is broad, limited only by general allocation of powers

concerns and as yet ill defined notion that there ought to be no "incongruity" between functions of
appointing a u t hority and power to appoint particular official).
45. See, e.g. , Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc., I 1 1 S. Ct. 2298, 2308 ( 1 99 1 ) (individual members of Congress could not serve, even "in
their individual capacities" on body created to oversee operation of certain D.C. area airports);
Springer

v.

Phili ppine Islands, 277 U.S. 1 89, 20 1 - 02 ( 1 928) (Congress could not authorize Philippine

legislature to appoint two officers of that legislature to sit on boards of directors supervising certain
public corporations in territory).
The constraint on such "dual officeholding " im posed by the implicit general principle of separa

tion of l eg i slative and executive power is s u p plemented by other federal constit utional provisions
explicitly excl ud ing a member of Congress from occupying an office the benefits of which have been

raised du ri ng t h e member's term, or from s i m ultaneously occ upying both an executive "office" and a
legislative seat:
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which h e was elected, be
appoin ted to any civil Office under t h e Authority of the United States, which shall have

been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been increased d u ri n g such time: and
no Person holding any Office under t h e U n i ted States, shall be a Member of either House
duri n g his Contin uance in Office.
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tees or others subject to congressional control exercise
to remove any admin
power
functions.46 Congress may not retain for itself the
and may not restrict
istrative officials by any means other than impeachment,47
out purely executive
the President's power to remove certain officials carrying
degree of security in
some
grant
to
r,
howeve
functions. 48 Congress is permitted,
or the grounds
power
removal
office-by limiting either who may exercise that
d by the
on which it may be exercised , or both-to inferior officers not appointe
t's
President or whose duties are only "peripheral" to the core of the Presiden
quasi
exercise
also
that
agencies
dent"
powers, 49 or to the so- called "indepen
judicial or quasi-legislative functions. 50
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, c l . 2.

repeti
These provisions were considered highly important by the founders, as security against
century
tion of what they considered to be the corrupt and undemocratic practice of eighteenth
British ministries in securing the support of members of Parliament through appointment of those

members to lucrative offices. GORDON s. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
1776 - 1 787 143- 48 ( 1969); Matheson, supra note 20, at 308. Perhaps surprisingly, these restrictions
have been very seldom litigated. The only case raising incompatibility issues to reach the United
States Supreme Court, in which plaintitfs asserted that sitting members of Congress could not consti

tutionally hold commissions in the Armed Forces Reserve, was dismissed without reaching the mer
its. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 4 1 8 U.S. 208 ( 1974). The single recent lower
court case to address the issue stands only for the unexceptional proposition that the incidental
exercise by Congress of a particular power that might be considered "executive" in nature does not
convert members of Congress into federal officeholders in violation of U.S. CONST. art I, § 6. Atkins
v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1067 (Ct. C l . 1 977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 ( 1 978).
46. See, e.g. , Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 7 14, 733- 34 (1986) (Congress could not vest "execu
tive" functions in Comptroller General because that official removable by Congress by means other
than impeachment); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1 20 - 43 (Federal Election Commission could not exercise
any executive or quasi-judicial powers because majority of Commissioners either legislative officers
or legislative appointees); see also Springer, 277 U.S. at 199 (Philippine legislature could not retain
authority to appoint members of Board of Directors of certain public corporations).
47. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 722-23.
48. See, e.g. , Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 ( 1926) (holding unconstitutional statute
that purported to limit President's authority to remove postmasters), overruled by INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 9 1 9 ( 1 983). In Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), the court significantly limited
Myers by holding that although "there are some 'purely executive' officials w h o must be removable
by the President at will if he is to be able to accomplish his constitutional role," that category does
not include all officers wielding purely executive powers. Id. at 690 - 9 1 .

49.

See , e.g. • Morrison, 487 U.S. at 69 1 - 92 (holding Congress may limit grounds on which

"independent counsel" appointed to investigate and prosecute government officials suspected of

cnmmal v10lat10ns may be removed). Although the counsel's functions were purely executive
in
nature. and "(a)lthough the counse exercises no small amount of discretion
and judgment in decid

�

mg how to carry out his or her duues under the Act," the Court professed
itself unable to "see how
t�c Prcsidcnt 's need to control the exercise of that discretion is so central
to the functioning of the
.
hc..:uuvc Branches to require as a matter of constitutional law

that counse1 be t ermmable at wt·11 by
.
Id . ; see also Umted States v. Perkins, 1 1 6 U.S. 483, 485 ( 1 8 86) ("[W]hen
Congress,
hy law, vests the appointment of inferior officers in the heads of departme
nts it may
restrict
,

..

the 1 resident.

..

·

the power. of removal as 11 deems best for the public interest."
).

50. S••t• , e.g:

·

limit and

�

H mphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602,
629 ( 19 3 5 ) (holding Congress

·
·
could hm1t P resid ent s removal authority by providi.
·
ng Comm1ss1oners o f Federal Trade Comm1s.
""" he appom ted for
term s and remove

�

fixe�

d only for cause). To disting uish Myers, the Court

·
"
relied on the C om m 1 ' 1on s role as an "ind epcn
dent agency and its exercise of quasi-judicial and
.
.
. 11 t 1 ve
4ua\1-lc g1sl
functmu See Wiener v

. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 ( 1 958) (holding Congress
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In sum, the allocation of federal governmental authority reflected in recent
case law does not take an expansive view of the powers of Congress. To be sure,
the Court has recognized the possibility of "independent" agencies5 t and has
permitted some degree of infringement on executive branch autonomy where
necessary to uncover misconduct within that branch. 52 However, the Court has
in other contexts tended to confine Congress to a single role--that of passing
stat utes of general effect and future applicability. The bulk of federal decisions
have, in effect, supported the centralization of power in the President by striking
down most efforts by Congress to construct formal mechanisms by which it
might exercise oversight over the most dynamic aspect of government, the bur
geoning administrative bureaucracy.
B. The Limited Relevance of Federal Precedents to State Distribution of
Powers Issues
One of the enduring issues in state constitutional law is the extent to which
state courts interpreting state constitutions may rely on precedent from other
jurisdictions, and in particular on precedent from federal courts interpreting the
Federal Constitution, as persuasive authority. While most judicial and scholarly
analysis of these questions has focused on cognate federal and state guarantees of
individual rights, 53 the underlying methodological issue applies as well to

�

ay limi t President's
power to replace members of War Claims Commission, body exercising quasi
JUdicial authority).
5 1 . See, e.g. , Humphrey's
Executor, 295 U.S. at 629. The Court's rhetorical support for this
concept has not been
constant, however.
52. See , e.g. , Mor
rison , 487 U.S. at 69 1 - 92 (upholding good cause provision limiting President's
ability to control
independ ent executives and counsel); Nixon v. Administrator of Gen . Servs., 433
U.S . 425, 454
(1 977) (upholding statute limiting former President's control over papers and tape
recordings he
created while in office); United States v. Nixon, 4 1 8 U.S. 683, 7 1 3 ( 1 974) (holding
executiv e privi
lege did not shield President from obeying subpoena to produce evidence for use in
cri minal trial).
r

5 3. The revival of
interest in state constitutional interpretation was sparked in large part by a

�ction to decisions of the Burger Court cutting back on criminal procedural protections and indi

vidual right
s. See, e.g. , RonaJd K. L. Collins, Foreword: Reliance on State Constitutions-Beyond
the "New Feder
alism, " 8 U. PUGET SouND L. REV. vi, vii-xiv (1 984) (tracing development of that
revival); Earl
M. Maltz et aJ., Selected Bibliography on State Constitutional Law, 1980-89, 20
u ERS L.J. 1093
( 1989) (noting great majority of articles listed concern criminal procedure or
tn tv1dual right
s). Not surprisingly, in light of this genesis, virtually all of the important scholarly
anicl es deba
ting issues of interpretive methodology and the persuasiveness of federal precedent
whatever
substantive position they may have taken-likewise focused on the interaction of federal
and state rights
guarantees. See generally William J. Brennan, J r., State Constitutions and the Pro
tection of Indiv
idual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 ( 1977) (discussing impact of Supreme Court
decisions under
Fourteenth Amendment on state constitutional interpretation); Ronald K. L. Col
lins & Peter J.
Galie, Models of Post-Incorporation Judicial Review: 1985 Survey of State Constitu
.
tio
nal Individual Rights Decisions, 5 5 U. CIN. L. REV. 3 1 7, 322-39 (1 986); Hans A. Linde, First
Things First:
Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379, 387-92 ( 1 980) (dis
cussing how state
courts and lawyers have approached constitutional claims in areas where Supreme
Court has been
both active and inactive); Earl M. Maltz, False Prophet-Justice Brennan and the
Theory ofState
Constitutional Law 1 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 429, 434- 48 ( 1 988) (exploring role

� :1'�
�

federalism plays in state
constitu ional analysis); Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court 's
Shadow: Legitimacy
ofState Rejection ofSupreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353,

�
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among the
problems of governmental structure and the distribution of powers
that
debate
from
d
emerge
has
that
sus
branches of state government. The consen
have
always
courts
State
:
can be readily stated, if not always so readily applied
certain
In
the power to interpret state constitutional provisions indepen dently.
circumstances, such as where the substance of a state constitutional provision
was derived from a foreign source,54 or shares historical and functional similari
ties with similar provisions of the Federal Constitution or of the constitutions of
other states, relevant precedent from those other jurisdictio ns is entitled to re
spectful attention and may be relied upon. However, particular ly when the text
or drafting history of a state constitutional provision differs significantly from
federal or sister state cognates, where the issue involves some unique aspect of
local history or culture which differs from that of the rest o f the nation, where
well established local precedent points toward a different conclusion, or where
there is some flaw in the reasoning or result of the proffered foreign precedent,
reliance may be inappropriate. 55
To some extent, a lengthy argument for the independence of state allocation
of powers analysis from its federal counterpart may seem like an exercise in
battering down an open door. Those courts that have squarely addressed the
issue have concluded, correctly, that the divergences between federal and state
constitutions are too great to permit much reliance. 56 Nonetheless, many state
courts continue to rely heavily on federal cases analyzing the proper distribution
of powers between the President and Congress for guidance i n resolving conflicts
between their own governors and legislatures, at least in the sense of treating
federal precedents as very persuasive, and as establishing the conceptual catego403-04 (1 984) (asserting state constitutional claims must be evaluated "upon state constitutional
analysis

and

not

upon

misplaced

reliance

upon

Supreme

Court

federal

constitutional

interpretations").

54. See generally John M. Devlin, State Constitutional Autonomy Rights in an Age of Federal
Retrenchment: Some Thoughts on the Interpretation ofState Rights Derived fro m Federal Sources, 3
EMERGING ISSUES ST ATE CONST. L. 195, 226 - 44 ( 1990) (tracing derivation of state constitutional
protections of autonomy privacy from federal sources, and arguing such rights should therefore be
interpreted in accord with interpretation given such rights by federal courts at time they were
adopted into state law).

5 . See generally Collins & Galic, supra note 53, at 325 (noting state courts generally feel need
to point to some non-result oriented factor to justify divergence from federal precedent); Williams,
supra note 5 3, at 385 -89 (noting criteria developed by state courts to justify rejecting Supreme Court
.
.
interpretation of s1m1lar federal constitutional question); Robert
F. Williams, Methodology Problems
in Enforcing State onstitutional Rights, 3 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
143, 1 7 1 ( 1 986-87) (emphasizin g
state courts should independently evaluate constitutional rights
based on state constitution's text
.
history, and state social int rpretation before analyzing
any federal constitutional claims). Stat
.
courts have occas10nally
articulated a simila r set of factors as governin
g the degree to which they
.
will rely on foreign
precedent in interpretin g state constitutions.
See, e.g. , State v. Gunwall , 720
P.2d 808, 8 1 2- 1 3 (Wash. 1986) (en bane) (discussing
reliance on federal precedent); People v. Tisler,
469 N . E.2d 1 47, 1 53 (lll. 1984) (same) .
56. See , e.g. • Parcell v. Kansas, 468 F.
Supp. 1 274, 1277 (D. Kan. 1 979) (h oId'mg P1 ai ntitf's
.
rehance
on Buc kl ey v. 8Ico, 424 U.S. I ( 1
976), misplaced and federal and state distribution of
powers cases cannot be used interchangeab
ly), ajj'd, 639 F.2d 628 ( 10th c·ir. 1 980).
The court noted
.
that .BuckleY was· bottomed on the Appom
tments Clause contained in Article I I §
.
2 of the Federal
.
'
Constlt utton and that the Kansas constitut1'on
·
con tams
· lent. Id.
no eqmva

�

�

�

v

;
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ries and modes of analysis that the state courts employ i n analyzing their own
state constitution. 57
The temptation to rely on this well-developed body of federal precedent is
undeniably strong. Governments in all states are organized similarly to their
federal counterpart, sharing both the familiar tripartite allocation of powers
among functionally differentiated legislative, executive, and judicial branches,
and some degree of interbranch "checks and balances" designed to afford each
branch sufficient opportunities to control the excesses of the others. 58 More
over, many of the specific questions that have confronted state courts in this
area, for example, whether legislators may appoint members of administrative
bodies, o r the propriety of the legislative veto mechanism, are broadly similar to
the problems that have been considered in recent federal distribution of powers
Yet another, and probabl y the most important, factor is the tendency of

cases.

contemporary American lawyers to think about all issues of constitutional law
in terms of categories and conceptual constructs originating in federal cases.
Federal cases and the web of scholarly commentaries that have grown up
around them provide lawyers, scholars, and state courts with an extensive and
familiar set of precedents and ready-made analytical tools lying readily available
for use in a nalyzing state distribution of powers issues-tools that we are all
predisposed to use by the still ingrained tendency of American law schools to
teach constitutional law solely in terms of the analyses articu lated by federal
courts interpreting the Federal Constitution. 59
Despite its obvious temptations, however, reliance on federal law does not
lead to happy results in state allocation of powers cases, as the Louisiana experi
ence in
strates.

State Board of Ethics for Elected Officials
In its successive opinions in Green, the

v.

Green 60

amply demon

Louisiana Supreme Court

considered the makeup and powers of the Louisiana Board of Ethics for Elected

57. See , e.g. , Book v. State Office Bldg. Comm'n, 149 N.E.2d 273, 2 9 3 - 96 (Ind. 1958) (citing
several federal cases); Tucker v. State, 35 N. E.2d 270, 280-83 (Ind. 1 94 1 ) (re ly i n g extensively on
Myers v. United States, 487 U.S. 654 ( 1 9 8 8), an d commentators on Fede ra l Constitution, to hold
that power to name officials inherently "executive'" in nature); Board of Eth ics For Elected Officials
v. Green. 540 So. 2d 1 1 85, 1 1 90-93 (La. Ct. App. 1 989) (citing several federal cases); Alexander v.
State. 44 1 So. 2d 1 329, 1336 (Miss. 1 983) (referring to federal sources as h a v ing "aut horitatively" '
addressed i ss ues of separation of powers analysis); State v. Bailey. 1 50 S . E . 2d 449, 452-54 (W. Va.
1 900) (ex t ens i v e l y discussing and following federal precedents).
58. These similarities are not acciden t a l ; rather. they reflect the facr t h at the drafters of the
various state constitutions, though opera ti n g over a time span of more than 200 years, have always

shared a co mmon intellectual heritage both with each other and with the framers
( 'onst it u t i on.

of the Fedcrnl

See l(enerally infra notes 73- 74 and ac compan yin g r c x t .

59. See Daniel R. Gordon, The Dem ise of Amaican CmJJtitulicmali.<m: Death by l.<'l(al f:ducu·
U. L..J., 75-82, 89 ( 1 9'l l ) (dec ry i ng ten d e n c y to sec all nH1 ' t i t u t i onal issues in terms
of fed eral constitutional anal ysi s and advocating revisiom to st a n da rd con s t i t u t ional law courses and
c1st·hooks as necessary rem ed y ) .
lion , lo S. l u .

oO.

/ ), a.ff"d, 545 Sn 2d l<l.\ I ( I .a 1 989) (<irt•c•n /I ).
<ir<'<'n dcl't\1011 was hneRy
noted and c ri t i q ued for its ultimate depart u re from formalist p nnnple' 111 F l i 1.ahct h Vaujlhnn llukrr,
Note. Umrpinl( th<.' Executive Pmwr: Stal<' Hoard of E1hin ji>r f:frctC'd Oj]inal• '" <iran, �I I.A I .
540 So. 2 d

1 1 85 (La. App.

Ct . ) ( Grt•en

ujj" d in par/, rcv 'd i11 part, 566 So. 2d

Rt v 'l l I ( 1 99 1 ).

1>2J

( La. l 'l90) (Grt•1•11 II/ ). The
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Officials, the administrative agency that administers the Louisiana Campaign
Finance Disclosure Act.61 The Board was composed of five persons: two elected
by the State House of Representatives, two elected by the State Senate, and one
chosen by the Governor.62 The Act authorized the Board to perform both tradi 
tionally "quasi-legislative" and traditionally "executive" functions, and specifi
cally gave the Board power to bring civil enforcement actions against violators
of the Act.63 In 1988 the Board brought a civil action alleging that Louisiana's
then-recently elected Commissioner of Insurance had knowingly falsified cam
paign finance reports. 64 In response, Commissioner Green argued that the
Board's civil suit represented an assertion of executive authority by a legisla
tively dominated entity in violation of the allocation of power provisions of the
Louisiana Constitution. 65
In its initial opinion, the Louisiana Supreme Court reaffirmed the results of
prior Louisiana jurisprudence by adopting the "formalist" analysis articulated
by the United States Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo 66 and held, by a bare
four to three majority, that an entity composed largely of legislative appointees
could not constitutionally exercise the executive power to initiate prosecutions.67

61. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1 8 : 1 48 1 - 1 532 (West Supp. 1993). The Board, for these purposes,
sits as the "Supervisory Committee on Campaign Finance Disclosure" a n d exercises the powers of
that supervisory committee. Id. §§ 1 8 : 1 5 1 1 . 1 - 1 5 1 1.2.
62. Id . § 42: 1 1 32. The Senate and House may choose any non-civil servant. The Governor's
appointee must be a former judge of one of the Louisiana courts.
63. Louisiana statutes gave the Board authority to: adopt rules and regulations necessary to
effectuate the purposes of the Act; render advisory opinions; receive and maintain the documents
and reports that the Act requires candidates to file; investigate potential violations of the Act; for
ward information to the appropriate district attorney regarding possible criminal violations of the
Act; and bring civil suits to collect civil penalties for violations of the Act.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN.

§§ 1 8. 1 5 1 1 . 2 - 1 5 1 1 . 6.

64. The allegations in the case were particularly lurid. The suit against Green claimed that he
had falsified his returns to conceal that over $2 million in loans to his campaign had come from the
owners of Champion Insurance, a troubled company that soon thereafter became embroiled in bank
ruptcy and criminal charges of fraud. Green I, 540 So. 2d at 1 1 86.

� ��

�

65. L o isi n 's consti ution is explicit regarding separation of powers: "vesting" legislative, ex
.
ecutive,
and Jud1c1al power m the state legislature, governor, and courts respectively, LA. CONST. art.

lll, § I, art. IV, § l, art. V, § l; explicitly reaffirming that such powers shall not be mixed, LA.
CONH art. II, § I; and specifically forbidding any person "holding office in"
any department from
:
exerc1smg power belonging to any other department LA CONST art
. II , § 2 . Though the pom
.
·
·
t was
·
.

.

not discussed m Green , the Louisiana Constitution also grants the
G overnor power to appom
t and
·
.
remove members of executive boards and commissions in
the executive branch, but limits that power
.
to positions not otherwise provided for "by law:"
( H ) Appointments

( l_) The governor shall appoint

· . . the members of
each board a n d commission in the
executi ve branch whose election or appointment
is not provided by this constitution or by
law.

•

•

•

( l ) Removal Power The governor may remove
fram office a person he appoints, ex·

c.ept

person appointed for a term fixed
by this constitution or by law.
I.A. CONST. art. IV, § 5.
.
a

.

,

66.
67.

424 U . S . I

( 1 976).

Green II, 545 So. 2d at 1 0 3 1
.
(opinion of then Judge Pike
Hall, sitting by designation in
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On rehearing, that opinion was vacated and the court issued a second opinion,
again by a bare majority, which cited Morrison v. Olson . 68 In this second opin
ion, the Green court found that the legislature exercised n o actual "control" over
its appointees, and concluded that the challenged Act therefore did not violate
the state separation of powers principles after all.69 That opinion too was va
cated, only to be reinstated, still by only a four to three majority, after the ascen

sion of the Louisiana Supreme Court's then newest member, Justice Pike Hall. 10
The decision in Green is noteworthy in two related respects. First, all of the
court's successive opinions treated federal precedents as persuasive, at least in
the sense of establishing the conceptual categories and modes of analysis that the
Louisiana court could and did employ in analyzing its own state constitution .

The successive decisions differed only as to which federal cases should be fol
lowed, not as to whether such reliance would be proper.

Second, while the

Green court articulated a rationale for its ultimate decision-the legislature's
lack of ongoing "control" of its appointees-that rationale appears to be more
related to debates among members of the Federal Supreme Court regarding pur
ported distinctions between Buckley and Morrison than to any pre-existing Loui
siana analysis. Despite three tries, the Louisiana Supreme Court failed to root
its rationale in Green in either a persuasive body of Louisiana precedent or a
broader context of distribution of powers analysis under the state constitution. 7 1

place of Justice Lemmon, joined b y Justices Marcus, Watson, and Cole). Prior to Green, only one
Louisiana case had addressed these issues directly. In Guidry v. Roberts, 335 So. 2d 438 (La. 1 976),
the Louisiana Supreme Court had considered the original version of the Louisiana Campaign Fi
nance Disclosure Act. The court there relied heavily on the federal decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. I ( 1 976), in holding that the state constitution would permit committees composed of legislative
appointees t o receive reports and to review them for compliance with law, but that such a committee
could not constitutionally exercise the executive authority to determine whether violations would be
prosecuted.

The court reached this latter conclusion without directly deciding the separation of

powers issue presented, ruling instead that the statute, giving the Board sole discretion whether to
refer a case for prosecution, violates LA. CONST. art. V, § 26(B), which gives local district attorneys
"charge of every criminal prosecution by the state in his district."
68. 487 U.S. 654 ( 1 988).
69. State Board of Ethics for Elected Officials v. Green, 559 So. 2d 480, 482-83 (La. 1 990)
(opinion of Justice Lemmon, joined by Chief Justice Dixon and Justices Dennis and Calogero). The
Green court did not directly rely upon Morrison for the "legislative control" test that was ultimately
adopted.

However, in the absence of any firm state constitutional basis for that "control" test, see

infra note 7 1 , the conclusion appears inescapable that the Louisiana court was at least heavily influ
enced by t h e Federal Court's analysis in Morrison. In Morrison, the Court emphasized Congress's
inability to remove--and thus, its lack of practical control over-Special Prosecutors as support for
its conclusion that the office was not so constituted as to interfere impermissibly with the President's
ability to carry out his constitutional duties and thus, did not violate federal separation of powers
principles.

Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685-86 ( 1 988) (distinguishing Bowsher v. Synar, 478

U .S. 7 1 4 ( 1 986)).
70. Green III, 566 So. 2d at 623 (opinion of Justice Lemmon, joined by Chief Justice Calogero
and Justices Dennis and Hall), denying rehearing and reinstating opinion originally published

at

559

So. 2d 480, rev g 540 So. 2d 1 1 85 ( 1 989). Justice Hall's position on these issues apparently changed
between the time he authored the court's original opinion and his eventual joining in the court's final
opinion.
7 1 . The operative distinction that the Green court ultimately adopted-that performance of
executive functions by legislative appointees only violates separation of powers principles when the
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iso
The problems the Louisiana courts encountered in Green were neither
by
ed
lated nor accidental. Rather, they were typical of difficulties encounter
from
many state courts confronting distribution of powers issues and resulted
state
and
federal
the court's failure to consider fundamental divergences between
fed
of
governments and constitutions-divergences that suggest that relevance
least.
eral models to issues of state constitutional law is questionable to say the
e on
relianc
Several considerations suggest that state courts should not put much
weak
federal analysis when interpreting their own state charters: the intrinsic
dif
nesses of federal precedents; origins at different historical periods; structu ral
of
nce
importa
ferences; differing pragmatic concerns; and the lessened
"tyranny" concerns in a federal system.

1 . The Intrinsic Weaknesses of Federal Precedents
As noted above, current Federal Supreme Court decisions on the distribu
r
tion of governmental powers are distinguished neither by the consistency of thei
as
results nor by the depth and persuasiveness of their analyses.72 I t may be,
h
whic
,
noted above, that the competing functionalist and formalist approaches
have polarized decisionmaking in the United States Supreme Court, each have
intrinsic validity in that each is rooted in one of the two streams of thought that
went into the American distribution of powers tradition.

The federal cases,

however, continue to provide no theoretically coherent way to reconcile these
competing principles and no rationale that can explain why the Court chooses
either approach over the other in particular cases. Thus, federal analyses are
unlikely to provide any firm grounding for a convincing and consis ten t state
constitutional analysis.

2 . Origins at Different Historical Periods
The Federal Constitution and state constitutions are generally creatu res of
very different historical periods. Very few state charters date from the revolu
tionary era; most were drafted during the gilded age or later.73 Such latter-day
l gislature also e ercises "control" of those appointees-was at best weakly supported in prior Loui
sian la'.". The smgle precedent that the Green court cited for that proposition, State ex rel. G uste v.

�

�

�

na
Legislative Budget Comm., 347 So. 2d 160 (La. 1 977), is scarcely
on point. In Guste , the Louisia
to
or
S preme Court faced the very different question of whether
rn
a statute empowering the Gove
ce
n
pick 24 o the 28 members of a legislative committee impermissibl
de
pen
y infringed upon the inde
of
of the legislature. Id. at 165. In holding that it did not
the Guste court focused not on the issue
ee.
"control" but rather on the essential information
itt
gath ring and advisory nature of the comm
.
"
us, while both Guste and the last of the Green
Id·
opinions shared a rejection of the "formalist
analysis, they shared little else. More troubling,
ch
neither Guste nor Green ultimatel y made mu
attempt to ex lain
iffi
the particular analyses they espoused were
the proper approach to the d
cult const1tut1onal issues presented.

�

�

�

�

�

�hy

72· See s�pra notes 29- 34 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the Supreme Court's anal·
.
ys1s of separation of powers issues.

73· Only three current state constitutio
ns date from the eighteenth century: Massach usetts,
dra ted .m 1 7 80; New Hampshire, drafted in
1 7 84; and Vermont' drafted in 1 793. Aside from the
.
.
Mame Constitution ' drafted in 1820 ti f
a o th e rest date from times two generations or more rem ov ed
from 1787. As Professor Bruff h as pomt
ed out, the Federal Constitution is a product of the Enhght·

�

•

·

·
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constitutions, drafted by people who experienced the governmental irresponsibil
ity and corruption resulting from i nitial experiments with untrammelled legisla
tive authority, 74 contain few broad or conceptually pure grants of authority to
any branch. Unlike the very short and open-textured Federal Constitution, state
constitutions generally seem drafted so as to restrain all branches' potential for
mischief-by incorporating a large number of specific mandates and prohibi
tions and by allowing each branch strengthened powers to oversee and control
the excesses of the others. 75 While reformers have tried to push for state consti
tutions that are closer to the federal model, their efforts have been largely inef-

enment, and reflects that era's "qualified optimism about the power of government to improve soci
ety" by creating a federal government whose powers could freely grow to meet new needs. Bruff,
supra note 20, at 1 3 3 8 - 39. In contrast, the latter part of the nineteenth century was a time of public
scandal and disillusionment with government on all levels. Thus, the Texas Constitution of 1876,
like many d rafted at about that time or thereafter, was intentionally drafted to be "long, specific and
confining," and intended to shackle the powers of all three branches of the state government. Id.
74. The original revolutionary era state constitutions often paid lip service to the principle of
separation of powers, but were noteworthy more for the clear predominance of their respective legis
latures over the other branches of state government. See generally Casper, supra note 24, at 2 1 6 - 1 9
(discussing early separation of powers concepts); Matheson, supra note 20, a t 309- 14 (noting states
in 1 776 gave only verbal recognition of concept of separation of powers in constitutions, which
resulted in powerful legislature and correspondingly weak executive); Robert F. Williams, The State
Constitutions of the Founding Decade: Pennsylvania 's Radical 1776 Constitution and Its Influences on
American Constitutionalism , 62 TEMP L. REV. 5 4 1 , 547 (1 989) (noting "lack of effective checks on
.

the powerful u nicameral assembly" established by initial Pennsylvania Constitution, is result of con
temporary political culture which stressed largely unalloyed democratic majoritarianism). For dis
cussion of the early constitutions of particular states, all of which reflected some degree of legislative
hegemony, see, e.g., JAMES L. UNDERWOOD, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA, VOLUME

I: THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES 7-26 (1986)
(explaining South Carolina's legislative hegemony in power politics as being attributed to control of
key government appointments and influence in financial policy); ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE NEW
JERSEY ST ATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 4-5 (1 990) (noting New Jersey's 1776 Consti

tution provided for little in way of separation of powers, extending even to legislative election of
governor); Moran, supra note 14, at 955-62 . (noting dominant position of legislature under Charter
that served Connecticut as constitution until 1 8 1 8); Orth, supra note 20, at 5-6 (noting North Caro
lina's founding fathers committed to principle of separation of powers, but Constitution of 1776
nevertheless granted predominance of legislature over other branches by providing for election of
Governor, Members of Council of State, Attorney General, State Treasurer, State Secretary, and all
Judges by General Assembly). The primary exception to this early tradition of legislative dominance
was New York, where a relatively strong executive was created at the outset. PETER J. GALIE , THE
NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE G UIDE 3-6 (199 1 ) ("[T)he New York constitu
tion of 1 77 7 provided for the strongest executive in the American states, giving her the longest term
with reeligibility, direct popular election, and a share with the judiciary in the veto power. ").
Later constitutions were enacted largely in an effort to control what were perceived as the
excesses of state governments in general, and state legislatures in particular. See, e.g. , Bruff, supra
note 20, at 1 33 8 - 39 (discussing Gilded Age disillusion with government in general); Moran, supra
note 14, passim (tracing gradual growth of executive power in Connecticut, in response to legislative
incapacity); Sheryl G. Snyder & Robert M. Ireland, The Separation of Governmental Powers Under
the Constitution of Kentucky: A Legal and Historical Analysis of L .R. C. v. Brown, 73 KY. L. J. 165,
167-68 ( 1 984 - 85) (noting "desire to control legislative excesses constituted the principal reason" for
calling Kentucky Constitutional Convention of 1 890).
75. See , e.g. , Bruff, supra note 20, at 1 338 - 39 (noting transition in context of Texas Constitu
tion); LEE HARGRAVE, THE LOUISIANA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 9 - 1 6 (1990)
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fective. Most state constitutions continue to be long, detailed, and characterized
by many specific restrictions on the political branches. 76
3.

Structural Differences

While it is true that all constitutions in the American tradition share certain
basic similarities of form, there are enough structural differences between the
Federal Constitution and state constitutions to make state reliance on federal
distribution of governmental power precedents suspect. For example, state con
stitutions d o not grant, but merely allocate, pre-existing reserved sovereign pow
ers. Unlike the branches of the federal government, the state legislatures are not
limited, even in theory, to any listing of .enumerated powers. Thus they wield, in
theory as well as in fact, sovereign authority to set up the organs of state govern
ment in any fashion not clearly forbidden by the people. 77 As another example,
one might note that federal analyses have often been based, at least in part, on
the observation that the framers of that document intended to create a "unitary
executive. "7 8 Most states, in contrast, authorize multiple independently elected
(discussing Louisiana Constitution); LEWIS L. LASKA, THE TENNESSEE STA TE CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE 1 6 - 1 7 (1990) (discussing Tennessee Constitution).
76. An example of this continuing tendency can be found in Louisiana. Culminating a process
of increasing detail in successive constitutions, the Louisiana Constitution of 1 92 1 was, already when
adopted, a long, detailed, and confusing "mish-mash of organic and statutory law," that both contin
ued prior restraints on the ability of the legislature to govern and added new ones. Mark T. Carle
ton, History of Louisiana Constitutions, in LEWIS E. NEWMAN, ED., Focus ON CC/73 7 (Baton
Rouge: LSU Institute of Government Research, 1 973). So detailed and dedicated to protection of
special interests was that constitution that virtually any significant (and many an insignificant)
change in government policy required constitutional amendment. By 1 970, that constitution had
grown to an unwieldy monster of some 250,000 words, including 536 amendments. A revolt of the
voters, who in 1970 rejected all 53 proposed amendments (!), led to calls for a constitutional conven
tion, which met in 1973 and 1974. The result of that convention, the Louisiana Constitution of
1974, was an improvement, but only a modest one. At 30,000 words, it is still quite long. The
restraints it places upon the political branches-particularly in requiring that taxes can only be
enacted by two-thirds vote, LA. CoNST. art. VII, § 2, and in dedicating much of the state's revenue
to specific purposes-have contributed significantly to the state's chronic fiscal crises. See generally
Hargrave, supra note 75, at 12-19 (discussing impact of constitution's strict provisions).
The Louisiana Constitution is not alone. While multiplication of examples could consume
many pages, I cannot resist a brief reference to the Alabama Constitution ' which ' as of 1 990 con
tai ned .287 sections and 534 amendments. The more recent amendments include one empo ering
.
the legislature to authonze
the Jefferson County Commission to "prohibit the overgrowth of weeds
an� the storage and accumulation of junk, inoperable automobiles and other Jitter," (but only if the
legislature so votes by a three-fifths majority), and another permitting bingo games by charitable
groups m Calhoun County. ALA. CONST. amends. 497, 508.
77. Se ve ra l courts have relied upon this concept of the inherent powers of state legislatures to
support arguments that the legislature, as holder of the sovereign power of
the people, has authority
to divest the governor of the power to appomt certain adm1mstrattve
·
officials, or to appoint those
.
.
officials itself. See infra notes 144 -45 for a d 1scuss1
· on the inherent powers of state
'
on of cases relying
. . res. Congres .
kg1�latu
s, m contrast, wields only delegated powers Its powers over the appomtment
·
.
process arc thus st ncti Y deI'imited by the terms of the appointm
ents clause of article II § 2 of the
.
" 1 Co n st 1tu t 1on
Fcd era
78. The "unitary executive" argument bne
· fty stated,
starts from the text of the Federal Consti.
.
tution which vests '
''cdera I executive authonty only ·
· 1e President
in a sing
and imposes on that Presi.
d�nt alnnc the duty to make sure .,that t hc Laws be
faithfully executed." U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1 ,

�

·

·

·

·

·

·

.

·

'

.

•.

.

·

·

.

1993] APPOINTEES PERFORMING ADMINISTRA TI VE FUNCTIONS 1227
statewide executive officers, 79 thus diffusing executive power and weakening ar-

3. From these texts and from the founders' goals of assuring energy and accountability in the execu

tive branch, the "unitary executive" argument concludes that the President must retain the power to
direct the activities of all administrative officials (except those who, like judicial clerks or congres
sional staffers, labor solely for another branch). Though the Federal Supreme Court seldom uses the
phrase, some such concept seems to have undergirded a number of decisions, from Myers to Chadha

and Bowsher. See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution:
Unitary Executive, Plura/ Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1 1 55, 1 1 65-68 ( 1 992) (discussing variations

on theory); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Note, Hail to the Chief Administrator: The Framers and
the Presiden t's Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 99 1 , 1 000 - 1 3 ( 1 993) (discussing framers' view

of President's role as Chief Administrator).
The decision in Morrison, which permitted "independent counsel" investigating executive mis
conduct to be insulated from direct presidential control, 487 U.S. at 705- 1 5, has been decried by
some as a rejection of this principle, a t least in the strong form proposed by Justice Scalia. See
Calabresi & Rhodes, supra this note, at 1 208-09 (Morrison signals "arguably irreversible" rejection
of any strong version of unitary executive position); Lee S. Lieberman, Morrison v. Olso n: A Formal
istic Perspective on Why the Court was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. R EV . 3 1 3 , 335-42 ( 1 9 89). However,
such claims seem to be at least somewhat overstated.

Morrison

did not go much beyond

Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), in limiting the President's authority to
control the methods and results of federal administration. While the cases were theoretically distin

guishable, in that the independent counsel in Morrison exercised only executive-type powers, the fact
remains that the situation presented in Morrison-the evident need to promote the perception and

reality of justice by insulating the person investigating the executive branch from control by th at
branch-is very unusual, to say the least. While the purity of the federal "unitary executive" theory
may have been sullied, it seems quite unlikely that the theory or result of Morrison will extend much
beyond its facts.
79. See , e.g. , A LA . CONST. art V, § § 1 12, 1 16 (p roviding for separate statewide election of

Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, State Auditor, Secretary of State, State Treas

urer, Superintendent of Education, and Commissioner of Agriculture and Industries). A lthoug h the
l i st of statewide elected officials varies from state to state, most provide for several such indepen
dently elected executives. See ARIZ. CONST. art. V, § I; ARK. CONST. art. 6, § 3; CAL CONST. art.
V, § 1 1 ; COLO. CONST. art. IV, § I; CONN. CONST. art. Fourth, § 4; DEL. CONST. art. 111, § 2 1 ;
FLA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 4 & 5; GA. CONST. art. V, § III, para. I ; IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § I ; 1 1.1..

C ONST. art. v. § I ; IND. CONST. art. 6, § I; KAN. CONST. art. I , § I ; KY. CONST. § 9 1 ; LA. CONST.
art. I V, § 3; MICH. CONST. art. v. § 2 1 ; MINN. CONST. art. v. § I; Mrss. CONST. art. 5, §§ 133 &
1 34; Mo. CONST. art. IV, § 17; NEB. CONST. art. IV, § I; NEV. CONST. a rt. 5, § 19; N.M. CONST.
art. V, § I ; N.Y. CONST. art. V, § I ; N.0. CONST. art. V. § 13; OHIO CONST. art. III, § I; OKI.A.
CONST. art. VI, § 4; OR. CONST. art. VI, § I ; R.I. CONST. an. VIII. § I; s.c. CONST. art. VI, § 7;
S . 0. CONST. art. IV, § 7; TEX. CONST. art. IV, §§ I & 2; UTAH CONST. art. VII, § I ; VT. CONST. ch.

II, §§ 47-49; WASH. CONST. art. III, § 3; W. VA. CO NST. art. VII, § I; Wrs. CON ST. art. V I, § I ;
Wvo. CONST. art. IV, § 1 1 .

A few states-primarily those with the oldest constitutions-go beyond this and provide for
c lccr ion of some executive officers by the leg i s la t u re. ME. CONST. arl. V, pt. 2, § I: pl. 3, § I (provid
ing for legislative election of Secretary of Sta te and Treasurer respectively); MASS. CONST. pt . 2, Ch.

2, § IV, art. I , ( § 80) (providing for leg i sla t ive election of Secretary, T reas urer and Receiver General.
Commissary General, Notaries public, and Naval officers); N.H. CONST. pt. 2. arl. 67 ( p ro vidi ng for

l egi s l a t i ve election of Secretary of State and Treasurer); Tr.NN. CONST. arr. V I I . § 3 (providing for
lt•gislativc e l ection of Treasurer or Treasurers and Comptroller of Treasury ).

Relatively few states follow the federal pattern and provide for a u n i ta ry executive.

Interest·

ingly, however, se ve r al of the more recen t state constitutions, including those of A l aska , Hawaii, and

New Jersey, fal l into this group. At.ASK A CONST. art. Ill, § 8 (providmg only el ec t ed oflkiul' arc
V. § I>
( p ro v i di n g heads of all principal deparrments will be nominated by Governor and confirmed t>y
Senate); IOWA CONST. art. IV, §§ J . J ( p rovidin g similar p rov ision as Alaska); Mu. CoNsT. 11rl. I I
Go ver no r and L i euten an t Governor, who run toget her on single ticket ): l lAw. C0Ns·1 . art.
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guments that derogations from gubernatorial authority violate the founders'
vision.80
4. Differing Pragmatic Concerns
The pragmatic concerns that should inform distribution of powers analysis
on the state level are also significantly different from those that are operative on
the federal level. Some of these pragmatic concerns relate to the ability of state
legislatures to fulfi11 their role as a co-equal leg of the tripod that sustains in
creasingly complex state governments. To cite but one example, Congress is in
session for the bulk of each year and is endowed with a large and professional
staff. 8 1 It thus enjoys a substantial institutional capacity to gather information
on a continuous basis and to deal with emergencies as they arise.

In marked

contrast, many state legislatures meet for only short and intermittent sessions,
and the legislators themselves are often only part-time politicians with other
livelihoods that require attention. 82 State legislative staffs are smaller and less
regimented than their federal counterparts. 83 These realities have a number of
practical consequences. Most obviously, state legislatures must often make spe
cial arrangements to deal with sudden funding needs or similar problems that

§

18

(same); N.J. CONST. art. V, § IV,

�

3 (similar provision to Hawaii).

The Pennsylvania and

Virginia executives are almost unitary, with the constitutions of both states providing for popular
election of the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and Attorney General only. PA. CONST. art. 4, § 5;

VA. CONST. art. 5, §

80.

15.

Independent election by the people gives those elected state executive officials far greater

autonomy, and far greater control over their departments, than any federal official enjoys. And that
autonomy is exactly what the framers of those state constitutions intended to achieve. See Michael
B. Holmes, Comment, The Constitutional Powers of the Governor and the Attorney General: Which

Officer Controls Litigation Strategy When the Constitutionality of a State Law is Challenged? 53 LA.
L.

REV. 209 (1992) (arguing in event of conflict, independently elected Louisiana Attorney

General,

and not Governor, authorized to determine what position state will take in litigation). Thus, even
under the broadest reading of Morrison and Humphrey's Executor, the President retains far greater
control over the processes and results of the federal administrative machine than governors typically
enjoy over their respective state executive branches.

81. These staff members are of several types. Each congressional committee has a professional
�ch officer of Co�gress has an office staff, and each member of Congress has a personal staff.
Some idc:8 of the total Size of these staffs may be gleaned from the 1992 Congressional Staff Direc
_

staff,

tory, which hsts

_

m

excess of 17,000 names in its "Individual Index." 1992 CONGRESSIONAL STAFF
Brownson ed., 1992). In addition, Congress has created a number of

DIR�c:roR� I

2

ad

agencies, such as the Congressional Budget Office, which also lend expertise and

�imstrative

�n L.

(

assistance to Congress.

•. e.
�. • nyder _ & Ireland, supra note 74, at
current M1ss1ss1ppi Constitution).

82. S�e

�

174

(noting weaknesses of legislature under

83. Durin the last several decades, many legislatures
have begun to meet more frequently and
for longer sessions, and have increased the number and
professionalism of their staffs. Rosenthal,
sup� ote ?· at
Nonetheless, these structural problems to effective "informal" oversight of
admmistrative agencies r main important. Many state
constitutions still limit the length and fre
.
_
quency
egislative sessions. And, while special
sessions and similar mechanisms may provide
some additional scope, they too
l ited in length and subject matter. Legislat
ive staffs of even
the largest states rarely top 1000 md1v1duals in total,
as
compar
ed to the many thousands of staff
_
assistants, many of whom have deep and special
·
ized expert"ise, who assist
Congress.

�

44-�.

�

0� �

�

a�e ��
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may arise when the legislature is out of session,84 or to acquire the expertise
required t o confront the executive branch. As will be seen below, certain inno
vative m echanisms that several state legislatures have created in an effort to deal
with these institutional problems-mechanisms such as "State Finance Coun
cils"85 and "Legislative Research Committees"86-have produced a significant
amount

of state constitutional case law and doctrine that has no federal

equivalent.
Less obvious but equally important, this "part-time" aspect of many state
legislatures has specific relevanc e for issues concerning the methods by which
legislatures exercise their authority to oversee state level administrative bodies.
Like C ongress, state legislatures are frequently required, by force of circum
stance if not by choice, to delegate large measures of discretion over important
and politically salient issues to administrative bodies. However, while state ad
ministrators may have of late become somewhat more responsive to legislators,
intermittent sessions and limited staffs still tend to make state legislators far less
able than members of Congress t o exercise influence through informal oversight
mechanisms, such as hearings o r direct contact with administrators. 87 Thus,
judicial decisions that have the effect of cutting off mechanisms of direct legisla
tive influence on administrative a gencies-for example, decisions forbidding leg
islative vetoes of administrative rules or precluding the legislative branch from
appointing administrative officials-may well have a different effect on state leg
islatures than they have on Congress. For Congress, the effect may only be a
substitution of one method of oversight for another. For state legislatures, the
result may be the substantial elimination of any effective oversight at all.
5. Tyranny Concerns and the Federal "Safety Net"

Finally, and most fundamentally, the states and the federal government
differ crucially with respect to the most basic issue of all-the purposes meant
to be served by the distribution of governmental powers.

Framers, 88 schol-

84. Most state constitutions provide for special sessions in the event of real emergencies. How
ever, such mechanisms clearly do not provide any secure basis for legislative acquisition of expertise,
or of responding to any but the most pressing of crises.

85. See infra notes 21 1-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of such mechanisms.
86. See infra notes 226-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of such mechanisms.
87. See, e.g. , Bruff, supra note 20, at 1 346 (discussing relatively "weaker" ties between state
administrative and political branches).

88. The classic statement is James Madison's frequently quoted lines from Federalist No. 47,
and his exposition of Montesquieu:
No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the author
ity of more enlightened patrons of liberty, than that . . . the accumulation of all powers,
legislative, executive, and judiciary, i n the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many

.

.

·

may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.
THE FEDERALIST No.

47, at 261-62 (James Madison) (M. Chadwick ed., 1987). To be sure,
48 to argue that a system of judiciously mixed powers and

Madison went on in Federalist No.

"checks a n d balances" among the branches, rather than any absolute conceptual separation, was the
best way to avoid that tyranny. But this does not derogate from the fact that it was the tyranny that
could result from the concentration of power that the founders and their critics both feared.
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I?' reason governmental
�
�

ars, 89 and the Supreme Court90 all agree that the prima

powers were separated on the federal level was and rema1 s to p eclude the tyr
anny that could result if those governmental powers, and m particular the pow

ers to make and to execute the laws, were combined in a single set of hands.

Moreover, avoidance of such a concentration of power is itself an instrumental
value. While concentration of power may have other negative consequences as
well, it is the potential of such a "tyrannical" government to oppress individu
als-to enforce unfair laws in an arbitrary or discriminatory fashion-that was
and remains the core concern.9 1 On these propositions there can be little disput the point, both colorfully and from the
89. As Professor Redish and a co-author recently
heart:

the Constitution are tremendously
[W]e believe that the separation of powers provisions of
but because the fears of creep
them,
imposed
Framers
the
important, not merely because
as they were at the time the
today
d
e
justifi
as
least
at
are
them
underlie
that
ing tyranny
have enemies." It
paranoids
Framers established them. For as the old adage goes, "even

ive and ac
should not be debatable that, throughout history, the concept of representat
been almost
has
This
.
vulnerability
of
state
constant
a
in
existed
has
government
countable
time.
as true in the years since the Constitution's ratification as it had been prior to that

Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, "IfAngels Were to Govern ": The Needfor Pragmatic Formal

ism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 453 (1991).

90. See , e.g. , Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986) ("The declared purpose of separating

and dividing the powers of government, of course, was to 'dilfus[e] power the better to secure lib
erty.' ") (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 ( 1 952) (Jackson, J.,

concurring)); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 9 1 9, 960-61 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting FEDER
A LIST

No. 47); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443 (1 965):

This "separation of powers" was obviously not instituted with the idea that it would pro
mote governmental efficiency. It was, on the contrary, looked to as a bulwark against
tyranny. For if governmental power is fractionalized, if a given policy can be i mplemented
only by a combination of legislative enactment, judicial application , and executive imple
mentation, no man or group of men will be able to impose its unchecked will.

�

E en when arg ing that a novel scheme for mixing powers does not violate distribution of powers
�
_
principles,
Just ices base their argument on the anti-tyranny principle-arguing that there is no real
danger of tyranny in the issue at hand. See, e.g. , Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for
the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, I l l S. Ct. 2298, 2 3 1 7 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) ("It is absurd
to suggest that the

a�sembh �� all
Framers. )

�ard's power represents the type of 'legislative usurpatio[n]

. . . which, by

�wer tn the same hands . . . must lead to the same tyranny', that concerned the
(quoti ng F�DERALIST No. 48 (James Madison)); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.

36 ' : 3KO -R 1 < 1 989) (noting some overlap of powers foreseen by founders and would not violate their

anti - t yra n n y concerns) .

<J I : T h e view that scparation of powers is primarily a means to the
end of securing the liberty of
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pute. However, it is important to note that the distribution of powers principle
serves other related but distinguishable purposes as well. Despite the Supreme
Court's occasional disclaimers,92 one of these other goals was what the framers
�oped would be an increase in energy and efficiency in government administra
tion-an increase to be gained primarily by the centralization of executive au
thority in a single person separate and apart from Congress. 93 Other identified
purposes served by the distribution of powers include the increase in political
accountability that results from having responsibility for particular functions
clearly placed in particular hands,94 and the prevention of any branch abdicat
ing its core responsibilities. 95 Nonetheless, in interpreting the Federal Constitufrom executive power. If it were joined to legislative power, the power over life and liberty
of the citizens would be arbitrary, for the judge would be the legislator. If it were joined to
executive power, the judge could have the force of an oppressor.
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 1 S7 (Anne M. Cobler et al.
eds. & trans., 1 989); see also
FEDERALIST, supra note 88, at 261 -62 (Madison) (tyranny
results from concentration of power);
Redish & Cisar, supra note 89, at 4S3 (concerns about tyranny valid even today).

92. See, e.g. , INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 9 1 9, 944 (1 983) ("Convenience and efficiency are not the
primary objectives-or the hallmarks-<>f democratic government . . . ."); United States v.
Brown,
381 U.S. 437, 443 ( 1 965) ("[s)eparation of powers not instituted to promote governmental
e fficien cy").
93. THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton). See generally Arthur Selwyn Miller, An
Inquiry into the Relevance of the Intentions of the Founding Fathers, With Special Emphasis Upon the
Doctrine of
Separation of Powers, 27 A RK. L. REV. 583, 588-89 (1973) (discussing importance of
efficient execut ive to founders and persistence of that theme in subsequent distribution of powers

analysis).

94. See, e.g. , THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 371 (Alexander Hamilton) (M. Chadwick ed., 1987)
(asserti ng importance of having executive head dependent only upon people for his reelection, and
therefore accountable to people for his conduct of office); THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 385 (Alexan

der Hamilton) (M. Chadwick ed., 1987) (emphasizing need for single executive, to assure he would
be politically responsible for acts).

95. This point was most recently and forcefully made by Justice Scalia, dissenting in Mistretta,
and arguing that delegation of the power to set criminal sentencing guidelines to a special agency,
including a judge, violated the requirements of separation of powers in part because it enabled Con
gress to avoid its duty to make certain hard decisions:
By reason of today's decision, I anticipate that Congress will find delegation of its
lawmaking powers much more attractive in the future. If rulemaking can be entirely unre
lated to the exercise ofjudicial or executive powers, I foresee all manner of "expert" bodies,
insu lated from the political process, to which Congress will deleg�te various � ions of its
lawmaking responsibility. How tempting to create an expert Medical Comm1ss1on (mostly
M.D.'s , with perhaps a few Ph.D.'s in moral philosophy) to dispose of such thorny, "n<;
win" political issues as the withholding of life-support systems in federally funded hospi

�

tals, or the use of fetal tissue for research. This is an undemocratic precedent that we set
not because of the scope of the delegated power, but because its recipient is not one of the

Three Branches of Government.
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 , 422 ( 1 989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). As Justice Scalia glanc
ingly noted, the concerns he expressed are allied to the concerns that underlie t�e non-delegation
doctrine, which is itself an aspect of distribution of powers. While the non-delegation has fallen mto
.
A�encan
desuetude in the federal courts, its principles have not been entirely forgotten.
by
JOmed
.
d1ssentmg
J.,
t,
Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543-48 (1981) (Rehnquis
stan
safety
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to
Labor
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y
Burger, C.J.) (insisting that allowing Secretar
�
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tion, the specter of a totalitarian concentration of power remains real, and the
need to articulate a body of doctrine that cannot be used to justify such a threat
to individual liberty remains a crucial constraint on interpretation. Other goals
of distribution of power can be given only a secondary role.
State governments, however, are in a different position.

Whatever may

have been the case when state constitutions were originally drafted, states today
do not operate in a legal vacuum, but rather are subject to the restraining influ
ence of paramount federal law. This pervasive background o f federal law is es
pecially salient in the area of individual rights, providing a "floor" beneath
which protection of individual liberties may not fall. In particular, the Federal
Bill of Rights and, to a lesser extent, the Federal Civil Rights96 and Voting
Rights97 statutes, provide a potentially significant degree of protection against
anti-democratic or oppressive acts by state authorities. To be sure, the Federal
Supreme Court has never yet held that any combination of state governmental
powers constituted, in itself, a violation of any of the substantive protections of
federal constitutional or statutory law. To the contrary, the question of whether
or how the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the state shall be sepa
rated or mixed has been held to remain a matter of state law alone.98 However,

quist, J., concurring) (arguing that challenged statutory provision should have been voided on non
delegation grounds because Congress had avoided rather than resolved fundamental but difficult and
politically divisive choice regarding how to balance workplace safety and cost concerns).

96. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-88, 2000 -2000h-6 (1988 & Supp. 1991). These statutes are primarily
directed against discrimination because of race or similar factors rather than against autocracy per
sc.

Nonetheless, they at least provide some potential protection against those "tyrannies" that are

intended to or have the effect of discriminating against a protected group in society.

97. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973- 1975f (l988 & Supp. 1993). As with the Civil Rights statutes, the
voting rights laws are directed only to a limited range of oppressive acts; here, racial discrimination.
However, some of the processes that the voting rights acts set up-such as requiring prior approval
within the federal court system before a proposed change in state voting laws may function to deny
an individual the right to vote-could well be an obstacle in the path of our hypothetical state tyrant.

98. See, e.g. , Dreyer v. Illinois, 1 87 U.S. 7 1 , 83 (1902) (criminal's federal due process rights not
if combination of

violated when sentenced in accord with Illinois Indeterminate Sentence Act, even

functions given to Illinois Board of Pardons under Act would have violated federal distribution of

powers principles). While the result in Dreyer is doubtless correct-the combination of functions
com lained of was minor at worst, and closely analogous to what the Federal Supreme Court upheld

�

� �the Dreyer Court's language is unfortunate because of the absolute tone of its rejection

m Mistrett

.

of the posstbthty of a federal constitutional violation arising out of a combination of functions on the
state level:
Whe t �er the legislative, executive and judicial powers of a State shall be kept altogether

dtstmct and separate, or whether persons or collections of persons belonging to one depart

.
ment m ay , m
respect to some matters, exert powers which, strictly speaking, pertain to

another department of government, is for the determination of the State.
And its determination one way or the other cannot be an element in the mqu1ry h
w et her the due process of
·

·

I uw prcscn·bed by t he Fourteenth Am en dment has been respected by the
State or its repre.
.
.
.
sentativ es when dealmg wi th matters involving life or
liberty.

Id at !14. While this may have been an accurate statement of
the law of federal-state relations as

.
they 'tood at the turn o f the century and under the facts
of the Dr:eyer case, t he expanswn of the

suhstuntive role of the Fourtccnth Amendment that has
taken P Jace Smee t hat llme makes Dreyer
.
'eem suhject to limitation at lea
.
.
s t . But see R obert M. O'Ne
il Th e Separat1on of Powers m
a Federal
.
. '.
.\)•f/m1 . .n EMORY L.J. S39 ( 1 9S8) (d e1en
, d mg Dreyer pnnc
·

·

tple).
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it is difficult to i magi ne that truly egregious or liberty-threatening violations of
the separation principle would not-precisely because of the combination of in
compatible governmental functions-violate the federally protected substantive
rights of citizens.

For example , if a state were to combine prosecutorial and

judicial functions in a single person, surely anyone convicted would have a via
ble claim that her rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment had been violated.99 Thus, to the extent that federal law provides a
reliable safeguard against tyrannical oppression of the individual, arguments

that strict application of the doctrine on the state level are necessary to achieve
this same i nstrumental result become correspondingly weaker.
An i nteresting, though as yet speculative, alternative ground for federal
protection of i nd i vid ual liberty against despotic concentration of state govern
mental power is raised by the recent resurgence of interest in the Guarantee

Cl ause of the Federal Constitution. 1 00 That clause is the only element of the
Federal Constitution that directly speaks to the several states' internal processes
of governance.

While it is not entirely clear what the framers meant by the

concept of "republican" government, we can at least have some confidence
about what that concept emphatically did not permit-that is, monarchy, aris
tocracy, or any similar form of centralization of powers in any in dividual or
group. 1 0 1 Th e relationship between these concerns and the anti-tyranny and
anti-centralization purposes of the separation of powers principle is readily ap
parent, and has led at least a few courts and commentators to argue that the

99. The argument proposed here seems compatible with post-Dreyer analysis from the Supreme
Court. For example, in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), the Court held the question of
whether the work of a state legislative i nvestigating committee should be enjoined depended on
whether the subject matter of that investigation "may fairly be deemed within its province. " Id. at
378. As Professor O'Neill has pointed out, this language clearly implies that the Court may deter
mine what is the proper "province" of a state legislature, at least where, as in Tenney, "(t]he individ
ual rights at stake were of a high constitutional order." O'Neill,

supra

note 98, at 545.

In subsequent cases, the Dreyer principle of state autonomy in allocation of governmental func
tions has been frequently restated. It has not, however, been used to justify what would otherwise be
a violation of basic substantive federal rights. For example, in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234 ( 1 957), the State Attorney General was statutorily clothed with both executive and legislative
powers, making him a "one man legislative committee" charged with investigating subversives. The
petitioner in the case was charged with contempt for refusing to answer certain of the Attorney
General's questions. While the Court refused to rely upon the apparent violation of separation of
powers principles as grounds, id. at 255, it nonetheless overturned the contempt conviction. Where

lower courts have relied on the Dreyer principle, the most basic issues of fundamental fairness simply
were not at stake. See , e.g. , Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1 191, 1 1 95 (4th Cir. 1 989) (holding Virginia's
$750,000 statutory cap on medical malpractice violated no federal guarantees-neither right to trial
by jury, nor separation of powers, nor right to due process); Ware v. Gagnon, 659 F.2d 809, 812 (7th
Cir. 1 9 8 1 ) (holding Federal Constitution does not preclude state from vesting power to revoke parole
in administrative agency).
1 00. "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Fonn of

Governm ent . . . . " U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.

I O I . See, e.g. , THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 234 (James Madison) (M. Chadwick ed. 1987)
(com paring foreign governments of dissimilar principles and forms); THOMAS M. COOLEY, TR�A
TISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 45 (7th ed. 1 903) (referring to prohibitions against nob1hty,
monarchies, and aristocracies).
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Guarantee Clause can and should function as the ultimate "backstop," ensuring
at least a minimal degree of separation of powers in the states. 1 02 To be sure, the
constraints imposed by the Guarantee Clause do not take the form of stringent
or legally enforceable rules. On the contrary, the concept of republican govern
ment permits a wide range of experimentation by the states, 1 03 and the clause
has been held to be enforceable only by Congress rather than by the courts. 104
Nonetheless, the Guarantee Clause remains available as a potential basis for fed
eral intervention-by the political branches if not by the courts-if a state gov
ernmental power were to become so concentrated or oppressive as to constitute a
threat to republican principles.
In any event, even if federal law does not outlaw centralization of political
power in the states per se, it surely provides significant protection to individuals
against many of the potential consequences of such tyranny. 1 0s At a minimum,

102. See, e.g. , Fox v. McDonald, 13 So. 416, 420 (Ala. 1 893) (noting guarantee of republican
form of government properly vests power of selecting officers of government in people, and power to
appoint to office not inherently executive function); Comment, Treatment of the Separation ofPowers
Doctrine in Kansas, 29 KAN. L. REv. 243, 246-54 (1981) (discussing framers' intent regarding guar

antee clause and separation of powers doctrine at state level).
1 03. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 263-66 (James Madison)

(M. Chadwick ed. 1987) (sur

veying differing degrees and forms of separation of powers in various states and pronouncing them
all compatible with liberty); see generally Jn re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Ethics Commis
sion), 6 1 2 A.2d 1, 16-18

(R.1. 1992) (holding amendment to state constitution which withdrew au

thority to prescribe substantive ethics rules for state officials from legislature and gave power instead
to appointed committee, fell within broad range of state governmental structures permitted by Guar
antee Clause of Federal Constitution).
104. See Pacific States Tel. &. Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 1 1 8 ( 1 9 1 2) (emphasizing that Con
gress's determination of whether particular state government is "republican" form binding on every
other department of government); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) l , 42 ( 1 849) (arguing, in
dicta, determination of whether particular state government "republican" lies with Congress rather
than courts; in other words, is a political rather than legal question). Scholars have argued, however,
that the courts could use that clause to defend certain important structural features of our system of
government, or to vindicate certain individual and political rights of individuals. See Deborah Jones
Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COL UM. L.
REV. I, 2 ( 1 988) (arguing guarantee clause could be used to guarantee some degree of autonomy for

states against federal regulation); see also sources cited id. at 22 n . 1 22 (proposing several other
applications of the clause).
105. See, e.g. , Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 688-89 ( 1 9 80) (noting rule that binds
federal courts not t impose consecutive sentences for multiple crimes all arising out of event, unless
Congress so authorizes, and rooting that aspect of Double Jeopardy Clause in distribution of powers

�

concerns-that Congress rather �han courts shall determine punishments for crimes). In dictum , the
court raised-a d apparently spht--on the issue of whether Dreyer might preclude application of the
�
full force of this rule to states. Justice Brennan, for the Court,
s uggested that Dreyer would not
.
proh1b11 apphcatton
of at least some federal constitutional standar ds·
. c Court has held that the doctnne of
Th
separation of powers embodied in the Federal
.
Consutu llon is
not mandatory on the States. . . . It is possible
, therefore ' that the Double
Jeopardy Clause docs not through the F
ourteenth Amendment, circumscribe the penal
aut h only of state courts m the same manner th
at it hm1ts the power of federal courts. The
Due Process Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amend
ment, however, would presumably prohibit state
courIs firom deprmng
.
. persons of liber1y or property
as pu111shment for criminal conduct except to the extent authorize
. d b� state law.
.

·

.

.

.

•

·

·

·

.

Id. at 689 n.4 (citations omitted) (emph asis
·
addcd)· However, Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, argued

1 993] APPOINTEES

PERFORMING ADMINISTRA TIVE FUNCTIONS

1235

t h e First Amendment's guarantees of freedom of speech , press, and assembly
would likely provide some protection for political activities by opponents of such
a state regime; the criminal procedural guarantees of the Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendments would give some protection against official retaliation; and
the d u e p rocess, equal protecti o n , and voting rights guarantees of the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments would give some protection against at least some
fo rm s of oppression or electoral manipulation, particularly if they were class
based.

I n addition, while the Federal Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts are

primarily directed against discrim inat io n because of race or similar factors
rather t h an against autocracy per se, several of their provisions would at least
make it difficult for a dictatorial state regime to deal "efficiently" with its oppo
nents. Most im portant, all of these rights can be vindicated in the federal courts,
a system that is by design independent of any control by state authorities. State
authorities can potentially be brought to account in many ways in federal court,
including through civil actions, 1 06 cri minal actions, 107 and habeas corpus
proceedings . 1 08
I n arguing that we enj oy some external protect io n from tyranny by state
governments, I do not wish to be understood as claiming that state courts should
ignore issues regarding the concentration of state governmental powers, or of the
potentia l for abuse inherent in such concentration. One who lives and teaches in
the state that Huey Long made famous would never so rashly contend. Rather,
the question is one of emphasis. The contentions are two. The first is that fed
eral law provides a "safety net" against that "tyranny"-tyranny in the sense of
oppression of individuals by an arbitrary government-that might concei vably
result down the road if some mixing of powers were permitted today . The sec
ond is that because of that safety net, arguments to the effect that rigid adher
ence to formal separation of powers is the only sure safeguard against loss of
liberty a re more relevant and con v incing in the context of federal distribution of
powers a n alysis than they are in t h e context of state analogues. Thus, this differ
ence m a y justify a somewhat greater degree of flexibility in state constitutional
interpretation.
thing goes."

By "flexibility," however, I assuredly do not mean that "any

On the contrary, concentration and conflation of governmen tal

powers can produce many bad con sequences. My point is only that the unique
position of states as actors within a federal system may, rightly understood, free
state courts construing state constitutions to concentrate somewhat less on re
mote a n d h y pothetical concerns about the prevention of oppression, in order to
concen t ra t e more on the other concerns that underlie d i stribution of powers
analysis- concerns such as maintaining efficiency, preserving accountability,
and preventing any branch from abdicating its responsi bilities.

that t he federal courts can never second -guess stales courts as lo th e ir reading of stale s1u1u1es,
'late le g islat ive intent. Id. at 706 (Rehnquist, J dissen ting).
..

1 06. 42 u . s.c. § 1 983 ( 1 988).

107. I ll U . S.C. §§ 24 1 , 242 (Supp. 1 99 1 )
I OK . 28 U . S.C. § 2254 ( 1 988 & Supp. 1 99 1 ).

or
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TOWARD A STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF DISTRIBUTION OF
POWERS: LEGISLATIVE PARTICIPATION IN CHOOSING
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS

A. Is There Such a Thing as State Constitutional Distribution of Powers Law?
For the reasons discussed above, it appears that federal distribution of pow
ers precedents should provide only limited guidance for state courts considering
similar issues.

However, the converse proposition-that decisions from sister

states have validity as persuasive precedents-remains to be established. Cer
tainly the obstacles to a unified state constitutional approach to distribution of
powers issues appear formidable. State constitutional texts differ markedly with
respect to these issues. These divergences, therefore, must be addressed before
any notion of a unified state constitutional approach to these issues can acquire
more than superficial validity.
The most immediately striking difference among state constitutional texts
concerns their respective guarantees of the separation of governmental powers.
Ten state constitutions follow the federal pattern by omitting any express re
quirement of separation of powers, incorporating that principle instead only by
implication from provisions establishing the three branches of the state govern
ment and "vesting" each type of power in one of those branches. 109 Twelve
states go beyond this to include an express statement that governmental powers
shall be separated, either standing alone1 10 or coupled with an express prohibi

tion against any department exercising any powers belonging to another, except
as otherwise provided elsewhere in the constitution. 1 1 1 The remaining state con
stitutions are even more pointed, coupling an express statement of the separa tion
109. T he ten states without express separation of powers provisions arc Alaska, Delaware, Ha
waii. Kansas. New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wisconsin. All ten,
however, explicitly vest legislative, executive, and judicial powers in those three branches. ALASKA
CONST. art. 11. § 1 . art. Ill, § I , art. IV, § 1 , DEL. CONST. art. II, § I , art. III, § I , art. IV, § I ;
HAWAII CONST. art. 1 1 1, § I , art . V , § I , art . VI, § l ; KANSAS CONST. art. 1 , § 3 , art. 2, § 1 , art. 3,
§ l; N.Y. CONST. art. Ill, § 1, art. IV, § I, art. VI, § 1 (phrased in terms of creating "unified court
.
system . rather than "vesting"' judicial power); N.D. CONST. art. III § 1 , art. V, § J , art. VI, § I , art.

XI, § 26 (explicitly stating three branches arc "co-equal"); OHIO CONST. art. II, § I , art. III, § S, art.
IV § l ; PA CONST. art. II, § I , art. IV, § 2, art. V, § l; WASH . CONST. art. II, § ) , art. III, § I , art.
.

IV. § l ; Wisc. CONST. art. IV, § I , art. V, § 1 , art. VII, § 2.
1 10. Sill stat�onnecticut, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and
South Dakota-have provisions that, though variously worded, confine themselves to an expression
of the separation the powers principle. CONN. CONST. art. II; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6; Mtss. CONST.

art. I. § l; N.H. CONST. Part First, art. 37; R.I. CONST. art. V; S.0. CONST. art. II. The New
Hampshi rc provision is noteworthy in that it clearly presupposes that the
principle will not be im
. full
posed m tts
conceptual rigor: "In the government of this state, the three essential powers thereof,
to wtt. the legislative. executive, and judicial, ought to be kept as separate
from, and independent of,
each other. as the nature of a free government will admit or
as is consistent with that chain of
'
connection that binds the whole fabric of the constitution
in one indissoluble bond of union and
.
amity . N.H. CONST. Pan First, art. 37 .
.

1 1 1 . Sill statcs.-- Alabama, Arizona, Illinois, Massach
usetts, Oklahoma, and Vermont-have
.
provi§ion\ of thi§ type. AL A CONST. an. Ill, §§ 42 &: 43; ARIZ. CONST.
art. Ill; ILL CONST. art. II.
'1._ CoNST. pt. 1 . art. XXX; OK L A . CONST.
§ I : M As.
art. IV, § l; VT. CONST. ch. II, § S. Again, while
theic prov1\1on� arc very difrercntly phrased, the basic
content is common.
.
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principle with an additional clause explicitly prohibiting "any person" belonging
to or exercising power under any branch from holding any office1 12 or exercising
any power or function 1 1 3 belonging to another. At least one state court has
attached importance to these textual differences, refusing to rely on precedent
from states whose separation of powers clauses were phrased differently from its
own. 1 14
Other textual provisions relevant to this analysis also show marked varia
tions from state to state. Virtually all states have constitutional provisions that
vest executive authority in the governor and impose upon the governor a duty
to see that the laws are faithfully executed. Yet states disagree on what spe
cific powers their respective governors will be given to carry out this duty.
Some states vest a general power to make administrative appointments in the
govem o r 1 1 5 or specifically debar the legislature from making such appoint-

112. Louisiana appears to be the only state with provisions so phrased:
§ 1. THREE BRANCHES
Section I .

The powers of government of the state are divided into three separate

branches: legislative, executive, and judicial.
§ 2.

LIM ITATI ONS ON EACH BRANCH

Section 2.

Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, no one of these branches,

nor any person holding office in one of them, shall exercise power belonging to either of the
others.
LA. C ONST.

art.

II, §§ 1 & 2.

113. Twenty-seven states have constitutional separation of powers provision s of this ty pe.

ARK. C ONST. art. IV, § I; CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3; COLO. CoNST. art. III; FLA. CONST. art. II,
§ 3; GA. C ONST. art. I, § II, para. III; IDAHO CONST. art. II, § I ; IND. CONST. art. 3, § I; IOWA
CONST. art. III, § I ; KY. CONST. §§ 27 & 28; ME. CONST. art. III, §§ 1 & 2; Mo. CONST. Declara
tion of Rights, a rt . 8; MICH. CONST. art. Ill, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. III, § I ; Mo. CONST. art. II,

§ I; M ONT. CONST. art. III, § I; NEB. C ONST. art. II, § I ; NEV. CONST. art. 3, § I; NJ. CONST. art.
III, para. l ; N.M. CONST. art III, § I ; O R . CONST. art. III, § I ; s.c. C ONST. art. I, § 8; TENN.

§ l ; UTAH CONST. art. V, § I ; VA. CONST. art. III, § I ; W .
VA. C ONST. art. 5 , § l ; WYO. CONST. art. 2, § I . The Tennessee provision may be taken as typical:
"No person or persons belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any of the powers prop
CONST. art. II, § I ; TEX. CONST. art. II,

erly b elonging to either of the others, except in the cases herein directed or permitted." TENN.

CONST. art. I I , § 2.
114. J.F. Ahem Co. v. Wi sconsi n State Bldg. Comm'n, 336 N.W.2d 679, 693-94 (Wis. Ct. App.
1983) (no t i ng separation of powers principle present in Wisconsin constitution only by implication,
and therefore decl in ing to regard factually similar cases from states with express separation of pow
ers clauses as persu as i ve precedent); see also Legislative Research Comm 'n v. Brown , 664 S. W .2d
907, 912 (Ky. 1984) (relying on strict wo rd ing of state's separation of powers clause as reason,
among others, to reject "liberal" in terpretation s of some sister state courts). But see

infra

notes 128

and 223-28 for examples of cases that do not depend on the wording of the text.
1 1 5. One common format for vesting such broad appointment powers in the governor recites
that, unless otherwise provided in the constitution, the governor shall appoint all single executive
heads of departments and all boards or commissions which head depart ments, or which have regula
tory or q u a s i-j udicia l functions. See, e.g. , ALASKA CONST. art. I l l, §§ 25-26 (Governor appoints

department heads and approves selection of chief executive officer); MICH. C ONST . art. V. § 3 (Gov
ernor appoints executive officer); N.J. CONST. a rt . V, § IV (same); S . D. CONST. art. IV. § 9 (same).
Other provisions are variously phrased, but are equally clear that it is the governor who has the
power to a p point, though tha\ power is sometimes subject to confirmation by the Senate or the
_
legisla ture as a whole. See, e.g. , fl.A. C O NST . art. IV, § 6(a) (requmng
either confirmation by Senate

or app ro va l by three cabinet members); I L L . CONST. art. V, § 9(a) (requiring majority of Senate);

[Vol . 6 6

TEMPLE LAW REVIE W

1238

tu re to decide the method by which
6
ments ' 1 1 while others leave it to the legisla
.
in some cases, reservmg that power to
officials will be appointed-including,
those admin istrators who must be
itself. 1 1 7 Some states carefully differentiate
the legislature may determine the
gubernatorial appointees from those for whom
1 1 s while in other states the text is, on its face, remark a
method of appointment,
11
nisms of appointment. 9
bly unclear as to which branch controls the mecha
NST. art. IV, § 5 1 (same);
art. V, § 3 (requiring advice and consent of Senate); Mo. CO
tion by General Assem
confirma
g
(requirin
10
§
N.Y. CONST. art V, § 4 (same); VA. CONST. art. V,
bly).
provisions making clear that
Particularly when combined, as they usually are, with additional
ent provisions obviously
appointm
such appointees serve at the pleasure of the governor, these
ative bureaucracy and
administr
the
of
control
both
locate
strengthen the governor, and tend to
hands.
governor's
the
in
squarely
actions
its
for
responsibility
electing or ap
1 1 6. See , e.g. , ILL. CoNST. art. V , § 9(a) (prohibiting General Assembly from
exception
specific
a
as
stands
prohibition
this
states
few
pointing officers of executive branch). In a
be cho
will
officials
ive
administrat
how
regulate
to
authority
plenary
otherwise
to the legislature's
sen. See, e.g. , OHIO CoNST. art. II, § 27 (prohibiting General Assembly from making any appoint

MINN. CONST.

ment or filling any vacancy); W. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (same).
1 1 7. See supra note 79, noting scattered provisions in older state constitutions placing power to
elect certain specified state officials in the hands of the legislature. A more common method of
granting effective power to the legislature is for the state constitution to provide that the governor
may appoint subordinate officials only insofar as he is authorized to do so "by law" or, alternatively,
that the governor enjoys the power to appoint unless the legislature provides by law for some other
methods of election or appointment of that official. See, e.g. , DEL. CONST. art. III, § 9 (providing
exception for vacancies that occur within two months of election); IND. CONST. art. 15, § I (appoint
ments not provided for in constitution must be appointed as prescribed by law); KAN. CONST. art.
1 5, § l (same); ME. CONST. art. v. pt. I , § 8 (same); Mo. CONST. art. II, § to (same); NEV. CONST.
art. 15, § 10 (same); OKLA. CONST. art. VI, § 13 (same); PA CONST. art. IV, § 8 (providing various
methods of making appointments depending on office involved and time of vacancy); R.I. CONST.
art. IX, § 5 (same as Indiana); TENN. CONST. art. VII, § 4 (granting legislature power to establish
method of filling vacancies); VT. CONST. art. II, § 20 (appointment power limited by constitution
and law passed by legislature); Wis. CONST. art. XIII § 9 (same).
Several state courts have held that such provisions have the effect of authorizing the legislature
to vest itself with the power to make certain administrative appointments, and that no violation of
separation of powers inheres in doing so. See, e.g. , State ex rel. Rosenstock v. Swift, 1 1 Nev. 1 28,
1 2-43 ( 1 876) (recognizing authority of legislature to choose officers of municipal corporations);
Rtchardso� v. Y.oung, 125 S.W. 664, 668 (Tenn. 19 10) (recognizing power of appointment does not
rest � xclus1vely m a�y one br�ch); see also Caldwell v. Bateman, 3 1 2 S.E.2d 320 (Ga. 1 984) (up
.
holdmg statute permuting legislature to make appointments to administrative body, without discus
.
sion of appomtments clause of state constitution); Parcell v. State, 620 P.2d 834, 837 (Kan. 1 9 80)
(same).
Interestingly, the Hawaii Constitution provides that the legislature may prescribe how
1
. . 1 8.
md1v1dual heads of departments are to be chosen, but that the governor must appomt members of
. .
boards or comm1ss1ons. HAw CONST art V § 5 The Lou1s1ana Const1tut1on, m contrast, makes
precisely the op�s1te allocation. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 5(H).
1 1 9. Prov1s1ons of this sort typicallY prov1·de that h
t e governor shall appomt all officers whose
.
.
appomtment "1s not otherwise provided fior. " su ch 1anguage
leaves unclear whether the "other pro. . , , referred
v1s1on
to must be found in the state const1tutton or may
be provided by statute. If the
.
former, then the governor has wide powers 0f appoi
ntment. If the latter ' then the legislature will
.
have stgm. ti cant control over the appointment process s
. ee, e.g COLO CONST. art. IV, § 6; IDAHO
CONST art IV § 6·, MONT. cONST. art. VI, § 8; N.M.
CONST· art. V, § 5,. N.C. CONST. art. III,
§ 5(8)-. UTAH CONST. art. VII' § lO· W. vA. CONST. art. VII,
§8
At least one court has construed this 1anguage
to mean that the governor has appointment
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I n addition, while the vast majority of state constitutions include provisions
specifically forbidding legislators from occupying other governmental positions
during their legislative terms, 1 20 those constitutions differ significantly as to the
exact content of the prohibition. Some of these incompatibility clauses are very
broadly phrased, prohibiting legislators from occupying any "office" 121 or from
accepting any other form of e mployment with the state or its subdivisions122
during their legislative terms. Others are a bit more limited, forbidding legisla
tors only from occupying "lucrative" offices or "offices of profit" while holding

their legislative seats. 1 23 Yet other provisions are quite narrow in scope, forbid-

authority unless the legislature otherwise provides. State ex rel Martin v. Melott,

359 S. E.2d 783,

785-86 (N.C. 19 87).
1 20. Such provisions serve a number of purposes. In addition to providing further support for
basic separation of powers concerns, they were also intended, like their federal cognate, to avoid
what the founders saw as the potential for corruption inherent in the practice of British ministries to
secure the support of members of parliament by dealing out lucrative offices to those supporters. See

supra note 45 and accompanying text.

1 2 1 . Though such provisions differ in detail as to their phrasing, the Hawaii version may be
taken as typical: "No member of the legislature shall hold any public office under the State . . . . The
term 'public office', for the purposes o f this section, shall not include notaries public, reserve police
officers or officers of emergency organizations for civilian defense or disaster relief." HAWAII
CONST. art. III, § 8; see also ARK. CONST. art. V, § 10 (prohibiting holding of any civil office); CAL
CONST. art. IV, § 1 3 (prohibiting holding of any other office or state employment); Cow. CONST.
art. V , § 8 (any federal or state office); CONN. CONST. art. III, § 1 1 (same); DEL CONST. art. II, § 14
(creating exceptions for attorneys and militia); MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 5 (creating exceptions for
post master or notary public); MONT. CONST. art. V, §

9 (creating exceptions for notary public and

militia); N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 28 (prohibiting legislators from contracting with state for one year);
N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (prohibiting any full time employment); OHlO CONST. art. II, § 4 (creating
exceptions for officers of political parties, notaries public, and militia); OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 1 8
(prohibiting concurrent state and federal employment); WY. CONST. art.

3 , § 8 (creating exceptions

for militia and notary public).
1 22 . The Arizona provision may be taken as typical of these:
No member of Legislature, during tenn for which he shall have been elected or appointed
shall be eligible to hold any other office or be otherwise emp loyed by the State of Arizona or
any county or incorporated city o r town thereof. This prohibition shall not extend to the
office of school trustee, nor to the employment as a teacher or instructor in the public
school system.
ARIZ. CONST. art . IV, pt. 2, §

5 (emphasis added); see a/s o MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 8.

I 23. The Florida constitution may be taken as typical of the very common provisions of this
sort, limited to "lucrative" offices, or offices of "profit" or "emolument:"
No person holding office of emolument under any foreign government, or civil office of
emolument under the United States or any other state, shall hold any office of honor or
emolument under the government of this state. No person shall hold at the same time
more than one office under the government of the state and the counties and municipalities
therein, except that a notary public or military officer may hold another office, and any
officer may be a member of a constitution revision commission, taxation and budget reform
commission, constitutional convention or statutory body having only advisory powers.

FLA. CONS T. art. II, § 5(a). See also, to like effect, ALA. CONST. art . X V I I , § 280 (prohibiting dual
employment if annual salary exceeds $200); A L AS KA CONST. art. I I , § 5 (prohibiting holding of any
office or position for profit); GA. CONST. art. I l l , § I I , para. IV; low A CONST. art. I l l, § 2 2 (prohih
iting holding of any position if salary exceeds $ 1 00 a year); ME. CONST. art. I V, pt. 3. § 1 1 & art. I X .
§ 2 ; Mo. CONST. art. III, § § JO - 1 1 (prohibiting holding of a n y office o r position fo r profit); Mo.
CONST. art. I I I, § 12 (prohibiting holding o f lucrative offices or positio ns ) ; NEB. CONST. art. I l l , § 9
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ding legislators only from simultaneously holding office under the federal gov
ernment or the government of another state, 1 24 or from holding an office the
election to which is vested in the legislative assembly. 1 2 s Some of the clauses are
exceedingly specific as to what combinations of offices are forbidden, 1 26 while
others are open ended, leaving it to the legislature itself to define which offices

are incompatible with legislative service. 1 2 7

Moreover, these fairly narrow textual points, important as they are, do not
tell the whole story. Different state constitutions embody radically different vi
sions of the relative weight of the political branches. Some state constitutions
were written to allow their legislatures to dominate the processes of state govern
ment, weakening the governor by splitting executive authority among several
independently elected officials, by limiting the substantive powers of the gover
nor, by limiting the governor to one or a few terms of office, or through other
mechanisms. Other state constitutions show an obvious preference for a strong
executive branch, and manifest this preference through such mechanisms as lim
iting legislative sessions, giving a governor extensive line-item veto authority, o r
through other arrangements.
Thus, it may well be argued that each state's doctrine on the allocation of
governmental power between political branches has a strong and inherent ele
ment of the sui generis, devoid of much potential to teach o r learn from other
states. To some extent this is true. Specific textual or historical differences may
well mandate unique results in individual cases. And, more broadly, states with
well defined traditions of dominance by either of the political branches may find

(same); N.J. CONST. art.

IV, § V, para. 4 (prohibiting holding ofoffices for profit and holding of both
Ill, § 7 (prohibiting dual civil appointment);

judgeship and seat on legislature); N.Y. CONST. art.
PA. CONST. art.

II, §

fit); S.C. CONST. art.

III, §

6 (prohibiting holding of any civil position where there is any monetary bene

Ill, § 24 (prohibiting

any dual state or federal employment); S.D. CONST. art.

3 (prohibiting employment in excess of $300 a year); TENN. CONST. art. II, § 26 (prohibiting

Ill
VI, § 6 (exempting m i itia, Post Master, an
Commissioner from dual employment ban); VA. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (prohibiting state

any dual state employment other than position in militia or as justice of peace)" TEX. CONST. art.

§ 19

i

(prohibiting legislative office); UTAH CONST. art.

United States

d

and federal employment).

§ 9 (prohibiting employment under two governments simultane
IX, § 6 (same); WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1 4 (same) .
CONST. art. V, § 30 ("No Senator or Representative shall during the term for

1 24. See NEV. CONST. art. IV,

ously);

R.I.

CONST. art.

.
. 1 2 5 See IND.

�ted in the legislative

which he was elccted, be eligible for any office, the election to which is v
. . . .. ); OR. CONST. art. IV, § 30 (same).

assembly .

1. 26. The oldest constitutions are the most specific. See, e.g. , MASS. CONST. ch. VI, art. 2
details of salary and distinguishing between offices); N.H. CONST. arts. 94 95 (listing
offices); VT. CONST. ch. II, § 54 (same).
1 21 7 · The Louisiana incompatibility provision seems the most open ended: "The Jeaislature shall

(providing

_

c·

.
enact aws defining and regulating duaI emp1oyment and defining
regulating and prohibiting dual
.
.
o fficc ho Id .mg m_ state and local governm ent." Statutes enacted

in res ponse to this mandate have
against constitutiona1 c ha11 enge. Bellon v. Deshotel,
370 So. 2d 22 1 , 223 (La. App. Ct.
.
197<1) · The North Caro11·na cqu1valent generally proh·b
1 1·ts Iegis
· 1ators �
1rom simultaneously occupying
"offices· of profit• .. bu1 provi·dcs t hat the General Assembl� �ay make
exceptions to this rule by
general law. N . C. CONST. art. VJ § 9 The Kansas
Constitution, m contrast, absolutely prohibits
'
· .
federal employees from serving 1·n the 1eg1s1ature ' and goes
.
on t° empower the legislature to enact
addi1ional d isqualifications. KAN CoNST. art. II, § 5.
.

been upheld

l 993J APPOIN TEES PERFOR MING ADMINISTRA TIVE FUNCT
IONS 1 241
it more true to the intentions of their framers to
consider decisions from states
with similar approaches to be more relevant than decisions
from states with a
different philosophy.
Despite these divergences, however, it seems possible to make useful com
parisons among states with respect to basic principles
of allocation of powers
between govern or and legislatures. Courts in fact do so. While
some decisions
rely solely on their own in-state distribution of
powers precedents, most state
distri bution of powers decisions cite and rely upon precedent from
other
states . 1 28 Such cross-state reliance is not unjustified.
To be sure, some differ
ences in consti tutional texts are so express in their
mandates and so clear in their
divergences as to preclude any real comparison
between jurisdictions. However,
these observations apply only to a limited number
of issues in a limited number
of state s. Many state constitutional texts are unclear, not self-evidently requir
ing either a pro-executive or a pro-legislative
interpretation. More importantly,
most of the hard issues relating to the
distribution of powers between governors
and legisl atures-including most of the questions
involving the authority of leg
islators to confer administrative tasks
on themselves or their appointees-are

simply not answered by these texts. Such issues must be determined through the
analysis of those
basic separation of powers principles that all states share.

Thus the possibility exists to make useful state comparisons with respect to
the basic allocation of powers principles between governors and legislators. But
to determine whether there are real possibilities for a unified state constitutional

approach, it is
necessary to look to the cases, to see whether their analyses show
su fficient similarity and cohesiveness across state lines.
B. A llocating Power Between Governors and Legislatures: The Exercise of
Administrative Powers by Legislators or Legislative Appointees
As was noted above, state legislatures cannot avoid delegating large meas
ures of discretion
over important and politically salient issues to administrative
bodies . However,
ceding total control over those administrators' exercise of that

discret ion to the executive is often politically unacceptable, particularly in sensi
tive areas such as the regulation of political campaigns or preparing the state
1 28. See, e.g. , Fox v. McDonald, 1 3 So. 4 1 6, 420 -2 1 (Ala. 1 893) (discussing precedent from
several states);
Greer v. State, 2 1 2 S.E.2d 836, 838-39 (Ga. 1975) (same); Book v. State Office Bldg.
Comm 'n, 1 49
N.E.2d 273, 293-97 (Ind. 1958) (citing both federal and sister-state precedent); State
ex rel. Black
v. Burch, 80 N.E.2d 294, 300-02 (Ind. 1 948) (relying on precedent from New York and

Louisiana for broad
construction of "functions" of branch of government); Frazier v. State, 504 So.
1987) (relying on precedent from Oklahoma and Texas to construe incompatibi 
lty clause);
Alexander v. State, 441 So. 2d 1 329, 13 35-37 (Miss. 1 983) (relying on federal and Indi
ana precedents);
State ex rel Spire v. Conway, 472 N.W.2d 403, 4 1 6 (Neb. 1991) (carefully picking

�d 675, 697 (Miss.

�

among precedents
from other states); State ex rel. Wallace v. Bone, 286 S.E.2d 79, 86-87 (N.C.
19 82) (cit ing
precedent from many states and discussing several at length); Monaghan v. School
District No. l,
3 1 5 P.2d 797, 803-04 (Or. 1957) (relying on precedent from Indiana, Louisiana, and
New York);
State ex rel. State Office Bldg. Comm'n v. Bailey, 1 50 S.E.2d 449, 452 (W. Va. 1966)

(e xtensively
discussing federal and Indiana precedent); J.F. Ahern Co. v. Wisconsin State Bldg.
Com m'n, 336 N.W.2d
679, 693- 94 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983) (distinguishing some sister-state precedents,
and expressly following analysis developed by Kansas courts).
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budget. Since state legislatures are generally far less able than Congress to exer
cise influence through informal oversight mechanisms, legislators may reason
ably believe that the only practical alternative is to secure legislative influence
directly, by structuring state government so that the legislature has a role in
choosing the administrators who will actually carry out its programs.
This legislative input into choosing agency members can take many forms.
In its weaker form, the legislature may require the governor or other appointing
authority to make appointments from a short list provided by the legislature, or
may retain for itself or its leadership the power specifically to designate individu
als to serve as its representatives on the board or commission. More intrusive,
and more constitutionally suspect, are systems whereby the legislature vests ad
ministrative functions in its own members, either by providing for the appoint
ment of individual legislators to a traditional agency or board or by transferring
administrative functions to a legislative committee.
Not surprisingly, these efforts by legislators to vest administrative powers in
themselves or their appointees have aroused varying responses from the different
state courts. To be sure, some of these divergent results may be explained on the
basis of differences in constitutional texts and history among those states. But as
will be developed below, each method by which legislatures may seek influence
over staffing seems to have given rise to several lines of analysis that garner
support across state lines, and thus give some indication of emerging state-based
approaches to the analysis of separation of powers issues.
Model 1 : Legislative Appointment of Administrative Officials
There is no doubt that state legislatures, like Congress, enjoy some powers
with respect to the appointment of administrative officials.

The legislative

branch always enjoys the authority to appoint its own functionaries who per
form duties incidental to the legislative process. 129 With respect to officials with
broader administrative duties, legislatures typically possess the power to set their
qualification s 1 30 and to approve certain high ranking gubernatorial appoin1 29. The concept of "administrator," as used in the discussion in the text thus does not include
indi vidua ls or bodies
.
. nature.
advisory m

� hich provide "housekeeping" services for the legislatu;e, or which are purely
�
�oubt, any reasonable notion of distribution of powers would have

Wtth ut any

to be construed o penmt the legtslature freely to appoint and remove those who merely provide
advice to the legislature, or who carry out its internal operations . See , e.g. , Q umn
·
v. DonnewaId,
483 N.E.�d 2 1 6, 222 (Ill. 1985? (holding legislative appointment of Board charged to recommend
_
levels 0f compcn�a!l on for pubhc officials
docs not violate appointments clause of Illinois Constitu
.
tion, h i. c h for_bids legislatu e f om appointing executive officials; here Board
operates only in advi
sory c paci ty , '" area of leg1slat1ve authority); see also Beadling
v. Governor' 308 N. W. 2d 269' 272
.
.
( M ich. Ct. App. 1 98 1 ) (d�p·t
1 e cIcar tnd1cat1on of leg1slat1ve
·
· tntent
·
to contrary, state statute granting
high ofth:ials n g h t to appeal terminations to Governor
could not apply to Director of House of
·
Represen tatives fiscal agency general se para t"ion
of powers pnnctples precluded executive agency
·
.
from p.issi�g upon p ropn.ety of termina
tion of purely legislative official).
DO. Se1' , e.g. . Murnl l v. Edwards, 6 1 3 So.
.
.
2d 1 8 5 ' 190 (La Ct App. 1992), (notmg
even tf
. .
.
�
' �
.·
·�··
-· to leave appotnttve power m
•'h0<i·
leaishturhands 0f governor, legislature may still "require that
.
>er\
h.1p o f a certai n board of com m ission
_
._
th c mcm.
·
possess cert am
· qualtficat
·
·
1ons
or be representative
.
.
or cer 1.am .1
.
• re as o f society, or that certain repres
.
.
entative grou Ps i n society
submit nominees to the
govrrnor for appointm ent" )' cer1· denie
. d 61
4 So. 2d 6S (La. 1 993). However, if
the legislature vests

�

�

� �

a

·

·

.

.

.

·

•

.

. .

.

.

·

·

•

•
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tees. 1 3 1 However, the question remains whether legislatures may go beyond this
limited role and, unlike Congress, confer on themselves or their leadership the
power to designate members of certain administrative boards and commissions.
As was noted above, a few state constitutions specifically resolve this question,
either by explicitly vesting appointive authority in the governor132 or by explic
itly forbidding the legislature to exercise such powers. 1 33 In most cases, how
ever, state constitutional appointment clauses are not facially exclusive; rather
they are generally phrased to permit a construction that would allow legislatures
to determine both how and by whom statutory administrative officials may be
chose n. 1 3 4
I n the absence of an explicit constitutional answer, the question of whether
legislatures or their leadership may appoint administrative officials must be re
solved o n general distribution of powers grounds. This in turn requires consid
eration of two distinguishable sub-issues.

The first sub-issue arises out of

constitutional provisions "vesting" executive authority in the governor and asks
whethe r the mere act of appointing a government official is so inherently "execu
tive" in nature that it must be reserved, absent explicit constitutional direction
to the contrary, to the governor or some other executive branch official. If the
answer to the first sub-issue is "no," the second sub-issue arises-assuming that
a legislature or legislative leader may appoint an official, whether and to what
extent general separation of powers considerations preclude that legislative ap
pointee from performing particular executive or administrative duties.
The first of these sub-issues can be disposed of fairly briefly. There is au
thorit y i n some states for the proposition that the act of appointing subordinate
administrative officials is, in itself, an inherently and exclusively executive func
tion.

Such claims have been made in federal cases, 1 3 5 in some older state

the governor with the power to appoint a particular official, it cannot describe the appointees' qualifi
cations so narrowly as to limit substantially the governor's discretion to choose whom to appoint.
Id. at 1 90 - 9 1 ; see also Wittler v. Baumgartner, 144 N.W.2d 62, 7 1 -72 (Neb. 1 966) (where constitu
tion vests appointive authority in governor, legislature may not describe qualifications of those ap
pointees i n such way as to limit governor's choice to only one or few individuals), overruled by State
ex rel. Douglas v. Nebraska Mortg. Fin. Fund, 283 N.W.2d 12 (Neb. 1 979).
1 3 1 . Vi rtually all state constitutions that authorize gubernatorial appointment of senior admin
istrative officials also provide for senatorial or, more rarely, legislative confirmation of these choices.
See provisions cited supra, note 1 1 5. Such provisions have seldom been litigated, but it is clear that
the power to reject is broad indeed. See , e.g. , Kraus v. Kentucky State Senate, 1 992 WL 3 1 1 175 (Ct.
App. Ky. Oct. 30, 1 992).
1 3 2 . See , e.g. , provisions cited supra , note 1 1 5.
1 3 3 . See supra note 1 1 6 and accompanying text.
1 34. See supra notes 1 1 7- 1 9 and accompanying text.
1 35 . See , e.g. , Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 1 1 6 (1926) (deriving inherent and exclusive
presidential power to hire and fire administrative officials from "vesting" and "take care'" clauses of
the Federal Constitution), overruled by INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 9 1 9 ( 1 9 8 3). But see Mormon v.
Olson, 4 8 7 U.S. 654, 671 (1988) (upholding vesting of appointment power in non-executive officer).
It is n oteworthy-and telling-that the major article discussing the leading case on appoint
ment authority under the Kentucky Constitution, while asserting that, "(i]t is generally recog111zed
that the power to appoint Executive Officers is inherently executive," supports this assertion solely
by citation t o federal case law. Snyder & Ireland, supra note 74, at 2 1 0 - 1 1 & n n 2 3 1 & 232.
.
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11 1 1 Howrecent state court dec1s10ns as we . 3
cases, 1 36 and occasionally in more
correctly
have
cases
better reasoned state
ever, most of the more recent and
and exclusive executive power. The
rejected this broad assertion of inherent
ls belongs ultimately to the people,
authority to appoint administrative officia
allocate the authority to appoint
and in drafting a constitution, the people may
elves b y making those offices
in any way they wish, or may keep it to thems
tutional mandate to the con
elective. Thus, in the absenc e of a clear consti
power to the executive, some
trary-an express grant of an exclusive appointing
lar case by the necessary
argum ent that such authority is required in a particu
ive authority, or an express
implication of some other express grant of execut
state constitutional inter
of
les
restriction on the legislature-ordinary princip
ded from choosing a
pretation would suggest that the legislature is not preclu
it creates. 1 3 8 Nor
method other than executive appointment to fill the offices
·

·

1 36. See, e.g. , Tucker v. State, 3 S N.E.2d 270, 280-85 (Ind. 1 94 1 ) ("except in cases where the
power of appointment is merely incidental to a major power expressly granted" in constitution, or
where new office created by legislature is made elective rather than appointive, power to name offi
cials part of "executive power'' vested in governor); In re Opinion of the Justices, 21 N.E.2d SS I,

556-57 (Mass. 1 939) (despite constitutional provision giving legislature power to "provide by fixed
laws for the naming and settling of all civil officers," power to appoint "special commissioners"
charged with redrawing election districts "executive power" which legislative officials cannot exer
cise); In re Opinion of the Justices, 19 N.E.2d 807, 817- 1 8 (Mass. 1 939) (same result).
1 37. See, e.g. , Alexander v. State, 441 So. 2d 1329, 1344.45 (Miss. 1 983) (power to appoint at
"core" of executive power and, therefore, legislature may not appoint individuals to serve on admin
istrative agencies that perform executive functions); Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664
S.W.2d 907, 922-23 (Ky. 1984) (discussing mixed precedents, but ultimately concluding power to
appoint inherently executive in nature); Opinion of the Justices, 309 N.E.2d 476, 479 (Mass. 1 974)
(state " Electronic Data Processing and Telecommunications Commission" unconstitutional on
ground, among others, that "[c]reation of a public office is a legislative function, but the appointment
of a particular person to office is the function of the executive department") (quoting Committee of
Admin. v. Kelley, 215 N.E.2d 653, 6S7 (Mass. 1 966)).
N te, howev r, that Alexander (completely) and Legislative R esearch Comm 'n v. Brown (par�
�
.
tially) involved situations where legislators themselves were personally occupying administrative
�oles. They were not just the appointers, but the appointees as well. This factor raises additional
issues'. ee
�otes 120-27, and may account for the court's hostility to the assertion of non
execuuve appomt1ve authority in those cases.

s supr�

1 3 8 . It is a traditional and fun damental tenet of state constitutional law that the legislature
·
rather than the executive is the "res1d uaI Iegatce" of th e ongmal
sovereign power of the people.
·
.
.
Thus, state executives, hke their federal counterparts, enjoy only those powers conferred by the
·
·
terms and necessary implications of th e1r
· respective
· constitutions.
·
State leg1slatures, however, unhke
·
.
Congress, retam all powers not expl1'c1'tlY t aken from them by the const1tutton.
·
·
·
This residual power
· ·
has been properly held to incIude, unIess the constitution
·
provides
to the contrary, the power to
.
. .
,
exercise the people s ongmal authority freely to determine how
officials will be chosen.
.
n w made expl citly by the Arizona Supreme
Court in Lockwood v. Jordan, 2 3 1
�
p· 2d
.
( nz. 1951), which held that the power to appoint "post auditor" was not inher.
.
ently executive m nature. The court in Lock ood
w
argued that m Anzona, at least, the people consid.
.
· t pnman
ered the power to 8ppom
1y a "polificaI question" which they largely kept to themselves.
.
ma k..mg many officcs elective and surrendenng
.
the nght to choose officials only in so far as "the
'. .
inherent necessi t ies and propnet1es seemed to
·
req uire
it.
· " ld· at 433. The court concluded therefore
.
.
that appointment power in genera1 15
not mherently "executive." Id. Rather the legislature
.
.
may not onIy provide a mode for fillin
.
g a va ancy 10 office, but tt
may create offices when
�
not prohibited by the constitufton and
provide for election of the officers
by the people,
·

·

·

:�� �:;�; �
•

·

�

.

·

·

'
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must the core concept of executive power-the power and duty to carry out the
laws-necessarily imply the exclusive power to appoint all of the subordinate
officials who may have some hand in administering the laws. The executive is
obligated to enforce the laws only to the extent that law itself permits her to do
so. Thus, even if a provision restricting her ability to choose certain subordi
nates were to interfere with enforcement of a particular law to some extent, that
restriction is itself part of the law and adherence to it is conceptually indistin
guishable from the executive's duty to abide by any substantive limitations the
legislature may choose to engraft onto its laws. 1 39 For these or similar reasons,
most recent decisions have upheld the power of state legislatures to confer ap
pointment authority on persons who are not members of the state executive, at
least where the legislature's choice as to the holder of that authority is related to
the functions of the agency. 140
Additional questions are raised, however, if the legislature purports to re
serve such appointment authority for itself or its leadership. Even if such an

allow for their appointment by a board or commission of their creation, or by the execu
tive, o r may itself make the appointment.
Id.; see also State ex rel. Morford v. Emerson, 8 A.2d 154, 1 56 -58 (Del. Super. Ct. 1939) (limiting
executive's power to make appointments); State ex rel Martin v. Melott, 359 S.E.2d 783, 787 (N.C.
1987) (appointment of Director of Administrative Hearings not exercise of executive power); Wentz
v. Thomas, 1 5 P.2d 65, 70-71 (Okla. 1 932) {permitting legislature to create and appoint members to
State H i ghway Commission).

Similar arguments have also been used to uphold the legislator's

power to create investigatory committees of its own members, committees that may continue to
function even after the legislative session has ended. See, e.g. , State v. Fluent, 191 P.2d 241, 246
(Wash. 1 948) (noting legislatures have such powers unless explicitly restricted in state constitution),
cert. denied sub nom. Washington Pension Union v. Washington, 335. U.S. 844 (1948).
Such arguments from the original reserved powers of the legislature, however, have not always
been accepted as sufficient to allow it to vest executive functions i n individual legislators. See, e,g. ,
State ex rel. Anderson v. State Office Bldg. Comm'n, 345 P.2d 674, 678-79 (Kan. 1959) (rejecting
argument that such vesting of original sovereign authority in state legislature permits legislature to
require that Governor appoint individual legislators to State Office Building Commission, arguing
such con struction would permit legislature to institute "parliamentary" government of sort founders
clearly rejected); Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 9 1 3 (Ky. 1984) (while
legislature repository of all state powers not vested elsewhere, this does not allow it to vest executive
functions in legislators; residual power includes only those powers legislative in nature).
1 39. See State ex rel. Martin v. Melott, 359 S.E.2d 783, 787 (N.C. 1 987) (distinguishing be
tween "the power to execute the laws" which it held to fall within core of executive authority, and
power to appoint others, which held did not).
140. See, e.g. , Caldwell v. Bateman, 3 1 2 S.E.2d 320, 325 (Ga. 1 984) (upholding statute empow
ering Speake r of House and President of Senate to appoint two of five members of Georgia Cam
paign and Financial Disclosure Commission); State ex rel. Martin v. Melott, 359 S.E.2d 783, 786-87
(N.C. 1 987) (rejecting arguments that text of state constitution vests governor with exclusive appoin
tive aut hority and act of appointing inherently exercise of executive power; and upholding statute
giving Chief Justice of State Supreme Court power to appoint Director of State Office of Administra
tive Hearings); see also Chiles v. Public Serv. Comm'n Nominating Council, 573 So. 2d 829, 832-33
(Fla. 1 99 I ) (legislature could freely determine how members of PSC would be appointed, since func
tions of agency-though both "executive" and "legislative" in nature--primarily legislative); In

re

Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 276 So. 2d 25, 29- 30 (Fla. 1973) (upholding legislative appoint
ments to administrative agency without discussing whether appointment is "executive" function);
Parcell

v.

State, 620 P.2d 834, 836 (Kan. 1 980) (same); State Bd. of Ethics v. Green, 566 So. 2d 623.

625 & n.4 (La. 1 990) (same).

[Vol. 66

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

1 246

exercise of appointment authority by the legislative branch survives scrutiny

under the appointments or vesting clauses of a state constitution, it ma� still fall

afoul of more general distribution of powers concerns, as expressed m many
states' explicit separation of powers mandates. 1 4 1
One line of analysis of these issues takes an essentially "formalist" approach
to distribution of powers analysis. In these cases the central issue tends to be
come one of classification-a legislative body or leader will be allowed to ap
point an official if, but only if, that official's duties are construed as essentially
"legislative" in character; a court, if but only if the official's duties are seen as
essentially judicial. Decisions from several states-including Louisiana, Massa
chusetts, Mississippi, and North Carolina-have taken such an approach, strik
ing down mechanisms of appointment that they saw as incompatible with the
functions of the appointee, 142 and upholding those that were seen to be
compatible. 143
One problem with such a conceptual approach, as with similar federal anal
yses, is that it is often very difficult to classify the functions of the appointee so
neatly. 1 44 But even where the duties of appointees can be classified with reason
able certainty, this approach can lead to results that seem hard to justify on
grounds of efficiency, accountability, or the need to prevent abdication of polit
ical responsibility-or even on grounds of any realistic fear of dangerous concen
tration of power. For example, in

Opinion ofthe Justices, 145

the Massachusetts

Supreme Court held unconstitutional a proposed Electronic Data Processing

1 4 1 . On the distinction between vesting or appointments clause analysis and separation of pow
ers analysis, see Charles Herman Winfree, State ex rel. Martin v. Melott: The Separation of Powers

and the Power to Appoint, 66 N.C. L. REV. 1 1 09 ( 1988), criticizing the Martin court for concentrat
ing only on the appointments clause issues, and failing to consider seriously the distribution of pow
ers issues raised when a legislature retains appointment authority in its own hands.

142. See , e.g. , Opinion of the Justices, 309 N.E.2d 476, 479-80 (Mass. 1974) (holding, among
other things, that neither courts nor legislature could appoint members to proposed Electronic Data

Processing and Telecommunications Commission, which would have unified operational control
over all data processing and communication services for entire state government); Alexander v.

Sta_te,

�l

So. 2d 1 329, 1344-45 (Miss. 1983) (distinguishing prior cases and holding, inter a/ia, that .
leg1slat1ve appointees could not exercise executive function of overseeing how appropriations were
spent); see also late ex rel. Martin v. Melott, 359 S.E.2d 783, 789- 9 2 (N.C. 1987) (Martin, J.,
.
dissenting) (arguing dulies of Director of State Office of Administrative Hearings primarily executive
.
and leg1slattve in nature, and therefore cannot be appointed by Chief Justice).
143. See Melott, 359 S.E.2d at 787-88 (Meyer, J., concurring) (arguing question of who m a y

�

appoint d e pends upon duties of appointee, that duties of Director o f Office
o f Administrative Hear
ings primarily judicial in nature, and permissible to vest appointment authority
in Chief Justice of
�tale Supreme Court); Guidry
Roberts, 335 So. 2d 438, 445-46 (La. 1 976) (legislature might
·
.
appoint members of ethics
commtttee because committee exercised no "executi
ve" functions). Com
.
are
v
St
Clark
ex
a
t
e
rel
1s issippi S ate Med. Ass'n, 381 So. 2d 1046 105
p
(Miss. 1980) (uphold
� .
,
'.
.
ing statute permitting MtSSissippi Medical Association to appoint
three members of State Board of

�

�

l

�

Health).

144. See, e.g. . Melott, 359 S E 2 d at 789- 92 (in wh'1ch
·
maJonty
· ·
opm1on
and dissent disagreed
.
· .·
.
largely
on questi on of whether dutres of Direct
or of State Office of Admm1strat1ve
· ·
·
·
should
Hearmgs
. . .
·
bc (; Iass1·r.1c d as primar
ily Jud1c1al , executive ' or Iegislaf1ve
· nature; best answer to quest1on·
m
.
·
fa m1l1ar to test takers everywhere-appears to be "all of
t he above").
1 4 5. 309 N.E.2d 476, 479-80 (Mass. 1974).
·

·
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and Telecommunications Commission.

That Commission would have been

composed of members appointed severally by the governor, the legislative lead
ership, and the Chief Justice of the State Supreme Court, and would have unified
operational control over all data processing and communication services for the
entire state government. Though the court described the motives behind the
commission as "laudable," 146 and acknowledged the possibility for some flexibil
ity in a nalysis where classification of the appointee's functions would be "ambig
uous," 1 47 it nonetheless held that the essentially "executive" functions to be
performed by the Commission precluded vesting any appointment authority
with either the court or the legislature. 148 While the court was doubtless correct
in its classification of the Commission's functions as "executive," it is hard to see
how such an arrangement could pose any real danger to the state, how it could
obscure political accountability for any branch's substantive work, or how it
might interfere with any branch or allow any branch to avoid its constitutional
responsibilities. The court did make some effort to argue that giving anyone
outside the judicial branch operative control of its data processing or telecom
munications systems might hold some "potential for dangerous concentration of
indirect but very real control;" 1 49 but the proof of that contention was essen
tially b y assertion. Surely telephones are no more necessary to the court's ability
to function than are, for example, heat and light or the physical structure of the
courthouse. Yet it would be difficult to argue that the court may not pay its
utility bills through a centralized administrative disbursing office, or that the
constitution requires the court to maintain its own unique building maintenance
staff.
Other courts have reached different results, upholding the power of the leg
islature to appoint administrators even if those administrators exercise non-legis
lative functions.

However, most of these courts have reached their results

without m uch in the way of convincing analysis of the separation of powers
issues inherent in such cross-branch appointments.

As was noted above, the

Louisiana Supreme Court in Green adopted an analysis apparently based upon
federal "functionalist" models, focusing its analysis solely on whether the legis
lature retained "control" of its appointees on the Board of Ethics for Elected
Offi cials after they were appointed. 1 so While this factor may certainly be rele
vant in determining whether a legislative appointment scheme constitutes an ef
fort at legislative aggrandizement, it seems less than complete as an analysis of
the distribution of powers requirement in this area. The Georgia Supreme Court
in Ca ldwell v. Bateman , 1 s 1 which similarly upheld the propriety of legislative
appoi ntees serving on the State Campaign and Financial Disclosure Commis-

146. Id . at 479.
1 47. Id.
1 4 8 . Id. at 480.
149. Id. at 48 1 .
1 50. State ex rel. Bd. of Ethics for Elected Officials v. Green, 566 So. 2d 623, 625 (La. 1 990).
See generally supra notes 60·71 and accompanying text for discussion of Green .

.

1 5 1 . 3 1 2 S.E.2d 320 (Ga. 1984) (upholding statute granting legislative leaders au tho ri t y lo ap
point two of five members of State Campaign and Financial Disclosure Commission).
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sion, was even less explanatory. It focused only on whether a legislator's exer
cise of the allegedly executive power of appointment violated the incompatibility
clause of the Georgia Constitution, without discussing the more basic separation
of powers issues implicit in such a n appointment. 1 5 2
These choices between sterile conceptualism or superficial functionalism are
not, however, the only options for a state court considering these issues. A dif
ferent line of decisions has emerged that takes a more pragmatic and potentially
fruitful approach to state distribution of powers questions, one that focuses in
stead on the particular circumstances of each case and the real possibility of
interference with the goals served by separation of powers if legislative appoin
tees were permitted to exercise those particular functions, regardless of how
those functions might be conceptually classified. Thus, for example, in

State, 1 5 3

Parcell v.

the Kansas Supreme Court considered an issue very similar to that

considered by the Louisiana court in Green -whether legislative appointees
might serve on the Kansas State Governmental Ethics Commission. The Com
mission consisted of eleven members with appointment authority carefully allo
cated among both the political branches and the political parties: five members
to be appointed by the Governor; two by the President of the Senate; two by the
Speaker of House; one by the Minority Leader of House; a n d one by the Minor
ity Leader of Senate. 1 54 Like the Louisiana Board of Ethics analyzed in

Green ,

the Kansas Commission was empowered to perform both legislative and execu
tive functions. 1 55 As in

Green,

a politician under investigation for alleged viola

tion of the state campaign finance laws challenged the constitutionality of the
Commission, arguing that a committee dominated by legislative appointees may
not perform executive functions.
The Kansas Supreme Court's prior decision in

State ex rel. Schneider

v.

which will be discussed below, 157 had established a framework for

Bennett , 1 56

1 52. 3 1 2 S . E.2d at 325. Compare Lockwood v. Jordan, 23 1 P.2d 428, 433 (Ariz. 1 9 5 1), in
which the Arizona Supreme Court upheld legislative appointment of a "post auditor" for the state.

�

The court w s at pains to argue that the legislature was not utterly debarred from exercising appoint
ment authonty. However, on the underlying issue of separation of powers, the court did little more
tha

� punt-identifying the "primary"

duties of that auditor as one of advising the legislature, and

leaving the door o�n for consideration of separation issues "if and when legislation is passed" im
posing executive duties on that auditor. Lockwood, 231 P.2d at 433. It is hard to conceive however
how any kind of auditor could operate without performing some functions ordinarily
executive

m

nature.

�onsidered

1 53 . 620 P.2d 834 (Kan. 1 980).
1 54. Id . at 835.
15 5 . The powers of the Commission included the power to adopt
regulations for administering
.
.
the state Campaign Finance
Act to create fionns fior cand1dates to use m reporting on their financial
affairs, to review those reports to issue ad v1sory
·
opinions
· ·
·
mterpreting
·
the Campaign Finance Act, to
mvesttgate complaints and if it finds cause, to refier the
matter
to
a
D1stnct
Attorney for prosecu.
. .'
.
tt0n.
Wh ile the Co mission has no direct enforcement
authority of its own the court had little
. concludm
difficulty m
g that at least some of its powers were among
those "traditionally ascribed to"
.
t he executtve branch. Id. at 836.
·

·

·

•

.

.

•

.

.

.

·

·

'.11

'

·

1 56. 547 P.2d 786 (Kan. 1 976).

1 5 7 . See infra notes 202- 1 1 and accompanying
text for a d1scuss1on of the Kansas Suprem e
. .
Co u rt. s prior dec1s1on.

.

·

·

·
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analysis of such distribution of powers issues in the state. According to Bennett,
the crucial inquiry does not focus solely on any conceptual classification of func
tions, but rather considers all of the specific facts of the case to determine
whether the challenged arrangement constitutes a "usurpation by one depart
ment of the powers of another department," defined as whether a department is
being "subjected directly or indirectly to the coercive influence of" another, and
whether there is "a significant interference by one department with the opera

tions of another department . " 1 58 To this extent, the Bennett/Parcell analysis
seems somewhat similar to federal analyses of the "functionalist" or "checks and
balances" stripe. 1 59 However, the Kansas court offered what appears to have
been a significant advance on federal law by specifying a non-exclusive but useful
set of four criteria that can be used to guide the judicial consideration of the
issues:
First, is the essential nature of the power being exercised-Is the
power exclusively executive or legislative or is it a blend of the two? A
second factor is the degree of control by the legislative department in
the exercise of power. Is there a coercive influence or a mere coopera
tive venture? A third consideration of importance is the nature of the
objective sought to be attained by the legislature-Is the intent of the
legislature to cooperate with the executive by furnishing some special
expertise of one or more o f its members, or is the objective of the legis
lature obviously one of e stablishing its superiority over the executive
department in an area essentially executive in nature? A fourth con
sideration could be the practical result of the blending of powers as
shown by actual experience over a period of time, w here such evidence
is available. 1 60
Appl ying these factors, the court i n Parcell held that the presence of legislative
appointees on the Kansas Governmental Ethics Commission did not violate the
requi rements of separation of powers, even though those legislative appointees
constituted a majority of the Commission's membership and would be eligible to

chair t h at Commission. Since the Commission did not possess direct enforce
ment authority, the court had n o trouble concluding that its functions were not
"essentially" executive in nature. 1 6 1 Applying the second factor, the court saw
the Comm ission's structure as an attempt to secure an appropriate balance be

tween t h e branches and the political parties, and therefore an exercise in "coop
eration " rather than an assertion of "coercive" control by either branch over the
other. 1 62 The third factor was also satisfied in the court's view because diffusion

of appointment authority was necessary-and therefore "cooperative" rather
than hegem onic in nature-to insure that the Commission would both be and be
1 5 8 . Parcell v. State, 620 P.2d 834, 8 3 6 (Kan. 1980) (quoting State ex rel. Schneider v. Bennett,
5 47 P.2d 786, 792 (Kan. 1 976)).
1 5 9. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
1 60. 620 P.2d at 836 (quoting Bennett, 547 P.2d at 786).
1 6 1 . Parcell, 620 P.2d at 836.
1 62. Id. at 836- 37. The court noted that not only did the system guarantee the governor five
out of eleven members would be his own appointees, but also that between five and seven of the
members would be of her political party. Id. at 837.
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perceived as sufficiently independent of both of the political branches whose
members it might be called upon to investigate. 163 Finally, the court endorsed
the trial j udge's speculative, but probably well founded, conclusion that the
"practical" effects of this mixture of powers would be positive in nature. 1 64
To be sure, the analysis used by the Kansas Supreme Court in Parcell is not
beyond criticism. The four factors identified by the court-the "essential" na
ture of the powers being exercised, the degree of cross-branch control, the pres
ence or absence of hegemonic intent, and the practical consequences-while
perhaps useful, may well be very difficult to apply in particular cases. Classifica
tion of governmental functions is always difficult, and the answer to other ques
tions posed-questions such as whether a particular level of influence by one
branch over another rises to the level of "coercion," or w hether the legislators'
intentions are benignly cooperative or hegemonic-appear to reside primarily in
the eye of the beholder. Nor is it obvious why these four factors were chosen by
the courts. Neither Parcell nor Bennett contains any convincing derivation of
these factors from the basic concepts or purposes underlying distribution of
powers theory, and the factors identified by the court appear only indirectly
relevant to the concerns of efficiency, accountability, or abdication that ought to
lie at the heart of distribution of powers analysis on the state level. Nevertheless,
the Kansas approach does point in a useful direction.

Its analysis seems far

better able to accommodate the evolving needs of state governance, while at the
same time preserving the necessary core of autonomy that each branch must
retain.

It is certainly more likely to lead to socially beneficial results than the
1 5
strained conceptualism of the Massachussets court in Opinion of the Justices, 6
or the unsupported single-factor "control" test of the Louisiana court in
Green . 1 66
Model

2:

Legislators Performing Administrative Functions

The last set of issues to be discussed in this partial survey involves legisla
tors who per�o?ally serve on administrative committees, or who personally un
.
dertake a mmtstrattve
tasks, while simultaneously retaining their legislative

�

It is clear that sitting legislators may perform administrative functions
that are part of t e inte�al ?P rations of the legislature itself. But when legisla
�
tors venture outside of this hmtted realm and undertake administrative functions
relating to the wider functions of government, two additional issues are raised:
first, whether such a dual role violates state constitutional incompatibility

seats .

�

clauses ·• 1 67 and second • whether such a comb'mat · on of functions m a smgle per1
·

·

·

1 63. Id.

164. Id.

1 6 5 . Sec supra notes 145- 49 and accompanymg text ior
r
d1scuss1on of Opinion of the Justices.
.
I L6
"-- supra notes 60 71 and accompanymg text •Or
u . .>ec
,
discussion of State v. Green .
.
.
.
.
16 7 . Scc supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text
for d'1scuss1on of state constitutional m.
compatibility clauses. Su genera11Y Mat heson, supra note
.
20 at 327-3 0 Some state constitutions
.
'.
do not co nta i n an express i ncom t'bT
1 1 tty c 1ause,
·

·

·

·

•

·

:�

or

ay contain clauses limited to "offices of profit"
'?
·
·
or the equiv alen t . In such circ
.
stances, a separation of pow
ers prov1S1on wh'1ch includes an express prohibition on any person 1·n 0ne b ranch perfo .
.
rming the functions
of another, see supra notes
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son violates distribution o f powers concerns.
Cases involving these issues fall into two general categories. The first type
are relatively innocuous, consisting of cases in which individual legislators oc
cupy minor pre-existing executive or administrative posts. Such cases promi
nently include legislators who are also employed as teachers in the state's public
schools or universities, 1 6 8 or cases in which an individual legislator happens to
occupy a seat on a traditional administrative board or commission. 169 In such
cases the essential issue is usually whether the combination of roles at issue vio
lates t h e particular terms of the state constitution's incompatibility clause. Basic

distribution of powers concerns are of relatively minor import. 1 10

The second-and potentially more dangerous-category of cases is that in
which the presence of individual legislators on the body performing assertedly
executive or administrative functions is mandated by the law that creates that
body.

Such results can be obtained in either of two ways. First, an enabling

statute might specify that one or more legislators be appointed, either ex officio
or in their individual capacities, to a seat on what is otherwise a traditional

1 12- 1 3 , has been used by some courts as an alternative constitutional basis for a broad prohibition on
simultaneous exercise of legislative and administrative roles. See, e.g. , State ex rel. Black v. Burch,
80 N.E.2d 294, 302-03 (Ind. 1948) (holding members of General Assembly cannot be employed by
administrative department).
1 68 . The issue of whether an individual can be simultaneously a member of the legislature and
a public school or university teacher has generated a surprising amount of controversy. Compare
Jenkins v. Bishop, 589 P.2d 770, 774-75 (Utah 1978) (per curiam) (holding teacher may serve on
legislature) with Begich v. Jefferson, 441 P.2d 27, 34-35 (Alaska 1 968) (holding public school teach
ers cannot simultaneously hold legislative office), oyerruled by Zerbetz v. Alaska Energy Ctr., 708
P.2d 1 270 (Alaska 1985); Stolberg v. Caldwell, 402 A.2d 763, 773 (Conn. 1978) (same); Frazier v.
State ex rel. Pittman, 504 So. 2d 675, 700 (Miss. 1987) (public school teacher cannot hold office
where salary derives from tax levies); State ex rel. Spire v. Conway, 472 N.W.2d 403, 415 (Neb.
1 99 1 ) (tenured assistant professor at state university on unpaid leave also barred); Monaghan v.
School Dist. No. l, 3 1 5 P.2d 797, 802-04 (Or. 1 957) (member of state legislature ineligible for teach
ing position); see also In re Sawyer, 594 P.2d 805, 809 (Or. 1979) (sitting judge may not be employed
as paid part-time teacher at public college).
169. See, e.g. , Sheffield v. State Sch. Bldg. Auth., 68 S.E.2d 590, 596-97 (Ga. 1952) (since
membership on Authority not "civil office," Speaker of House of Representatives can sit as member
of that Authority without violating state constitutional provision); State v. Hayden, 184 P.2d 366,
373 (Or. 1 947) (holding, on separation of powers grounds, appointment of state representative to
seat on State "Fish Commission" unconstitutional).

1 70. This is not to say, however, that important separation of powers concerns could never
arise i n such circumstances. As was noted at note 120, supra, the founders' generation feared the
potential for corruption that could result if the appointing authority could use the possibility of
appointment to a truly lucrative office in return for a legislator's support. Where such circumstances
exist, real separation of powers concerns are present.
Though uncommon, a few of the cases involve at least a whiff of such concerns. See, e.g., State
ex rel. Black v. Burch, 80 N.E.2d 294, 296-98 (Ind. 1948), in which four members of the Indiana

legislature had been appointed to salaried positions on various administrative agencies-as Secretary
of the Flood Control Water Resources Commission, Director of Motor Vehicle Department of the
State Public Service Commission, Superintendent of Maintenance for the Stale High"': ay Commis
sion, and in an unspecified but remunerative capacity with the Board of Barber Exammers. While
not quite saying so, the court seemed clearly to imply that the offices were sinecures, and ruled the
legislators' simultaneous occupation of those offices unconstitutional. Id. at 302.
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legislature migh t achieve a similar re
administrative agency. Alternative ly, the
tive or executive powers on what is-or
sult by purporting to confer administra
Examples of such traditional ad
was-a purely or primarily legislative body.
personally served include adminis
ministrative bodies on which legislators have
capital construction projects1 7 1 o r
trative organs that administer the state's
172 Examples of legislative
perform other miscellaneous administrative tasks.
functions of various types
e
bodies that have gradually acquired administrativ
ch Commissions" or "Leg
prominently include the so-called "Legislative Resear
of various types, 1 74 and
islative Councils," 173 Legislative Finance Commissions
powers. 175
fiscal
other
e
exercis
similar legislative bodies purporting to
Sheffield v. State Sch. Bldg.
1 7 1 . The cases are common, and decisions go both ways. Compare
"civil office," and Speaker
not
is
Authority
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1952)
(Ga.
596-97
590,
Auth., 6 8 S.E.2d
); State ex rel Fatzer v.
of House of Representatives therefore can sit as member of that Authority
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(upholding
1954)
(Kan.
Kansas Turnpike Auth., 273 P.2d 198, 207-08
road projects t o
of
types
various
operate
and
construct,
finance,
to
created
Turnpike Authority
t Review Panel, 3 6 3
chairmen o f State and House Committees on Roads); Tall Tower v. Procuremen
adminis
S.E.2d 683, 685-86 (S.C. 1987) (upholding presence of legislators on Panel which conducts

State
trative review of protests arising under state Procurement Code.); J.F. Ahem Co. v. Wisconsin
Bldg. Comm'n, 336 N.W.2d 679, 696 - 97 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983) (upholding mixed executive and
legislative membership on State Building Commission, empowered to, inter alia, select sites for pub

lic buildings, approve construction contracts, administer construction, and lease those buildings)
with Greer v. Georgia, 212 S.E.2d 836, 838-39 (Ga. 1975) (striking down statute appointing six
sitting legislators to World Congress Center Authority, public corporation authorized to construct
and operate Center); Book v. State Office Bldg. Comm'n, 149 N.E.2d 273, 297 (Ind. 1958) (striking
down Commission created to oversee building of new State Office on ground it contained legislative
members); State ex rel. Anderson v. State Office Bldg. Comm'n, 345 P . 2 d 674, 682-83 (Kan. 1 959)
(striking down statute providing Governor may appoint only members of legislature to seven person
State Office Bldg. Comm'n); State

ex rel

State Office Bldg. Comm'n

v.

Bailey,

1 50 S.E.2d 449, 456

(W. Va. 1966) (holding State Office Building with legislative members unconstitutional).

1 72. See, e.g. ,

People v. Tremaine,

168 N.E. 8 1 7, 822 (N.Y. 1929) (incompatibility clause pro

hibits legislators from sitting on committees which control spending); State

ex rel.

Wallace v. Bone,

286 S.E.2d 79, 81 (N.C. 1982) (striking down appointment of four legislators to North Carolina
Environmental M anagement Commission). Such bodies are probabl y far more common than the

�ase law dis�ussing them would indicate.

In at least one recent case, an administrative body which

incl uded legislators among its members-the Pennsylvania Intergovernmental Cooperation Author

ity, a body formed to enter into binding financial reform plans with major cities in that state-was
upheld without disc u ssion of he merits of the distribution of powers issues raised, on grounds of
lack of s ta n dm g Local 22, Philadelphia Fire Fighters' Union v. Commonwealth 613 A. 2d 522 526
'

�

.

'

( Pa. 1 992).

1 7 3. �<'<'. e.g. Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 9 1 (Ky. 1984) (strik
5
.
_
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It is easy to understand why legislatures would want to require a legislative
presence o n certain controversial or politically powerful administrative organs.
In view of the institutional problems caused by short legislative sessions and lack
of staff, the urge to create a continuously functioning body, one that can act on
the legislature's behalf when it cannot fend for itself, can be strong indeed. And
even while the legislature is in session, the most direct way for legislators to
assert influence on the way statutes and programs are administered is for legisla
tors themselves to sit as members of the relevant agency or board.
Such service by a legislator on an administrative body does not necessarily
violate state constitutional incompatibility provisions, at least those which, like
most, preclude sitting legislators from occupying administrative "offices" during
their legislative terms. 176 Particularly where the legislators serve without pay,
the additional responsibilities that such service entails may not rise to the level
of an "office." 1 77 However, even if not made per se unconstitutional by such an
incompatibility clause, such a combination of roles in a single individual raises
serious distribution of powers questions-questions that result not only from the
mixing of conceptually different roles, but also from the real potential for such
arrangements to allow the combination of lawmaking and law-applying func-

Comptroller General, Chairman of Senate Finance Committee, and Chairman of House Ways and
Means Committee, all ex officio, and authorized to deal with fiscal affairs of state); Elliott v. McNair,
156 S.E.2d 42 1 , 43 1 (S.C. 1 967) (upholding State Budget and Control Board, comprised of Gover
nor, State Treasurer, Comptroller General, C hairman of Senate Finance Committee, and Chairman
of House Ways and Means Committee, all ex officio) with Alexander v. State ex rel. Allain, 441 So.
2d 1329, 1 3 39- 42 (Miss. 1983) (striking down, inter alia, statute setting up joint executive/legislative
Commission o n Budget and Accounting with broad powers to prepare proposed state budget, over
see administration of certain appropriations, regulate purchases by state agencies, and administer
state employees' life and health insurance plans); Jn re Opinion of the Justices, 1 9 N.E.2d 807, 8 1 718 (Mass. 1 9 3 9) (striking down legislative "Recess Commission" which purported to exercise au
thority to approve governor's decisions to spend emergency funds); see also Stockman v. Leddy, 129
P. 220, 223 (Colo. 1 9 1 2) (striking down committee of legislators empowered to investigate and act in
prosecuting or defending certain actions on part of state), overruled by Denver Assoc. for Retarded
Children, Inc. v . School Dist., 535 P.2d 200 (Colo. 1 9 75).
1 76. See supra notes 1 2 1 -27 and accompanying text for discussion of state constitutional in
compatibility provisions.
1 77. See , e.g. , Sheffield v. State Sch. Bldg. Auth., 68 S. E.2d 590, 597 (Ga. 1 952) (Speaker of
Georgia House of Representatives could sit as member of state School Building Authority without
violating incompatibility clause of state constitution). But see Jn re Opinion of the Justices, 19
N. E. 2d at 8 1 7- 1 8 ( legislator's seat on "Recess Commission" of legislature constituted forbidden OC·
cupation of "civil office" under meaning of state constitution).
It must be noted, however, that the express incompatibility clauses may not be the only source
for a constitutional prohibition on dual officeholding. As was discussed at notes 1 1 1 - I J, supra some
'.
state constitutional "separation of powers" clauses contain additional language expressly forb1ddmg
persons belonging to or exercising powers under one branch from holding office or exerc1smg any
power or function of another. Such clauses can function as alternative grounds for proh1b11mg
legislator from exercising an administrative role.

a

Where such provisions refer to holding "office" in

another branch, they do not seem greatly broader than a typical incompatibility clause. However.
_
10 persons m one branch

where the second c lause of the state separation of powers provision refers

exercising the "powers" or "functions" of another branch, a much broader prohibition on dual of·
ficeholding may result.
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178 Depending on the circumstances,
tions in the same persons or institutions.
result in the small-scale "tyranny" of
such a combination of roles could well
of the agency at issue, provide a
effectively unfettered discretion on the part
over anothe r, interfere with the
mechanism for the domination of one branch
of responsibility and account
lines
the
efficient operation of government, or blur
process of democr atic con
ability that are required to link political actors to the
trol of govemment. 179
the analyses em
Although the factual circumstances and outcomes vary,
who
rs
personally exer
ployed by state courts to analyze cases involving legislato
d
cise administrative functions are strikingly similar to the analyses employe in
the cases involving legislative appointees to administrative agencies, addressed
above. Here too, many of the courts that have struck down such arrangeme nts
have done so largely for "formalist" reasons. 1 80 Thus, for example, in Book v.
State Office Building Commission , 1 8 1 the Indiana Supreme Court declared that a
Commi ssion created to oversee the erection of a new state office building was
unconstitutional solely because that Commission contained both executive and
legislative officials among its members. 182 Though the court acknowledged in
principle the need for "flexible" interpretation of distribution of powers princi
ples, it relied on federal as well as state authority to conclude that executive and
legislative functions must be kept radically separate. 1 8 3 Since the court classified

the Commission as an "executive" organ, 184 no legislator could serve on it. The
court made no attempt to analyze why application of such a strict rule was
1 78. This is the aspect of separation of powers analysis that Professor Vile refers to as the
"separation of persons" strand. VILE, supra note 24, at 17.
1 79. See
1 80. See

infra notes
infra notes

180-221 and accompanying text for a futher discussion of these problems.
181-85 and accompanying text for discussion of Book v.

State Office Bldg.

Comm'n. See also Stockman v. Leddy, 129 P. 220 (Colo. 1 9 1 2) (striking down committee of legisla
tors formed to prosecute ceratin legal actions on part of state), overruled by Denver Assoc. for Re
tarded Children, Inc. v. School Dist., 535 P 2d 200 (Colo. 1975); State ex rel. Judge v. Legislative
Finance Comm., 543 P. 2d 1317, 1 3 2 1 (Mont. 1975) (holding committee composed of legislative
members, purportedly authorized to review and approve expenditures by state agencies in excess of
.

appropriations and any allocation of non-general fund monies not available at previous general ses
sion of legi lature, unconstitutional); State v. Hayden, 184 P.2d 366, 373 (Or. 1947) (holding state
�
representative may not be appointed to State Fish Commission); State ex rel. State Office Bldg.
Co m' n v. Bailey, 150 S.E.2d 449, 456 (W. Va. 1966) (holding c ommittee unconstitutional where
� .
leg1slat1ve members perfonn administrative or executive functions
).
1 8 1 . 149 N.E.2d 273 (Ind. 1958).

1 82. _Id. at 293-97 . The Commission consisted of the Governor,
Lieutenant Governor, the
.
Budget Director, the legislative members of the State
Budget Committee one additional member of
the Senate (appointed by the Lieutenant Governor
), and one additiona member of the House of
_ ted by the Speaker)
Rep. (appom
All memuc:rs
'-�
served ex officto; the leg1 slat1ve members constituted
a maJon ty of the Commission. Id. at 293
.
1 8 � · Id. at 293-97 (quoting O'Donoghue v.
United States 289 U.S. 5 1 6 530 (1933)· Springer v.
. .
Phihppm sl nds, 277 U.S. 189, 202
(1 928); THE FEDERAL! No. 4 8 (Ja es Madiso )· and cross
,
sec ion 0
ra ters of Federal Constitution, for
�
proposition that strict separation of powers must be
. d).
mam tame
·

.

·

·

i

·

·

.

;� �

�

�

�

1 84. The court's discussion clearly
shows the "classifying" methodology of the formalist

approach:

The members of the Commission
.
are c1e r1 not ud. c. al or leg
islative officers, hence, they,
J 1 1
� Y
of necessity, must fall within
the execut1ve department of State
Government, and are ad-
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necessary to prevent abuses in the case before it, but rather relied upon the gen
eralized potential for evil that might occur if similar institutions were in fact
used to usurp the governor's duty to execute the laws. 1ss
Recent cases coming to similar conclusions have tended to rely on both the
formalist argument articulated i n Book, and on a more general argument about
the nature of the legislative function-that legislatures may create instrumentali
ties to implement legislation, but may not "retain some control over the process
of implementation by appointing legislators to the governing body of the instru
mentality." 1 8 6 Such reasoning was applied in Greer v. Georgia to preclude indi
vidual legislators from serving as members of the Authority created to oversee
construction of Atlanta's World Congress Center; 1 87 in State ex rel Wallace v.

Bone to strike down a statute giving legislative leaders power to appoint four
legislators to the North Carolina Environmental Management Commission; 1 88
and in A lexander v. State ex rel. A llain to preclude legislators from sitting on
the Mississippi Commission on Budget and Accounting, a n organ that both as-

ministrative officers in the sense that they would perform functions which usually are and
would be performed by administrative officers within the executive department.
Book v. State Office Bldg. Comm'n, 1 49 N.E.2d 273, 295 (Ind. 1958).
1 8 5. Id . at 296. "If members of the Legislature may be appointed as members of Boards which
exercise functions within the executive-administrative department of Government, the door is then
open for the Legislature to enter and assume complete control thereof." Id .
1 86. Greer v. Georgia, 2 1 2 S.E.2d 836, 838 (Ga. 1975).
1 87. Id . at 839. The statute at issue provided that the Authority was to construct and operate
the Center, and that six of the 20 members of that Authority must be appointed from the members of
the General Assembly. Id. at 837. The court acknowledged "it is impossible to draw a mathemati
cal line by which every action can be exactly classified; and there are some matters which do not
inherently and essentially appertain to one department of government rather than to another." Id.
at 838 (quoting Southern Ry. Co. v. Melton, 65 S.E. 665, 667 (Ga. 1909)). However, it had no
difficulty i n concluding that the functions o f this Authority were "primarily, if not exclusively, exec
utive," and that legislators were not permitted to have any direct role in implementing the laws.

Greer, 2 1 2 S.E.2d at 838. The court rejected, without discussion, arguments that such dual service
would not, under the facts of the case, pose any real threat to the values underlying the separation of
powers principle. Id. at 837.
188. 286 S.E.2d 79, 81 (N.C. 1982). The North Carolina Environmental Management Com
mission was a quasi-independent regulatory agency with the investigatory, permitting, and enforce
ment powers typical of such an agency. Id. at 79-80. Of the 17 members of the Commission, 1 3
were to be appointed b y the governor, two by the Speaker of House from the membership of the
House, and two by the President of the Senate from the membership of the Senate. Id. The court
relied upon the tradition of strict separation of powers in North Carolina and an extensive review of
sister-state precedent to conclude that legislators may not sit on agencies with such operational
responsibilities:
It is crystal clear to us that the duties of the EMC are administrative or executive in char
acter and have no relation to the function of the legislative branch of government, which is
to make laws.

We agree with the Georgia court's holding in Greer that the legislature

cannot constitutionally create a special instrumentality of government to implement spe
cific legislation and then retain some control over the process of implementation by ap
pointing legislators to the governing body of the instrumentality.

Id. at 88. The court was apparently unmoved by the fact that its decision would affect some 49 other
North Carolina boards and commissions on which legislators were then serving as members. Id.; see
generally Orth, supra note 20, at 10-17 (critiquing Wallace as unsupported by precedent and unnec
essarily rigid).
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sisted

in

preparing the state budget and oversaw
expenditures. 1 89

certain

administrative

Such strict approaches may have some merit at least as prophylactic meas
ures. Given the real possibility for abuse inherent in a l lowing those who write
the laws also to determine how those laws shall be applied, a strict refusal ever
to allow legislative and administrative functions to be joined in the same person
may indeed be the safest course. But this formalist approach suffers from the
defects of its virtues-it has tended to obscure the difference between novel gov
ernmental arrangements that are real violations of the principles of distribution
of powers and those that are merely technical violations. Thus, for example, in

Alexander

State ex rel. Allain , 190 the Mississippi S upreme Court's formalist

v.

analysis led it to declare unconstitutional not only the Commission on Budget
and Accounting's role in supervising expenditures by administrative agencies 1 9 1
mentioned above, but also the Commission's role in preparing a proposed budget
that would thereafter be presented to the legislature as a whole. The court ac
knowledged that both the Governor and the legislature had important roles in
the budget-making process, 192 and that each could appoint some of their mem
bers o r other experts or advisors to assist them. 193 However, the court held that
those legislative and executive appointees could not sit together on a common
budget drafting committee without violating the requirement of separation o f
powers. 194 The grounds for this holding appear to be wholly conceptual-issues
of whether such an arrangement posed any real danger to the state, whether it
obscured political accountability for budgeting decisions, or whether it allowed
any branch to avoid its responsibilities were all left undiscussed. The fact that
such an arrangement might be of "practical benefit to the state," or that it might
be "efficient, convenient and useful in facilitating the functions of government"
was, we were told, "legally irrelevant." 195
1 89 . 441 So. 2d 1329, 1338-42 (Miss. 1983). The statutes at issue in Alexander authorized
legislators to sit on several administrative boards and commissions, the most significant of which was
the Commission on Budget and Accounting ("CBA"). The CBA was composed of the Governor,
Lieutenant Governor, and nine members of the legislature. Its powers included preparing a pro
posed st t bu get, some administration of appropriations, regulating purchases by state agencies,

��

�

�

�

and admm1sten g state empl yees' life and health insurance plans. Id. at 1 33 8 - 39. The court began
_
by notmg wha tt saw as the intentions of the drafters ofthe state constitution to enact a particularly

�

strong separation of powers provision to declare all such boards and commissions unconstitutional
.
.
Id. at 1 335- 36. The court sharply dtst1.ngu1·shed between Iegis
· ·
· 1ahve
and executive
roles and ' c1tmg
·
·
the federal decision in Chadha, concluded that all of the actt'vi·ti'es of the comm1ss1on
· h eren ti y
were m
· ·
.
.
.
executive
functions
.m which
legislator
s cannot participate in any way. Id. at 1 338- 42.
.
1 90. 44 1 So. 2d 1 329 {Miss. 1983).
'

1 9 1 . Id. at 1 34 1 .

.
1 92 . Id. at 1 339-40 {noting "budgetmakmg
·
· a Iegislat1ve
ts
·
prerogative and responsibility" but
.
[t)he legislature has acknowledged the ng
· ht 0f the governor to submit to it his recommendations
.
..
upon t he budget, a nght founded on explicit text of
state constitution).
19 3. The nght of the executive to appom
· t sueh subordinate
·
advisory officials was unquestioned ·'
the ng ht o f the 1eg1s
· 1ature to do so was expressly recognize
. db
Y the court: "The Legislature of this
.
State has the power and preroga t'tve to create such
.
.
a committee as tt may deem appropnate to assist
. . .
. .,, Id.
It m its budget-making respons1·b·l·
1 •hes
at 1 339.40 .
1 94. Id. at 1338- 4 1 .
1 9 5 . Alexander v. State ex rel. Allain 441
.
So. 2d 1 329, 1 33 9 (Miss
'
. 1 983).
..

·
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Nor were earlier cases that reached the contrary conclusion, thus permit
ting legislators to exercise particular administrative tasks, any models of sophis
ticated or convincing legal analysis. On the contrary, many of the early cases
that upheld such mechanisms against separation of powers challenges tended to
analyze them in a superficial m anner, either avoiding the issue, t96 relying on the
purest ipse dixit, 197 or simply asserting, without much analysis, that the func
tions performed by the agency at issue are "incidental to" proper legislative
functions . 1 9 8 This lack of critical examination may have been an artifact of the

196. See, e.g. , Branham v. Lange, 16 Ind. 497 (1861) (upholding constitutionality of statute
giving committee of three legislators power to authorize charges against Civil War emergency fund).
The question of whether the structure of the committee violated separation of powers principles was
squarely presented to the court, in the s trongest terms. The Court quoted the grounds of the appeal
as including the following:
The appointment of this Auditing Committee, composed as it is of members of the Legisla
ture, i s against Art. 3 of the Constitution of the State, in as much as the distribution of
powers of the government is violated. If the General Assembly can safely appoint, out of
its own members, a committee for the settlement and the examination and allowance of
claims, they can also arrogate to themselves the custody of the public money; the executive
prerogative of granting pardons; and elaborate, for the judiciary, a set of rules to be ob
served by the Courts: all of which would lead to revolution and anarchy.
Id. at 499. The court's rather bland reply merely noted that "the Legislature may prescribe rules as
to the custody of public money, (see the Embezzlement Law,) may prescribe rules as to the granting
of pardons, . . . . and has elaborated a set of rules to be observed by the Courts." Id. at 500 - 0 1 .

While t h e implied point as to the absence of "revolution and anarchy" was undoubtedly correct, the
court really failed to consider the possibilities for abuse that might inhere if a subcommittee of the

same body that appropriated emergency funds also retained the power to dole those funds out.
197. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 1 3 So. 2d 674 (Ala. 1 943), upholding a World War II
vintage War Emergency Council-composed of the governor, four members of the House and four
from the Senate and empowered, while the legislature was out of session, to meet emergencies by

dispersing $750,000 in discretionary funds. The Court had no hesitation in classifying the disputed
Council as "administrative" rather than "legislative." Its entire discussion of the separation of pow
ers of problems posed consisted of less than two obscure paragraphs:

When the members of the Legislature are selected to serve under the proposed act,
they do so as members of a board, not as members of the Legislature, nor as individuals.
They are not ex officio members because they are also chairmen of certain legislative com
mittees.
The legislator, who may be appointed on the board, is performing administrative acts
wholly apart from that which he renders as a legislator. And the Legislature may validly
select from their membership executive and administrative officers without violating Sec
tion 42 or 43 of the Constitution.

Id. at 677-78. The only case cited for authority, Fox v. McDonald, 13 So 4 1 6 (Ala. 1 893), stands
.

only for the proposition that appointment authority is not inherently executive in nature, and that

the legislature may vest authority to appoint a city police commissioner in a Boa rd, which is in turn
appointed by a judge.

Nothing in Fox speaks to the propriety of legislators performing executive

functions.

198. Two Kansas cases from the 1 950s seem typical of this genre

.

I n State ex rel. Fatzer v.

Kansas Turnpike Auth., 273 P.2d 1 98 (Kan. 1 9 54), the court upheld the Turnpike Authority against
constitutional c h all en ge on sepa ration of powers grounds. Id. at 207-08.

The Authority, like con

temporaneous bodies in other states, was empowered to issue bonds and to finance, construct, and

operate various types of state highway projects. Id. Membership on the boa rd consisted of seven
members, two of whom-the chairmen of the state and house committees on roads-were members
of the le gis lat u re sitting ex officio. Id. The other five were representatives of the executive brunch:
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wartime or other "emergency" circumstances that led to the creation of many of
these earlier legislative-administrative organs, and may reftect the court's desire
to avoid standing in the way of a perceived need.
A more serious approach to analysis eventually began with the ground
breaking decision of the Kansas Supreme Court in State ex rel. Schneider v.

Bennett. 1 99 At issue in Bennett was the State Finance Council, a nine-member
body composed of the Governor and the leadership of both houses of the Kansas
legislature. 200 The Council was the successor of prior bodies originally created
to oversee and approve specific expenditures of emergency funds while the legis

lature was not in session. 201 Over time, however, the Council had been statutothe state Director of Highways, and four other individuals to be appointed by the Governor. Id. at

206 - 07. The court began by noting that the Kansas Constitution does not expressly either authorize
or prohibit the e

l gislature from appointing its

own members

ex officio members of boards and

as

commissions, and that the practice had become common. With respect to

separation of powers, the

court refused to find any unauthorized attempt to confer executive authority on legislators:
While the legislature cannot interfere with nor exercise any powers p roperly belonging to
the executive, it may engage in activities which may properly be regarded
and within the scope of its legislative duties, and it is not

an

as

incidental to

encroachment on the executive

for the legislature to create a commission and to designate its members to perform delega
ble legislative duties.

Id. at 207. The court did not, however, discuss why administ ation of a building program is "inci

r

dental to" the legislative function.

In State v. Fadely, 308 P.2d 537 ( 1 9 57), the court held constitutional a statute that created a
state emergency fund and set up a "State Finance Council" to make intersession appropriations from
that fund. Id. at 549-50. The six-member Council was a successor to a prior body administering a

ed in

state war emergency fund, creat

1943, and was composed of the Governor, Lieutenant Gover

nor, Auditor of State, Speaker of the House, and the chairmen of the Senate and House Ways and
Means Committees, all serving ex officio. Id. at 541. Although the Council had broad power to

advise in preparation of the state budget, invest gate hear and determine certain adm nistrati e ap

i

v

i

,

peals, and approve certain administrative rules, the only challenge was to the Council's power to

j ed a separation of powers challenge in a short and

allocate state Emergency funds. The court re ect

obscure passage that merely re ied on Fatzer for the principle that where legislators "performed only

l

administrative duties" this "did not constitute an encroachment on the executive . . . . " Id.
199. 547 P.2d 786 (Kan. 1976).

200. Id . at 794.
20 1 . The Council was specifically empowered, by unanimous vote, to issue short tenn debt
in t r me ts to cover temporary sho

s u

n

rtfalls within a single fiscal year, and to allocate state emergency

funds to and authorize expenditure of those funds by state agencies o r political subdivisions. Id. at
796.
as.

Legis lat ive bodiC:S exercising such functions have a long history. Examples can be found at least
. War, when the Indiana
as t he Civil
state legislature appropriated a special sum of $ 1

far back

m1ll1on t o defray unforeseen emergency expenses and appoi'nted three m
·
· Iators to act as
d'1v1'd ua1 1eg1s
. .
.
an audt t g committee charged to examine and approve accounts to be
fund. See,
from

m

paid
that
e.g. , Branham v. Lange, 16 Ind 497 ( 1 86 1 ) (uphold'mg I eg1s
·
· Iahon
agamst separation of powers chal·
lenge). Subsequent emergencies and wars gave nse to s1m1·1ar solut ·
o s; legislatures appropriating
. .
. .
emergency funds and appointin
g admm1strative bodies, including individu al legislator with powe
s
to approve dispersal those funds· See e.g. , op· ni· on of
the Just ces, 1 3 So. 2d 674 (Ala· 1943) (up.
.
.
.
holding constttuttonahhty of War Eme gency counci·1
�omposed of governor and eight legislators
. h was given aut onty
.
w h1c
to disperse discrefionary fiunds, to
supplement regular appropriations as
needed to meet war emergencies).
In some states, as in Kansas these bodie s ev 1
0 ved . nt �eneral purpose "State Finance Commis
sions" and other similar bodies set up to make
appropnauons for all types of unforseen expenses
·

·

·

i n

·

'

•

i

r

.

.

'

r

·

i

-

i �
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rily invested with a broad range of additional supervisory and administrative
powers as well. 202 The State Attorney General brought an action alleging,
among other things, that separation of powers precluded such a legislatively
dominated body from exercising these administrative powers.
The

Bennett court began its analysis by tracing what it saw as the evolution

from the formalist approach that characterized distribution of powers analysis at
the beginning of the century, to a "practical" approach that recognized that
government powers can no longer be clearly separated into conceptual catego
ries. 203 A s was noted above in the discussion of Parcell, the court in

Bennett

went on to reformulate the essential inquiry as whether a particular mixing of
conceptually different powers constitutes a permissible exercise in "cooperation"
between the branches or an unconstitutional attempt at "usurpation" of the au-

when the legislature is not in session. See, e.g. , State v. Fadely, 308 P.2d 537 (Kan. 1957) ("State
Finance Council" not usurpation of power by legislature over executive).
Not all courts have upheld such arrangements, however. Some have held, on separation of
powers or incompatibility grounds, or both, that legislators cannot directly exercise such "adminis
trative" responsibilities. See, e.g. , State ex rel. Judge v. Legislative Fin. Comm., 543 P.2d 1 3 1 7
(Mont. 1 975) (purely legislative committee with power to review and approve expenditures by state
agencies in excess of appropriations held violative of separation of powers); In re Opinion of the
Justices, 1 9 N.E.2d 807 (Mass. 1939) (proposed legislation establishing fund for "unforeseen condi
tions" during second fiscal year where action cannot be postponed until next session, but permitting
governor to transfer from fund to particular items of appropriation only on consent of special legisla
tively dominated "recess commission," held unconstitutional).
202. Bennett, 547 P.2d at 786. As summarized by the court, these additional administrative
duties included the power to: (1) "[h]ear and determine appeals by any state agency from final
decisions o r final actions of the secretary o f administration or the director of [computer services];"
(2) "approve, modify and approve or reject proposed rules and regulations submitted by the secre
tary of administration;" (3) "fix or approve the compensation to be paid to a large number of officers
and employees of the executive department;" (4) "approve all rules and regulations prepared by the
director of the division of personnel for carrying out the provisions of the Kansas civil service act,"
including t h e assignment of government positions to classes and salary ranges; and (5) supervise the
activities of the division of the budget, the state vocational training program for prison inmates, and
the state director of architectural services. Id. at 794-95.
203. Id. at 79 1 . The court argued that such a practical approach has been made necessary by
the fact that the powers of modern government cannot be completely separated. Id. Rather, "[t]he
most that can be done is to recognize the theoretical classification made and preserve in general
outline the distinction drawn." Id. (quoting State v. Johnson, 60 P. 1068, 1079 (Kan. 1 900) (Doster,
C.J., dissenting)). The court went on:
In our judgment a strict application of the separation of powers doctrine is inappropri
ate today in a complex state government where administrative agencies exercise many
types of power including legislative, executive, and judicial powers often blended together
in the same administrative agency.

The courts today have come to recognize that the

political p hilosophers who developed the theory of separation of powers did not have any
concept o f the complexities of government as it exists today. Under our system of govern
ment the absolute independence of the departments is impracticable. We must maintain in
our system sufficient flexibility to experi ment and to seek new methods of improving gov
ernmental efficiency. At the same time we must not lose sight of the ever-existing danger
of unchecked power and the concentration of power in the hands of

a

group which the separation of powers doctrine was designed to prevent.
Bennett, 547 P.2d at 79 1 .

single person or
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Bennett court proposed a
2
thority belonging to one branch by another. 04 The
of the power being exer
non-exclusive list of four factors-th e essential nature
h, the objective sought
branc
other
cised, the degree of control exercised over the
ich might be used
-wh
in the arrangement, and the likely practical consequences
and the impermis
to help a reviewing court distinguish between the permissible
0
analysis, the
sible combinations of functions and/or personnel.2 5 Applying this
cy funds,
mergen
e
expend
to
l
court concluded that the power given to the Counci
large
part
in
issue short term debt, and transfer money were all permissible,
because the requirement that such actions be taken only by the unanimous vote
of the Council gave the Governor an effective veto over the Council's actions in
206 On the
this area and thus prevented any usurpation of the governor's role.
other hand, the court concluded that the power given to the Council to exercise
"day-to-day" supervision over operations of the Department of Administration
was a usurpation of executive authority. Since these matters are essentially exec
utive in nature, and since action by the Council in these areas required only a
majority vote, the Council had the potential to exert a "coercive" influence on
that portion of the executive realm. 207
While this analysis is subject to the criticism that the four factors are not
clearly derived from basic separation of powers theory and that they may be
difficult to apply in some cases, it does seem to have led to defensible results in
this case. The court's attention seems properly focused on the underlying reality
of what the Council is actually doing, and where the acts relate to appropriating
money, the creation of debt or other matters as to which the legislature has a
legitimate role, the court seems willing to tolerate experimentation. On the
other hand, the day-to-day operations of government are kept firmly in executive
hands. This functional split appears well designed to promote the goals of effi
ciency and accountability, and does not seem likely to lead to any abdication of
the core responsibilities of either branch. And while, as noted above, the court's
four factors may not be the last word in the structured analysis, they do seem
capable of focusing attention on the relevant issues.
This line of analysis articulated in Bennett has also captured the allegiance
_ other states. The analysis has been
of �ourt� m
relied upon to uphold the consti
tut1onahty of the South Carolina State Budget and Control Board, 20s the South
204. In Bennett, the court stated:

Th separation of
doctrine docs not in all cases prevent individual members of the
legislatur e from serving on administrative boards or commissio
ns created by legislative
.
enactments. lnd1v1dua
l members of the legislature may serve 0n adm1ms
· · t rat1ve
·
board s o r
. .
comm1ss1ons wh rc such service falls i n the realm
of cooperation o n t h e part 0f t he Iegis
· I a_
.
turc and there 1s no attempt to usurp fiunctions
of the executive department of the
government.

�

po�crs

�

Id. at 792. Sec supra notes 1 53-64 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the Bennett analysis.
.
205 . Scc supra note 160 and accompanying te
xt tior a d'1scuss1on of four factors proposed by the
Bennett court.
·

·

206. Id. at 798. The court, however, struck
down the speci"fic grant of power to transfer funds

on non·dclcgation grounds. Id. at 799.
207. Id. at 797-98.

2011. State I.';{ rel. Mcleod v. Edwards
236 S E 2d 406 (S.C. 1977). That
Board was comprised
•

·

·
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Carolina Procurement Review Panel,209 and the Wisconsin Building Commis
sion, 2 1 0 all of which included legislators as members and all of which performed
some tasks that would be classified as "executive" in nature. However, the most
interesting counterpoint to the Bennett line of cases was a decision that did not
directly rely on Bennett at all In Legislative Research Commission v. Brown , 2 1 1
the S u preme Court of Kentucky refused to cite or discuss Bennett or any of its
progeny and, indeed, went out of its way to assert that any "liberal" approach to

of Governor, State Treasurer, Comptroller General, Chairman of Senate Finance Committee, and
Chairman of House Ways and Means Committee, all serving ex officio. The Board dealt with the
fiscal affairs of the state through division s of "Finance," "Purchasing and Property," and "Personnel
Administration." Id. at 407. While at least some of the functions of the Board were undoubtedly
executive in nature, the court found no "usurpation" of executive authority by the legislature on the
facts. Id. a t 409. The legislative members comprised only a minority on the Board. On the totality
of the facts, the court found no evidence of any intention to usurp the functions of the executive
department, but rather saw the legislators' participation as a "cooperative" effort to make the exper
tise of the Finance Committee chairmen available to the Board. Id.
209. Tall Tower v. Procurement Review Panel, 363 S.E.2d 683 (S.C. 1987), rev'd on other
grounds sub

nom.

Charleston Television, Inc. v. South Carolina Budget and Control Bd., 392 S.E.2d

67 1 (S.C. 1 9 90). The Panel at issue was composed of: a member of the state Budget and Control
Board, the chairman of the state Procurement Policy Committee, a member of the House Labor,
Commerce and Industry Committee, a member of the Senate Labor, Commerce and Industry Com
mittee, and five other "at large" members appointed by the Governor. Id. at 685. The Panel con
ducts administrative review of protests of decisions regarding the award of state contracts according
to the state Procurement Code. Id .
As in McLeod, the court held that the "overlap" of functions presented in the case did not
exceed permissible bounds because the legislators were a minority on the Panel, and because the
Panel's membership appeared to be a "cooperative effort to make available to the executive depart
ment the special knowledge and expertise of designated legislators in matters related to their func
tion as legislators." Id. at 685-86. The court went beyond McLeod to hold that the analysis would
not change even if the Panel were to elect a legislative member as its chairman. Id. at 685.
2 10. J.F. Ahem Co. v. Wisconsin State Bldg. Comm'n, 336 N.W.2d 679 {Wis. Ct. App. 1983).
The State Building Commission was a "legislative committee" consisting of the Governor, three
Assembly men, three Senators, and a private citizen appointed by the governor. It was empowered
to, among other things, select sites for public buildings, approve construction contracts, oversee
construction, and lease the resulting buildings. The court held that the grant of such executive
powers to a legislatively dominated comm i ttee did not exceed the permissible bounds of separation of
powers. Id . at 697 .
Although the court in Ahern relied upon Bennett and endorsed its "pragmatic" approach, the
analysis it adopted appears distinguishable from that employed in Bennett, at least in emphasis. Id.

at 696. Like Bennett, the Ahern court argued that, although the separation principle was "funda
mental," it is often impractical to try to classify a particular office as belonging to a particular
branch.

But rather than phrasing the question in terms of coercion versus cooperation, the Ahern

court foc used more upon the "checks and balances" between the branches:
The doctrine of separation of powers must be viewed as a general principle to be
applied to maintain the balance between the three branches of government, to preserve
their respective independence and integrity, and prevent concentration of unchecked power

in the hands of any one branch.
Id. at 695 (quoting State v. Washington, 266 N. W.2d 597, 605-06 (Wis. 1 978)). Thus. the court
concluded, Wisconsin law permits sharing of power among the branches, subject to t he hmll that no
body be allowed to wield "unchecked power." Id. at 696.
2 1 1 . 664 S . W . 2d 907 (Ky. 1 984). This case is extensively and approvingl y discussed in Snyder

& Ireland, supra note 74, at 103.
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the interpretation of separation of powers was precluded by the text and drafting
history of the Kentucky Constitution.212 Nonetheless, both the reasoning and
the result in that case are compatible with Bennett.
Legislative Research Committees ("LRCs") of the sort at issue in Brown
began as a reaction to the shortness of state legislative sessions.21 3 Like the
"Finance Council" at issue in Bennett, such LRCs have a long pedigree.

Typi

cally, such committees began as groups of legislators who operated between ses
sions, performing essentially factfinding roles. They were used in several states,
and-when confined to such limited roles-generally upheld against constitu
tional challenge.214 However, in 1982, the Kentucky legislature made sweeping
changes in the status and functions of its LRC. The committee was designated
an "independent agency of state government" and given, in addition to its tradi
tional information gathering functions, broad legislative21 5 and administrative
functions. The court in Brown readily concluded that, despite its alleged inde
pendence, the LRC was a "legislative" agency.216 The question was whether

212. Brown, 664 S.W.2d at 91 2- 1 3 (noting that §§ 27 and 28 of Kentucky constitution specifi
cally require that powers be separated, and that no person belonging one department may exercise
power belonging to others, and pointing out that main purpose for which Kentucky constitutional
convention was called was to curb power of state legislature). In rejecting any softening of the
demands of separation of powers, the Kentucky Supreme Court also drew support from the similar
positions taken by what it saw as the majority of other states, and by the Federal Supreme Court.
Id. at 914 (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 ( 1983)).
213. Snyder & Ireland, supra note 74, at 103. Snyder and Ireland state in their article:
The [Kentucky] Constitution of 1 89 1 resulted in an imbalance of political power be
tween the Governor and the legislature. Handicapped by its brief session and lack of legal
existence after its biennial adjournment, the legislature was unable to gather sufficient in 
formation to evaluate legislative proposals submitted by the Governor. This lack of infor
mation gave the Governor a special advantage in affecting the biennial budget. and thereby
all of state government.
A consensus that an entity should be created to provide the legislature with the requi
site research during the interim between it sessions to enable its members to better dis
charge their legislative function. Consequently, the Legislative Research Commission
(L.R.C.) was born . . . .
Id. at 174.
214. See, e.g. , State v. Aronson, 3 14 P.2d 849, 856 (Mont. 1 957) (holding statute creating legis
lative council did not violate separation of powers clause); State ex rel. Jones v. Atterbury, 300
S.W.2d 806, 8 1 2-13 (Mo. 1957) (holding Constitution of Missouri permitted and provided for in
terim legislative research committee); State ex rel. Robinson v. Fluent, 1 9 1 P.2d 241 , 245 (Wash.)
(h�lding "lnteri� Commi.tt�" au�horized to conduct factfinding investigations, but requiring Com
mittee be established by JOmt action of both Houses), cert. denied sub nom. Washington Pension
Union v. Was�ingt?n, 335 U.�. 8� (1948); �tate ex rel. Hamblen v. Yelle, 1 85 P.2d 723, 727 (Wash.
1947) (uphold1� g . State Lcgislahve Council," performing factfinding functions, against allegation
.
that membership. �n Council was "c�vil office" that legislators forbidden to hold).
215. In add1t1on to the executive or administrative powers discussed in the
text, the 1982
amendments also �urported to authorize the LRC to exercise, while the legislature was not in ses
.
all of the legislative powers of that absent legislature, with the sole exception
sion,
of the power to
enact laws. Brown ' . 664 S.W.2d at 912. �e court in Brown held that such a broad
delegation of
.
power to a sub �umt of the legislature ��l ted state constitutional provisions
vesting legislative
�
.
power m the legislature as a whole and hm1tmg the legislat '
ure s term. KY. CONST. § 29 (amended
1982); Brown , 664 S.W.2d at 914-16.
2 1 6. Brown , 664 S.W.2d at 9 l l , 916-17 . The court held that such
c1aims of m
' dependence com·
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such an arm of the legislature could exercise any of the range of administrative
functions that the legislature had given it.
In holding that many of the new functions assigned to the LRC were un
constitutional, however, the court in

Brown

did not rely upon any formalist

analysis. Rather it inquired, as t o each challenged innovation, how that practice
would affect the functioning of government. With respect to the LRC's asserted
power t o review and suspend administrative regulations-a suspension that
would last until the next session of the legislature, a period that could be as long
as twenty-one months-the court reasonably concluded that the power to adopt
such regulations went to the heart of the Governor's duty to carry out the law,
and that giving a body over which the Governor had no influence the power to
suspend such regulations for such a long period of time encroached too deeply
on that duty.217 On the other hand, the authority given to another legislative
committee to require the executive branch to report on the state's financial con
dition, t o prepare contingency plans in the event of revenue shortfall, and to
require that the plan be submitted for committee review, was held not to violate
the state constitution. Since the reviewing committee did not have the power to
veto the other branches' contingency plans, the court saw the exercise as "coop
eration" between branches rather than any "usurpation" by the committee of
the judicial or executive branches' autonomy.2 1 8 And, with respect to the power
given to the LRC to review applications by the executive branch for federal
block grants, the court proposed what was in effect a compromise. The court
acknowledged that the legislature had a legitimate interest in monitoring the
uses to which these sources of non-general fund revenues would be put, and that
the very limited duration and frequency of legislative sessions posed a practical
impediment to such oversight.

The court, therefore, proposed that the LRC

could perform these oversight functions on behalf of the legislature; all that
would be required was for the legislature to establish "adequate standards" to
guide the LRC in this endeavor.2 19 In effect, the court converted the issue into a
non-delegation doctrine problem. In doing so, the Brown court seemed to imply
that legislators can undertake at least some quasi-administrative duties-at least
where necessary to support a core legislative interest, and where those legislators
are bound by the same safeguards and limits on their discretion as other admin
istrators exercising delegated authority.
Thus, there appears to be at least a degree of sub silentio convergence of
method, exemplified by a Kansas court that saw itself as rejecting the "strict"
conceptual analyses220 and a Kentucky court that saw itself as rejecting the "lib-

ported neither with the court's analysis of the committee's functions nor with the mandatory three·
part organization of the state government. Id. at
put, no fourth branch of government." Id.

9 1 7.

The court explained that "(t]here is, simply

2 1 7. Id. at 9 1 8- 1 9. The court also noted that, even if the power to review administrative rcgu·
lation s could be considered "legislative" in nature, such power could only be exercised by the legis·
lature as a whole, not by a small committee. Id. at 9 1 9.
2 1 8 . Id. at 926-27.
2 1 9. Id . at 929.
220. State ex rel. Schneider

v. Bennett,

547

P.2d

786, 791

(Kan.

1 9 76).
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eral" analytical altematives. 22 1 Though starting with very different philosophi
cal commitments, or at least very different rhetorical foundations, both courts
ended by adopting very similar pragmatic approaches to the actual task of dis
tinguishing between permissible and impermissible combinations of functions
and/or personnel. Together, they may well indicate both the power of that
pragmatic approach to analysis of state distribution of powers issues and the
probable line of future development.
C. Toward an Independent State-Level Allocation of Powers A nalysis: On the
Virtues of Experimentation and Pragmatism

Any inquiry into the distribution of powers among governors, state legisla
tures, state courts, and state administrative agencies must acknowledge the great
breadth of the field. This article has examined only a small part of that field and,
for that reason, its conclusions must be few, brief, and tentative. Nonetheless, a
few observations do seem justified.
First, analogies to and reliance on federal precedents are of only limited
utility. For a number of reasons set out above-the lack of persuasive force in
current federal analyses, differences in history and structure between the federal
and state constitutions, the lesser ability of state legislatures to oversee adminis
trative agencies, and the existence of pervasive federal protection against oppres
sion by state authorities-state courts should not rely too heavily on federal
distribution of powers precedents. Moreover, despite the more express terms in
which most state constitutions address their commitment to separation of pow
ers, many of the arguments that most strongly support more rigid and concep
tual approaches to interpretation on the federal level-the founders' intent to
create a strong and unified executive, or the need to create prophylactic rules to
prevent the possibility of future tyranny-apply far less strongly, if at all, in
interpreting state constitutions. On the contrary, because of the existence of
federal law as an ultimate protection against oppression of individuals by state
authorities, state courts have the opportunity to interpret and apply state distri
bution of powers principles with less concern for theoretical purity or any need
to avoid precedents that could be misused in the future. They, more than federal
cour:is ha�e th� o�port�nity to i�terpret the distribution of powers principles
explicit or imphc1. t m their respective state constitutions in accord with the other
goals of separation of powers; goals such as efficiency, accountability, and avoid
ance of abdication. 222
Second, sta�e courts �an and should rely on relevant precedent from other
states as persuasive authonty . The same structural features that served to differ
entiate �eder�I dis� ribution of powers analysis from its state analogues-the dif
fer�. ng htstoncal circumstances in which the federal and state constitutions were
written, structural features such as the legislature's original rather than dele
gated powers and the prevalence of plural state executives, practical problems
.•

22 1 . Brown, 664 S.W.2d at 907.

·
2 2 2 . �e supra notes 72-108 and acco
1 �panymg text for more detailed discuss on
of the di ffe ri
. between the ''
cnc cs
'
ederal and state ana ys1s.
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caused by intermittent legislative sessions and relative lack of legislative staff,
and the lesser importance of anti-tyranny concerns-all serve to demonstrate the
profound underlying similarities among all states, no matter what the specific
phrasin g of their respective constitutions.
Nor are these basic similarities significantly overcome by the differences in
the respective texts of various state constitutions. To take the most obvious dif
ference, while most states have express separation of powers clauses in their state
constitution, a minority do not. 223 Such a divergence, however, is more appar
ent than real. The separation principle is no less important or enforceable for
being implicit rather than explicit; indeed, as many federal cases show, the ab
sence of a n express provision can be compatible with a very rigid view of separa
tion of powers. Nor, despite o ccasional statements to the contrary, have such
textual divergences proven to be outcome determinative in the cases. Kansas
and South Carolina, two of the states without express separation of powers
clauses, have taken a "pragmatic" approach to these issues,224 but so have Ari
zona, Louisiana, and Wisconsin , three states with constitutions in which the
principle is expressly stated. 22 5 Similarly, while Indiana, Mississippi, and North
Carolina, all states with express constitutional separation of powers language,

have taken a fairly rigid and conceptual approach to these issues, 22 6 so too has
Pennsylvania, a state whose constitution lacks such a provision.227 This is not
to say that text is unimportant. Certain state constitutional provisions-for ex
ample, provisions clearly allocating appointment authority, 22 8 or broadly forbid
ding dual officeholding229-may mandate particular results with regard to
specific issues. However, these are different and somewhat specialized questions.
On the most basic and general issues of state distribution of powers analysis, the
important structural similarities among states far outweigh their differences, in
cluding divergent texts.
Third, some sort of "pragmatic" analysis, such as that adopted by the Ben

nett line of cases and echoed in part in Brown , appears to be the most promising
approach to the resolution of state distribution of powers issues for several rea223. See supra notes 109- 1 4 and accompanying text for a discussion of state constitutional
texts.
224. See , e. g. , Parcell v. State, 620 P.2d 834 (Kan. 1 980); State ex rel Schneider v. Bennett, 54 7
P.2d 786 (Kan. 1 976); Tall Tower v. Procurement Review Panel, 363 S.E.2d 683 (S.C. 1987); State
ex rel. McLeod v. Edwards, 236 S.E.2d 406 (S.C. 1977).
225. See, e. g. , Lockwood v. Jordan, 2 3 1 P.2d 428 (Ariz. 195 1 ); State Bd. of Ethics v. Green,
566 So. 2d 623 (La. 1 990); Guste v. Legislative Budget Comm., 347 So. 2d 160 (La. 1 977); J . F.
Ahern Co. v. Wisconsin State Bldg. Comm'n, 336 N.W.2d 679 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983).
226. See , e. g. , Book v. State Office Bldg. Comm'n, 149 N .E.2d 273 (Ind. 1958); Alexander v .
State, 441 So. 2d 1 329 (Miss. 1983); State ex rel Wallace v. Bone, 286 S . E.2d 79 (N.C. 1 982).
227. See , e. g. , Commonwealth v. Sessoms, 532 A.2d 775, 780 (Pa. 1 987) (deriving strong sepa
ration of powers principle from vesting of governmental powers in different organs of state govern
ment and, specifically, noting "the inclusion of legislators and/or judges on an agency admm1stenng
the laws is itself likely violative of the separation of powers doctrine.. ). The opinion in Sessom
closely followed the formalist analysis of the United States Supreme Court in Bowsher v. Synar. 478
U. S. 7 1 4 ( 1 986).
228. See supra notes 1 1 5- 1 6, 1 1 8, and accompanying text.
229. See sup ra notes 1 2 1 -22 and accompanying text.
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sons. Such an analysis is compatible with both the text o f most state constitu
tions and the basic intentions of the architects of the American system of
distribution of powers. It seems better able than its more conceptually-based
competitors to preserve the dynamic balance between governors and legislatures

in light of the great growth in size and power of state-level administrative agen
cies. And, most importantly, it permits courts to make distinctions between po
tentially useful and potentially dangerous governmental innovations.
Such an approach would be contrary neither to the ideas of the original
founders of the American polity, nor to the plain terms of express state constitu
tional texts.

The framers of the original American constitutions clearly were

pragmatists rather than conceptual purists. That fact . is shown both by the
range of constitutional structures they created and their willingness to change
those structures if they did not work, and by their willingness to mix concep
tually ditferent types of power if by doing so they could achieve. practical bene
fits, such as the increase in individual security to be derived from the opposition
of power against power. 230 Nor would such a pragmatic approach be precluded
by the terms of even the most absolute sounding state constitutional provision.
While such clauses prohibit mixing of "legislative" and "executive" powers,
these terms do not define themselves. As was discussed above, the power to
appoint need not be considered an "executive" act. 2 3 1 And the influence exer
cised by legislators personally sitting as members of specialized boards or com
missions need not be considered to rise to the level of legislative exercise of
executive powers, at least in the absence of an overwhelming or coercive legisla
tive influence on that body.
Nor is a rigid definitional approach to separation of powers questions the
only way to avoid the evils against which the doctrine was intended.

Other

provisions, such as an explicit allocation of the authority to make particular
administrative appointments or a carefully articulated incompatibility clause,
may well prevent real abuses without the need for analysis under more general

� �

a loc tio� of powers principles. Indeed, some sort of pragmatic approach to the
dtstnbutton of powers may be required to vindicate the framers' desire to main
tain a rough balance of influence between governors and legislators. Because
much of the work administrators perform has often been considered most nearly
analogous to traditional "executive" functions, the traditional solution, on both
the federal and the state levels, has been to assign primary responsibility over the
230. Various conclusions may perhaps be drawn c.
·
·
irom the spec1'fi c ways m which
·
constltul!ons
.
·
have changed over tlme-;uch as the gradua1 abandonment of most early constitutional
· ·
prov1s1ons
.
·

·

. .
. .
.
.
v stmg exphc1t appointive authonty m state legislatures. See Gerhard
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·
an d Practices,
·
30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2 1 1 ' 2 1 6 - 1 8 ( 1 989).
.
However, the overndmg fact 1s that they dI' d change and that
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.
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rather were willing to mix powers in
.
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administrative machinery to the executive branch and to phrase constitutional
questions in terms of whether a particular effort by the legislature to exercise
influence or control constitutes an impermissible interference with that primary
executive authority. However, total control over administration cannot be as
signed to governors or presidents without severely unbalancing the balance of

power among the branches which the framers of our constitutions tried so hard
to preserve.

Moreover, a fact-based analysis of the Bennett type permits the court to
make useful distinctions among various specific proposals for conferring admin
istrative duties on legislators o r legislative appointees. Some forms of executive
le gisl a ti ve interaction in the administration of the laws clearly are "cooperative"

and beneficial in nature. To return to the example that began this discussion, the
presen ce of legislative appointees on the Louisiana Board of Ethics for Elected
Officials seems to be more than merely innocuous. Rather, the presence of legis
lative as well as executive appointees serves both to insure the Board's impartial
ity an d

independence, and t o strengthen the public's perception of that

i mp a rti a lity and independence--both of which are necessary for the Board to do

its job. And, as the court in Bennett pointed out, there will be occasions when
le gisl a t ures will have relevant expertise that might be usefully lent to joint ad

ministrative-executive endeavors.232 This is not to say, however, that all ar
rangements giving administrative power to legislators or legislative appointees
should be found acceptable.

On the contrary, giving administrative tasks and

duties t o legislators or legislative appointees poses significant dangers. There is a
quasi-delegation concern-the possibility of maintaining ongoing leg islati ve in
put i n to the administration of a statute may reduce the incentive for the legisla
ture t o d raft statutes carefully, or may encourage them to pass the "hard

questions" on to a separate and less publicly accountable "expert" body that the
l eg isla t ure can both control and, i f expedient, disclaim. 233 Alternatively, to the
e x t ent that individual legislators take it upon themselves to direct some portion
of t he day-to-day affairs of administrative bodies, some decrease in efficiency and

accountability may well occur.234 Such a combination of roles could result in
the smal l-scale "tyranny" of effectively unfettered discretion on the part of the
agency at issue. 235 In a few cases, such efforts to impose legislative control on
the ad ministrative process may even be so far reaching as to truly threaten the

2 .1 2 . State ex rel. Schneid er v. Bennett, 547 P.2d 786, 792- 93 ( K a n . 1 9 76).
2 J .1 . See quote cit ed Jupra note 9 5 .
2.\4. T h e potential prohle ms seem evident. A n y requirement t hat a n agen cy !ICCk approval nr
actions from multiple masters will potentially slow its activit ies and. where t hose m"ten di"ll ·
�fl'l", require n egot i a t ions and co mpro m i ses that could limit the speed and elfectiveness of its work.
Morcovcr, if neither of the politically a cc ountah k branches holds ulti mate authority over sut'h an
adm ini�t rn t i vc organ. each can hlame t he other for any shortcomint1• i n t h e admimstratwn of the
ih

Jaw,

A mi where each branch accuses the ot her or interference, the p o�•ihi l i ty t hat the c lC1: toratc <"•n

rffn: t i vcly nssert its ultimate authority becomes even more remote.

2 .1 � - If t h e same persons exercise effective control of both the dmft i n11 and the apphrat1on of
rule,, t hen· can bc little effc.;tive opposition to a rb i t ra ry use of those p o w er • R u les <· an l'IC' broadly
dr.1flcd 111 the a"urnnce that they will only he used •ll•1mt those whom the drafler ,.-1'he• t hem u ....1
a;:.1 1 r 1 ' t . and will nnl readily be c hnn t1ed even if m isu� .
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and thus the system of checks and
independence and initiative of the governor,
tutions clearly envisioned . 2 3 6
consti
ican
balances that the framers of all Amer
most important, many such attempts
Finally, and though less obvious probably
strative process represent an in
to assert legislative influence over the admini
as a whole, but for individual
crease in effective power not for the legislature
bodies and, especially, those
legislators-those who win posts on administrative
to appoint outsiders or col
in the legislative leadership who have the power
e power over state-wide
leagues to those committees. Such an increase in effectiv
is accountable to the
whom
of
each
als,
issues in the hands of a few individu
problems of lack of
obvious
raises
electorate of only a small portion of the state,
electoral accountability. 237

In any event, it is only by explicitly weighing each effort by the legislature
to place administrative powers in the hands of its members or appointees against
this range of concerns, that these issues may be directly addressed. Some form
of Bennett-type analysis holds out at least the hope that the court will be able to

distinguish between the useful and the pathological. The process of judging is
not certain and it may therefore be appropriate for courts to err on the side of
caution, perhaps by placing the burden of persuasion on the party seeking to
justify a departure from strict conceptual distinctions among the different magis
tracies. But however done, a pragmatic, fact-based approach cannot help but be
better at distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate innovations than any purely
definitional or conceptual analysis would be.
Finally, it appears from this brief analysis of cases that the work of formu
lating a pragmatic, state-based approach to these issues is far from accom
plished. The various factors articulated by the courts-the "control" test of the

Green, the four-factor test employed by the Kansas courts in
Bennett/Parcel/ line of cases, or the fact-based attempt by the Kentucky

Louisiana court in
the

court to distinguish between "cooperation" and "usurpation"-are all useful
building blocks for analysis. However, more thought must be given to the task
of refining the factors that should go into such an analysis, demonstrating how
those f�ctors can be convincingly derived from the underlying purposes of the
separation and checks and balances principle (both the purposes as they ap

�

to the founders and as they appear to us), and creating a structure for
pear
applymg these factors that is reasonably predictable in its outcomes.

236. This may well have been the case in Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d

907 (Ky. 1984). The powers that the legi'slat'tve Comm1ss1on
purported to arrogate to itself m that
.
.
case were truly sweepmg-mcluding not onI Y the power to make appomtments to many admm1stra·
·

·

·

·

·

·

·

.
.
live agencies, but also the power to con firm executive appointments, to
review and suspend admm1s.
.
trauve regulations, and to control applications for federal "Block
Grant" funds among others.
Togethe r, these may �ell have limited the powers of the
Governor to the point here she might
cease to play an efl'echve role as a counterweight to th 1 ·
e
egts
1ature.
.
.
237. Penods dunng which powerfu1 Congress1onal
leaders exercised disproportionate influence
over the 1c
� dera 1 government have not been
happy ones. See, e.g. ' WOODROW WILSON, CONGRES·
SIONAL GOVERNMENT· A sTUDY IN AMERICAN
POLITICS (World Publishing Co. 1965) ( 1 885)
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